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China is currently undergoing a wave of corporate takeovers and accordingly, hostile 
takeovers are projected to rise. The term “corporate takeover” is a reference to the 
“means of one company acquiring control over another,” whilst hostile takeovers are 
those opposed by the incumbent management of target firms. In hostile takeovers, 
workers are especially vulnerable to adverse treatments by the new managerial team. 
The thesis uses three theories to examine this vulnerability. First, the new management 
tends to seek to improve the efficiency of the acquired firm, sometimes at the expense 
of the workers’ interests. Second, hostile takeovers constitute the breach of implicit 
contracts between the employer and employees of the target firm. The implicit contract 
is maintained based on the workers’ trust in the incumbent management. This breach 
of trust leads to the shareholders’ expropriation of the employees’ wealth. Third, it is 
generally agreed that Chinese firms adopt the corporate governance model of 
shareholder primacy, which inappropriately prioritises shareholder interests over other 
stakeholders, including the employees. Therefore, workers are in urgent need of a 
mechanism that can safeguard their interests. 
 
On the other hand, the thesis uses approaches of theoretical analysis and qualitative 
studies to argue that better employee protection positively relates to firm value. This 
can be examined using the development of corporate governance models that are 
distinguished from shareholder primacy. For instance, according to enlightened 
shareholder value, to protect workers’ interests positively relates to the long-term value 
of the firm and shareholders. Moreover, the stakeholder theory highlights their 
importance in corporate governance, which arises from business ethics and its 
functions in value creation. In this case, workers’ interests deserve to be considered in 
hostile takeovers. From the economic perspective, an enhanced labour protection and 
involvement mechanism in takeovers is expected to usher in benefits from three 
perspectives. First, an enhanced employee protection and involvement mechanism is 
expected to improve employees’ productivity, which positively relates to firm value. 
Second, in the face of uncertainties and risks of a breach of implicit contracts, 
employees tend to be reluctant to invest in firms, adversely affecting firm value. An 
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enhanced employee protection mechanism and deeper employee participation in 
takeovers may effectively impede this problem. Third, in hostile takeovers, the 
employees’ involvement in the takeover decision can reduce the leeway for managerial 
opportunism, which reduces the shareholder-manager agency costs. Additionally, it 
helps establish high trust workplace relationships, which reduce the employer-
employee agency costs. 
 
Since employees are vulnerable to adverse treatments in takeovers and improving 
worker’s protection and participation is positively related to firm value, it is necessary 
to establish an effective mechanism in Chinese firms, especially considering that 
institutions such as trade unions and the Workers’ Congress were embedded in the old 
planned economy and cannot be adjusted into modern corporate governance. This 
thesis attempts to draw lessons from the German co-determination mechanism to 
resolve the Chinese problems by adopting the approach of “legal transplants.” 
 
The grounds for the introduction of the German co-determination mechanism can be 
examined from the perspective of Chinese economic development. Under the varieties 
of contexts of capitalism which focus on the firms’ coordination with other economic 
factors, Chinese firms are highly similar to their German counterparts, in terms of ways 
of coordination among firms and other institutions. However, they demonstrate a 
distinguished landscape in terms of worker’s treatment. The Chinese employer-
employee relationship leads to institutional incoherence, which hinders their economic 
transition to a more innovative one. The most direct and effective way to solve this 
issue is to alter the Chinese firm-worker relationship to that of the German style. This 
introduction of the German model is more likely to adhere to the Chinese economy. In 
addition, this compatibility with demands for economic development align with the 
interests of the party-state that have the dominant control over industrial relations in 
China. Therefore, this German system is more likely to be adopted. 
 
It should be noted that German workers’ co-determination rights exist at the board as 
well as the establishment levels. Inspired by this system, the thesis attempts to improve 
the Chinese mechanism at both levels. The thesis adopts a comparative study to 
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examine the difference of corporate structures and ideologies underlying corporate 
laws between these two countries. Thereafter, the thesis provides suggestions for 




Lay Summary  
 
It is quite common in the securities market that a company (the acquiring company) 
acquire the control over the other (the target company). This is referred to as corporate 
takeovers. However, the management in the target company may resist some of the 
takeover offer, and these types of takeovers are called hostile takeovers.  
 
After the completion of a hostile takeover, the uncooperative management are 
normally replaced, and the acquirer normally select new management. In order to 
improve the efficiency of the company after takeovers, the new management normally 
take a series of measures to cut the costs, which include massive lay-offs or reduction 
in wages. Due to the imbalance of powers between the management and employees, 
employees are vulnerable to adverse treatments, and therefore they need a mechanism 
to protect their interests. On the other hand, the mechanism that aims to safeguard 
workers’ interests can positively affect the interests of the firm. This is because 
stronger protection of workers is expected to encourage workers work more 
productively, with less fear of possible adverse treatments in the near future. Therefore, 
a stronger employee protection mechanism is in urgent need by both employees and 
employers. 
 
However, the mechanisms provided by Chinese laws does is ineffective, which can be 
evidenced by an increase in labour strikes arising from takeovers. The main reasons 
for the ineffectiveness are two-fold. First, the employee protection mechanism is under 
the control of the party-state, and therefore the extent to which workers can be 
protected depends the policy chosen by the party-state. The second is that these 
mechanisms were created in the old planned economy, which was coherent with 
organisational structure of the corporation at that time. However, when the modern 
corporate structure was introduced, these mechanisms became obsolete and 
incompatible with the modern corporate structure. Therefore, workers in Chinese 
companies need better mechanisms to safeguard their interests. 
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The thesis attempts to resolve the Chinese problems by borrowing the worker 
participation scheme for German laws. The reason to choose the German scheme as 
the model is its renowned strong employee protection. In addition, the thesis finds that 
the Chinese ways of treatment on workers negatively affect the national economy and 
the country’s innovative capability. By introducing the German mechanism, these 
negative effects can also be alleviated. This means that the German ways of treatments 
on workers are coherent with the Chinese economic system.  
 
The German system safeguard workers interests by providing two channels for 
workers to express their voices. The first is through workers’ representatives on the 
board whilst the second is through the works council internal the firm. These 
mechanisms cannot be adopted by Chinese companies directly, because of the 
difference of organisational structures between Chinese and German firms. In addition, 
it should be noted that the law is embedded in the cultural, economic, political, and 
social background of its origins. Hence, there is a risk that the German mechanism 
cannot be well fit into the Chinese context. Therefore, certain modifications of the 
German scheme should be made to make it adapted into Chinese contexts. 
 
To sum up, both employer and its employees are in need of a strong labour protection 
mechanism, but the protection of employees’ interests is weak. In order to resolve 
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1. Research Background 
Hostile Takeovers: The Market for Corporate Control 
 
China is currently experiencing a wave of corporate takeovers; hostile takeovers, being 
part of it, are thus projected to rise. The term “corporate takeover” refers to “one 
company acquiring control over another”,1 while hostile takeovers are those that are 
opposed by the incumbent management of the target firms.  
 
The first successful hostile takeover was initiated in the UK in 1953, when Charles 
Clore found that the retailing premises of J. Sears Holding were substantially 
undervalued.2 At the time, the investors’ valuation of a company was largely based on 
dividends yields, and therefore, the share price of J. Sears was substantially lower than 
its market value.3 Accordingly, Charles Clore paid a significant premium directly to 
shareholders of the target firm, a move unwelcome by its management. Despite the 
management promising to increase the share price to the market value, a majority of 
shares were sold to the bidder.  
 
Since then, with the development of the stock market, hostile takeovers are deemed as 
a mechanism to discipline underperforming directors and executives, which is also 
referred to as “the market for corporate control.”4 In large firms, the control over 
corporate management and policy-making is delegated to the management,5 and the 
objective of the latter is to maximise shareholders’ interests. Any managerial 
behaviour that deviates from this objective, especially to pursue their own interests, 
 
1  J. Mukwiri, Takeover and the European Legal Framework (Routledge-Cavendish, 2012) 1. The number of 
domestic mergers and acquisitions rose from 3,176 to 4,999 from 2012 to 2015. See J. Liu, “Analysis of 
Development Trend of Mergers and Acquisition Market in China 2017” (2017 年中国企业并购市场发展趋势分
析) China Venture Research (投 中 研 究 院) ), available at 
https://www.chinaventure.com.cn/cmsmodel/report/detail/1267.html.  
2 J. Franks, C. Mayer, and S. Rossi, “Spending Less Time with the Family: The Decline of Family Ownership in the 
United Kingdom” in R.K. Morck (ed), A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups 
to Professional Managers (University of Chicago Press- 2005) 581. 
3 G. Bull and A. Vice, Bid for Power (Elek Books-1958) 30. 
4 H.G. Manne, “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control” (1965) 73 Journal of Political Economy 110. 
5 P. McGinty, “Replacing Hostile Takeovers” (1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 983. 
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tend to lower the firm efficiency, which is normally accompanied with reductions in 
share prices. In theory, shareholders have voting rights to replace the management if 
they deem the latter to be underperforming. However, in practice, this can hardly be 
achieved for reasons such as shareholders’ collective action problems,6 especially in 
large corporations. To make informed voting is costly and shareholders have diverse 
interests in the company; therefore, the threshold of majority voting can hardly be 
achieved to replace the management.7 Accordingly, it is more convenient and realistic 
for shareholders of the target firm to “vote with the feet” by selling their shares to 
acquirers to gain premiums. Under such circumstances, the incumbent management 
tend to resist the takeover bid to retain their jobs, as a successful takeover normally 
leads to the replacement of the board and managers.  
 
Employee Vulnerability to Adverse Treatments in the Context of 
Takeovers 
 
A bidder attempts to recover the premiums they have paid in the hostile takeover 
through post-takeover operational changes, and one of the most common and effective 
ways is to cut labour costs.8 Accordingly, employees generally experience layoffs, 
wage reductions, early retirement, or reduction in welfare benefits. Considering the 
imbalance of power between the employer and employees, the latter is put in a 
vulnerable position of adverse treatments by the new employer. 
 
This is especially true for China. Since its establishment at the beginning of 1990s, the 
Chinese securities market has witnessed rapid growth, further evidenced by a 
proliferation of hostile takeovers in recent years. One of the most high-profile cases in 
recent years is Baoneng’s attempt to obtain control of Vanke,9 the largest property 
development company in China. The bid was unwelcome due to its private ownership 
 
6 P. Gourevitch, “Collective Action Problems in Monitoring Managers: The Enron Case as a Systemic Problem” 
(2002) 3 Economic Sociology: European Electronic Newsletter 3. 
7 W.T. Allen, R. Kraakman, and G. Subramania, Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business Organization 
(Wolters Kluwer Law & Business-2012) 188. 
8 S. Bhagat, A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny, “Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return to Corporate Specialization” 
(1990) Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 1,  
available at https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/hostile_takeovers_80s.pdf. 
9 E.M. Kruszewska, “Target Board’s Possible Response to a Hostile Takeover Attempt in China: A Case Study of 
Vanke vs Baoneng” (2018) 7 The Academy of Business and Retail Management 257. 
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and business backgrounds by the management of Vanke, and accordingly they took 
measures such as the “White Knight”10 to frustrate the takeover bid.11 This hostile 
takeover battle lasted for months and ended up in failure due to the intervention of the 
party-state. This high-profile hostile takeover battle is only one case in the wave of 
corporate takeovers in China. Within this context, the conflict between the employer 
and employees is becoming increasingly intense, which can be noted in the significant 
amount of news concerning labour conflicts;12 there were about 138 unlawful labour 
unrests between 2015 and 2019.13 In this context, Chinese workers are in urgent need 
of a mechanism to safeguard their rights in the context of takeovers.  
 
2. Research Questions and Methodologies 
 
This thesis attempts to address workers’ vulnerability to adverse treatments by 
augmenting their involvement in the context of hostile takeovers. To achieve this 
objective, three research questions should be answered step by step in this thesis. 
 
1) Why should employees’ claims be valued in the context of hostile takeovers? 
 
This question is answered from three perspectives through theoretical analysis.  
 
First, employees are susceptible to adverse treatments in case of takeovers. To 
begin with, the new employer tends to seek improvement in the efficiency of the 
acquired firm, sometimes at the expense of workers’ interests. In addition, the 
hostile takeover constitutes a breach of implicit contracts between the employer 
and employees of the target firm, which are sustained by workers’ trust in the 
 
10 The “White Knight” refers to the takeover defence measure that to seek for a competing friendly acquirer to 
take the control over the target firm. 
11  Financial Times, “Vanke Tussle Points to China’s First Hostile Takeover Battle” (2015) available at  
https://www.ft.com/content/f7537254-ad27-11e5-b955-1a1d298b6250. 
12 One of the most renowned cases of labour conflicts in takeovers is Chinese listed company, O-film, acquiring 
one of Sony’s subsidiaries in China. Due to the unfair O-film’s treatment of employees, workers went on strikes for 
two weeks. See: Sina Finance, “The Sale of Subsidiaries in Guangzhou Lead to Labour Unrest and Labour’s 
Demands for Compensations” (索 尼 出 售 其 广 州 工 厂 遭 员 工 罢 工 求 偿) (2016), available at  
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/2016-11-23/doc-ifxyawmm3164167.shtml. 
13 China Labor Bulletin, “Strike Map” (2019), available at https://maps.clb.org.hk/strikes/en. 
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management. This breach of workers’ trust leads to the expropriation of employees’ 
wealth by shareholders. The third theory arises from the corporate governance 
model. It is generally agreed that Chinese firms adopt the corporate governance 
model of shareholder primacy, which prioritises shareholders’ interests over those 
of other stakeholders. In the context of takeovers, this model leads to an inordinate 
bias towards shareholders’ interests even at the cost of other stakeholders, 
including employees. 
 
Second, taking employee claims into consideration is expected to positively affect 
a firm’s value. The qualitative methodology is used here to argue that employees’ 
deeper involvement in takeover decision making positively affects their 
productivity and thereby the firm value. In addition, in front of a potential change 
of ownership, which is characterised by uncertainty and unpredictability, 
employees tend to withhold their firm-specific investments. A deeper involvement 
of employees in the process can effectively address this problem. Moreover, 
adequate employee involvement can play a supervisory role and help curtail 
management behaviours that are expected to reduce or destroy the maximisation 
of firm value.  
 
Third, with the development of corporate governance ideologies, challenges to the 
traditional model of shareholder primacy emerge. Models such as team production 
theory, enlightened shareholder value, and stakeholder theory are stakeholder-
oriented compared to shareholder primacy. All these theories recognise the 
correlation between the stakeholders’ (including employees) interests and a firm’s 
long-term value. These theories provide a theoretical foundation for employee 
claims to be reasonably considered in the context of hostile takeovers.  
 
2) What are the reasons for labour protection problems in the context of hostile 
takeovers in China? Why are employees so poorly protected when legislation 




This thesis uses doctrinal and theoretical methodologies to address this question. 
Two channels have been provided by Chinese law to let workers participate in any 
takeover process. The first is through employee representatives on the board of 
directors, and the second is through mechanisms at the establishment level, namely 
the trade union and the Workers’ Congress. However, this thesis finds these 
mechanisms to be ineffective. By examining the history of these mechanisms, this 
thesis finds that these institutions were embedded in the old planned economy, 
which is incompatible with the modern corporate governance structure. 
 
3) How can the issues of the labour protection be addressed in the context of hostile 
takeovers in China? 
 
This thesis attempts to resolve the problems by creating a model where the German 
co-determination scheme is introduced to Chinese firms in the context of hostile 
takeovers. The methodologies adopted here are comparative study, doctrinal 
analysis, and theoretical analysis.  
 
Borrowing rules from one legal system to another is referred to as legal transplants. 
The literature on this theme has a high level of complexity.14 Contrary propositions 
decreases the feasibility of transplanting rules across jurisdictions, especially 
considering the divergence of cultural and economic environment between the 
exporting and importing countries.15 These arguments are reasonable to identify 
challenges in legal transplantation but cannot constitute the reason to reject its 
effectiveness in law development or reform in emerging economies, including 
China. It should be noted that China’s long-standing tradition in legal transplanting 
and most transplanted rules of Chinese corporate and commercial laws are from 
western countries. 16  However, inspired by these counter arguments, legal 
 
14 M. Siems, Comparative Law (Law in Context) (Cambridge University Press- 2018) 231. 
15 O. Kahn-Freund, “On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law” (1974) 37 Modern Law Review 1. 




transplants in this thesis should be used in a careful way. Accordingly, three sub-
questions should be addressed.  
 
First, why is the German co-determination mechanism chosen as the model for 
Chinese firms? This thesis explores this question by using the theoretical analysis 
of the varieties of capitalism approach. Depending on how firms resolve 
coordination problems central to their competencies, capitalist systems are divided 
into various types.17 The German system is referred to as coordinated market 
economies, which relies on private and insider information rather than the market 
mechanism to resolve coordination problems. This approach further argues that the 
incoherence of the market economies tends to negatively affect a country’s 
innovative capabilities as well as the performance of the national economy. By 
comparing the economic systems between Germany and China, this thesis finds 
that Chinese firms share a high level of similarities with German firms in terms of 
coordination with other firms, whereas their ways of coordination with workers 
are completely different. This leads to an incoherence in the Chinese economic 
system. This coherence issue needs to be resolved, considering China’s urgent 
demands for economic development and innovation. The most direct and effective 
way to address this problem is to introduce German ways of treatments on 
employees, which is mainly represented by the co-determination mechanism. In 
other words, the introduced German mechanism is coherent with the development 
direction of Chinese economy, and thus, this is used as the model for Chinese firms. 
 
Second, what are the difference between the laws governing workplace 
representation and participation in corporate decision-making in China and those 
in Germany? What are the ideologies underlying the difference of laws in the two 
countries? These two questions are addressed through comparative study. More 
specifically, this thesis finds the difference in the corporate organisational 
structures and a lack of detailed rule to guarantee workers’ participation in Chinese 
firms lead to the ineffectiveness of workers’ participation scheme compared to the 
 
17 P. Hall and D. Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundation of Comparative Advantage (Oxford 
University Press-2001) 8. 
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German counterparts. This thesis cites path dependence theories18 to stress the 
importance of different histories in forming the existing different rules in China 
and Germany. 
 
Third, how can the German co-determination scheme be adapted to China in the 
context of hostile takeovers? Since this thesis does not aim to reform the overall 
corporate structure of Chinese firms, the introduced model should be coherent with 
existing Chinese corporate laws. In this regard, the thesis finds proper organs as 
those found in the German system to act as well as make certain amendments to 
the German rules. It must be admitted that there is resistance to adopting the 
suggested model, considering the different economic, cultural, and legal 
backgrounds. However, these problems can be gradually resolved with further 
implementation of the suggested system.  
 
3. Structure of the Thesis 
 
The chapters of this thesis are arranged as follows. Chapter 1 identifies the signs that 
predict an increase in hostile takeovers and examines workers’ vulnerability to unjust 
treatment in this context. Chapter 2 lays the theoretical foundations related to the 
advantages of an enhanced employee protection and participation mechanism. The 
foundations are two-fold. First, the ideology of shareholder primacy conflict with firms’ 
long-term value and three more stakeholder-oriented corporate governance models, 
namely enlightened shareholder value, team production theory, and stakeholder theory, 
are examined. Second, based on economic grounds, greater participation of workers in 
hostile takeovers is conducive to the interests of firms as well as shareholders. Chapter 
3 examines the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the extant Chinese system and 
provides directions of legal transplantation to resolve these problems. The 
ineffectiveness of workers’ participation mechanisms at the board and establishment 
levels is examined before the factors leading to such ineffectiveness are explored. At 
 
18 L.A. Bebchuk and M.J. Roe “A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance” (1999) 52 
Stanford Law Review 127. 
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the end of this chapter, the controversy over the method of legal transplants is 
examined, and a guidance on principles to use this method is provided. Chapter 4 uses 
the varieties of capitalism approach to argue that the adaptation of the German co-
determination system will positively affect the Chinese economy and its innovative 
capabilities. The varieties of capitalism approach is first introduced before a 
comparison of the German and Chinese economic systems. At the end of this chapter, 
the grounds for the adoption of the German system are provided. Chapter 5 identifies 
the difference in institutional arrangements to let employees participate in hostile 
takeovers as well as their underlying ideologies. Based on those differences, Chapter 
6 makes certain amendments to the German scheme for better adaption into Chinese 
corporate organisational structure in order to improve workers’ information and 
participation rights in hostile takeovers. Thereafter, factors that may challenge the 





Chapter 1: The Vulnerability of Employees in Hostile 
Takeovers 
 
This chapter examines why employee involvement in hostile takeovers is needed. The 
core reason is that workers are particularly vulnerable to unjust treatment in the context 
of hostile takeovers. Accordingly, three theories that can explain workers’ 
vulnerability are examined in this chapter. First, since takeovers are considered the 
market for corporate control, the acquirer has an incentive to improve the firm’s 
efficiency, normally by cutting labour costs. Second, workers rely on their trust in 
managers with the hope of maintaining a long-term relationship with a firm. However, 
hostile takeovers breach this trust, and workers lose the returns they expect to accrue 
from the employment relationship. Third, Chinese firms have adopted the corporate 
governance model of shareholder primacy, which makes management inappropriately 
inclined towards the interests of shareholders at the expense of other stakeholders, 
including employees. This vulnerability has been exacerbating and is a cause for worry, 
considering that hostile takeovers are projected to rise in China.  
 
The chapter starts with a brief introduction of hostile takeovers in China, which is 
followed by the predicted increase in hostile takeovers in China. At the end of this 
chapter, theories that explain workers’ vulnerability are analysed.   
 
1.1 Introduction to Hostile Takeovers in China 
 
In order to explore the key arguments of this thesis, it is necessary to briefly introduce 
its context: the hostile takeovers in China. This section aims to describe how a takeover 
is made, which mainly focuses on two aspects: 1) the means and procedures of a 




In general, acquirers have two means to obtain control of a listed company.19 The first 
is through voluntary tender offers, when the acquirer make a voluntary offer to all 
shareholders to purchase partial or all shares of the listed company.20 At the time when 
the bidder notifies the target firm of its intention to make the tender offer, the bidder 
should make an indicative announcement of the summary of the report of the offer. 
After the tender offer is approved by the competent authorities, such as China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the bidder should make the official public 
announcement of the tender offer report. The board of directors of the target firm 
should analyse the conditions of the target company and the tender offer and appoint 
an independent financial advisor. Within 20 days from the official announcement, the 
board of directors of the target firm should report whether they recommend 
shareholders to accept the offer and opinions issued by the financial advisor to the 
public. The offer period should be between 30 and 60 days. Within 15 days as of the 
end of the offer period, the bidder should announce the offer result and report it to the 
stock exchange and CSRC. The second way to purchase shares of the target firms is 
through agreement.21 When the change of interests of the target firm is above 5% or 
the investor is expected to hold 5% or more interests after the share purchase, it should 
be reported to CSRC and the stock exchange and be made public.22 If the acquirer 
holds an interest of more than 30% before the acquisition or is expected to hold more 
than 30% after the acquisition, the mandatory bid offer rule is triggered.23 
 
It should be noted that hostile takeovers can hardly be achieved only through a share 
transfer agreement due to the mandatory bid rule. In order to seize the control of the 
target firm, the interest that the corporate raider holds after the takeover must exceed 
the threshold of 30%, which triggers the requirement to use the voluntary tender offer. 
In addition, the shareholder transfer agreement can only be made when both the target 
and the acquiring companies are satisfied with the terms and conditions. In other words, 
 
19 Article 5 of Measures for the Administration of the Takeover of Listed Companies (上市公司收购管理办法) 
(2014) (Takeover Measures) and Article 85 of the Securities Law of People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国
证券法) (2019) (the Securities Law of PRC). 
20 Article 23-46 of Takeover Measures and Article 89-93 of the Securities Law of PRC. 
21 Article 47-55 of Takeover Measures and Article 94 of the Securities Law of PRC. 
22 Article 13 of Takeover Measures and Article 85 of the Securities Law of PRC. 
23 Article 24 of Takeover Measures and Article 96 of the Securities Law of PRC. 
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an agreement can hardly be reached if the board of directors of the target firm resist 
the potential takeover.  
 
Regarding the approaches of takeover defences, China has adopted a combination of 
approaches from UK and US,24 which have most developed takeover rules even with 
the great existing divergence.25 To begin with, in terms of whether shareholders or the 
board of directors have decisive say over takeover defence tactics, Chinese laws adopt 
the board neutrality rule, which originates in UK laws.26  According to the board 
neutrality rule, without the approval of shareholders, directors cannot initiate any 
action that aims to frustrate the takeover bid.27 However, it should be noted that the 
Chinese neutrality rule can only be applied when it fulfils the following 
preconditions:28 1) the takeover defence measure proposed by the board significantly 
affects the assets and liabilities of the company, and 2) the defence measures should 
only be taken after the announcement of the takeover offer. Therefore, the board 
neutrality rule in Chinese firms leaves room for the board of directors to take defence 
measures if they can avoid the abovementioned preconditions. In this regard, the board 
of directors should have a duty of loyalty towards shareholders, which resembles the 
fiduciary duty in the US laws (Delaware).29 However, Chinese laws only provide 
general and simple terms of directors’ fiduciary duty, and there is no further detail to 
guide the implementation of this rule. This leaves directors with their own discretion 
to initiate takeover defence measures if only these measures do not conflict with the 
Chinese board neutrality rule. 
 
 
24 J. Armour, J.B. Jacobs, and C.J. Milhaupt, “The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in Developed and Emerging 
Markets: An Analytical Framework” (2011) 52 Harvard International Law Journal 219. 
25 J. Armour and D.A. Skeel, “Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeover and Why?—The Peculiar Divergence of 
US  and UK Takeover Regulation” (2006) Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper 
No.331, available at https://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-business-
research/downloads/working-papers/wp331.pdf. 
26 Rule 21 of the City Code of Takeovers and Mergers (2018) (The City Code). 
27 M. Ventoruzzo, “Takeover Regulation as a Wolf in Sleep’s Clothing: Taking UK Rules to Continental Europe” (2008) 
11 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 135.  
28 Article 33 of Takeover Measures. 
29 For example, the fiduciary duty of directors were analysed in cases such as Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 
493 A.2d at 955 (Del. 1985), Moore Corp. Ltd v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995), 
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) and Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. V. 
Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.1990). 
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This section sketches out the procedures and the allocation of powers in the target firm 
in case of hostile takeovers, especially in terms of initiating takeover defence measures. 
It should be noted that hostile takeovers are perceived as the battlefield where directors 
of the target firm fight against corporate raiders as well as shareholders of their own 
firms. However, employees are rarely mentioned by scholars, even though they are 
vulnerable to adverse treatments in this context. Their vulnerability is becoming 
increasingly severe and worrisome, especially considering that hostile takeovers are 
expected to rise in the future. Therefore, in the rest of this chapter, the prediction of a 
rise in hostile takeovers is made, which is followed by identifying workers’ 
vulnerability in this context. 
 
1.2 The Predicted Rise of Hostile Takeovers in China 
 
This section identifies factors that facilitate the rise and proliferation of hostile 
takeovers from two aspects. The former is more relevant to the shareholding structures 
and arrangements, while the latter is related to the Chinese capital market. An increase 
in hostile takeovers is expected to leave employees worse off, as workers are 
particularly vulnerable to unjust treatment in this context.  
 
Scholars have carried out productive research anticipating the growing trend of hostile 
takeovers in China. As pointed out by Demott, “the feasibility of hostile bids in any 
country depends in large part (1) on shareholders' ability to transfer their shares freely, 
(2) on the pattern of share ownership of that country, and (3) on the voting rights 
allocated to publicly-held shares”.30 It should be noted that Chinese listed firms are 
compatible with all three factors. 
 
In response to the former two factors,31 scholars have identified two signs that would 
promote the increase of hostile takeovers in China. The first is attributed to the equity 
 
30 D.A. Demott, “Comparative Dimension of Takeovers” (1987) 65 Washington University Law Quarterly 69. 
31 In terms of the third factor “the voting rights allocated to publicly-held shares”, Chinese laws currently forbid 
the dual class stock structure, which means the acquirer is able to gain the control of the target company once it 
purchases enough shares. However, it should be noted that the state has expressed their intentions to experiment 
with the dual class stock structure recently. See the State Council of People’s Republic of China (PRC), The Opinions 
on Promoting the High-Quality Development of Innovation and Entrepreneurship to Upgrade the Innovation-
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division reform,32 which made previously non-tradable equities of listed companies 
tradable. Non-tradable equities are a legacy of the planned Chinese economy. At that 
time, almost two-thirds of shares could not be sold on the securities market.33 Non-
tradable equities were caused by the party-state’s uncertainty on whether certain type 
of equities, such as state-owned and enterprise-owned equities, should be traded on 
Chinese stock exchanges at the establishment of the Chinese securities market. This 
can be attributed to the predicament of state-owned enterprises and some other types 
of enterprises such as township and village enterprises, who had “lots of problems such 
as financial distress, overstaff, heavy burden, and so on”.34 Considering that these non-
tradable shares were normally held by the controlling shareholder, if these shares could 
be traded, share prices were expected to drop significantly, and the party-state might 
suddenly lose control of state-owned enterprises. The existence of non-tradable shares 
was perceived as an obstacle for hostile takeovers, since the volume of tradable shares 
on the market was insufficient for the acquirer to gain control of the target firm. 
Accordingly, the acquirer was required to purchase non-tradable shares by private 
agreement rather than tender offers, which was difficult to achieve, given the 
likelihood of the incumbent management rejecting any such offer.35 In line with the 
theory of Demott, the equity division reform eliminated the difference between 
tradable and non-tradable shares, and accordingly made available more shares on the 
capital market. Shareholders will then be able to transfer shares freely.   
 
The greater circulation of shares is able to disperse the hitherto concentrated ownership 
of Chinese companies,36 which is the second sign that is perceived as enabling the rise 
of hostile takeovers. Concentrated ownership structures are deemed to hinder hostile 
 
Entrepreneurship Initiative (国务院关于推动创新创业高质量发展打造双创升级版的意见) (2018). 
32 This reform was started by the promulgation of China Securities Regulatory Commission,  Regulatory Measures 
on the Equity Division Reform of Listed Companies (上市公司股权分置改革管理办法) (2005). 
33 Z. Yang, “The Impact of Equity Division Reform on Investors” (2017) International Conference on Economics, 
Management Engineering and Marketing (EMEM 2017) 42. 
34 H. Zhang and Z. Wang, “The Study of Equity Division Reform Effect on Chinese Listed Companies Financing 
Behaviors” (2009) 2009 International Conference on Management and Service Science 1, available at 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5303567. 
35 H. Huang, “The New Takeover Regulation in China: Evolution and Enhancement” (2008) 42 The International 
Lawyer 153. 
36 This is because non-tradable shares were normally held by the controlling shareholder, and since more shares 




takeovers, because a transfer of control can only be achieved with the voluntary 
permission of the controlling shareholders of target firms. On the other hand, a lower 
degree of ownership concentration can promote the liquidity of the market in China, 
thereby facilitating takeovers, especially hostile takeovers.37 Some researchers have 
argued that concentrated ownership structures in the private sector arise from the 
ineffective investor protection mechanisms in China.38 Accordingly, shareholders tend 
to use concentrated ownership as an alternative to external legal protection.39 However, 
with the maturing of the Chinese legal system, controlling shareholders are now more 
willing to disperse ownership. There are also scholars who project more dispersed 
ownership structures of private companies due to the frequent use of stock options to 
tie key employees to companies, and founders handing over control to their children, 
where the latter emphasize the important role of professional management and the 
capital markets. 40  In addition, scattered ownership structures are normally 
accompanied by a market-centred economy, where hostile takeovers flourish. This is 
compatible with the objective of the reform of the Chinese securities market.41 As John 
Coffee states, dispersed ownership structures are “characterized by strong securities 
markets, rigorous disclosure standards, and high market transparency, in which the 
market for corporate control constitutes the ultimate disciplinary mechanism” and “the 
hostile takeover, its final guillotine”.42 Admittedly, although shareholding structures 
are becoming dispersed, they still remain relatively concentrated, especially compared 
to companies in the United States. As a result, hostile takeovers have hitherto rarely 
been seen in the Chinese stock market. 43  However, it should be noted that the 
 
37 R. La Porta, F. Lopes-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, “Corporate Ownership around the World” (1999) 54 The Journal 
of Finance. 471. 
38 H. Deng, “Constraining the Majority Shareholders under the Concentrated Ownership Structures of Chinese 
Listed Firms” (我国上市公司股权集中模式下的股权制衡问题) (2008) 6 China Legal Science (中国法学) 145.  
39 R. La Porta, F. Lopes-de Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny, “Legal Determinants of External” (1997) 52 The 
Journal of Finance 1131. 
40 L. Zhang, “The Potential Rise of Hostile Takeovers in China: Efficiency, Politics and Law” (2014) 12 China: An 
International Journal 136. 
41 See an interview of the press spokesperson of China Securities Regulatory Commission, D. Chang, see Sina 
Finance, “China Securities Regulatory Commission: To Promote the Reform of the Market for Mergers and 
Acquisitions” (证 监 会: 积 极 推 动 并 购 重 组 市 场 化 改 革) (2018), available at 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/gncj/2018-08-18/doc-ihhvciix0254130.shtml.  
42 J.C. Coffee, “The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership 
and Control” (2001) 111 Yale Law Journal 1. 
43 R.H. Huang and J. Chen, “Takeover Regulation in China: Striking a Balance between Takeover Contestability and 
Shareholder Protection” in U. Varottil and W.Y. Wan (eds), Comparative Takeover Regulation: Global and Asian 
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press-2018) 211. 
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shareholding structures of Chinese firms are now visibly becoming dispersed, as 
reflected in the statistics.44 From this perspective, it can be reasonably expected that 
hostile takeovers will rise in the future, having already started with the first successful 
hostile takeover reported by the media.45 
 
The third factor, namely the voting rights allocated to shares in public-held companies, 
does not constitute an obstacle for takeovers in China. This factor relates to the issue 
of separate classes of stock that hold different voting rights. In particular, shares 
available for sale should be accompanied by sufficient voting rights to allow the 
acquirer to take control of the firm. However, although the Chinese government is 
considering allowing the emergence of dual class equity structure in Chinese firms,46 
the principle of one-share-one-vote is largely upheld by Chinese firms, so that voting 
rights are not really an obstacle for the prevalence of hostile takeovers. 
 
In addition to the three abovementioned factors, scholars attribute macroeconomic 
factors that make takeovers attractive to the rise of hostile takeovers.47 The first is the 
decreasing intervention of the state in the capital market, which is perceived as an 
impediment to hostile takeovers. This opinion is relevant even in the private sector, 
considering that the government, through the CSRC, has the authority to approve 
takeovers. However, the responsibility of CSRC is restricted to overseeing the 
legitimacy of a takeover. In general, CSRC has remained silent in the wake of hostile 
takeover attempts, which complies with its long-standing objective of developing a 
market-oriented Chinese stock exchange. Therefore, the party-state cannot be 
perceived as an obstacle in the rise of hostile takeovers, at least in the private sector.  
 
 
44 According to the statistics collected by China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database (CSMAR Solution) 
available at http://www.gtarsc.com, by Sep 30, 2014, the listed company with the largest shareholder holding 50% 
or more shares accounted for 19.84% of all (512/2580), in comparison with 21.76% (386/1774) by Dec 31, 2009 
and 35.08% (483/1377) by Dec 31, 2004. As to the largest shareholder holding 30% or more shares, the ratio was 
58.37% (1506/2580) by Sep 30, 2014, 59.19% (1050/1774) and 65.36% (900/1377). 
45 Y. Wang, “Analysing the First Successful Marketized Hostile Takeover in A-Share” (解码 A 股首例成功市场化敌
意并购案) (2018) JRJ.com, available at http://stock.jrj.com.cn/2018/06/29033024743240.shtml. 
46 Xinhua News, “China Securities Regulatory Commission Suggests Separate Class of Stock Structure” (03 Sep 
2018), available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2018-09/03/c_129945588.htm. 
47 Armour et al (n 7). 
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The second is the increased attractiveness of the target firms in the market due to 
attractively priced shares of listed firms. This can be evidenced by the Shanghai 
composite index, which dropped from more than 5000 in mid-2015 to around 3000 at 
the end of 2019.48 For instance, the market value of China First Heavy Industries, the 
manufacturing giant in China, declined by 84% during this period.49 Under this context, 
more listed firms are vulnerable to takeovers, as shares of these firms are cheaper and 
more attractive to corporate raiders.  
 
The third factor is that the obstacles to acquirers’ funding have been removed.50 In the 
early stages of the development of the Chinese capital market, firms were prohibited 
from taking loans from commercial banks to make equity investments.51 However, this 
prohibition was lifted in 2008, when China Banking Regulatory Commission 
permitted commercial banks to provide funding for firms to acquire other firms.52 In 
2015, corporate acquirers got more channels for funding when peer-to-peer (P2P) 
lending (one form of internet finance) and lending between firms became 
permissible.53 Thus, acquirers are now more likely to have adequate funds to acquire 
attractive target firms. 
 
To sum up, three factors contribute to the increase in hostile takeovers in China in the 
future. First, with the development of Chinese capital market, the shareholding 
structure is becoming more dispersed and shares can easily be traded. Second, the 
party-state has reduced its intervention in the takeover market. Accordingly, corporate 
acquirers are legally permitted to raise funds from more sources, while the party-state 
tends not to reject hostile takeovers if only the procedures do not violate existing rules. 
Third, the Chinese stock market is becoming more attractive for hostile takeovers, 
especially considering the general declining share prices of listed firms. In this context, 
 
48 Shanghai Stock Exchange, statistics available at http://www.sse.com.cn/market/sseindex/overview/focus/. 
49 Statistics form Investing.com, available at https://cn.investing.com/equities/cn-first-heavy-historical-data. 
50 R.H. Huang and J. Chen, “The Rise of Hostile Takeovers and Defensive Measures in China: Comparative and 
Empirical Perspectives” (2019) 20 European Business Organization Law Review 363. 
51 Article 20 of General Rules of Lending (贷款通则) (1996). 
52 Article 1 of Guidelines on the Risk Management of M&A Loans of Commercial Banks (商业银行并购贷款风险
指引) (2008). 
53 Articles 11 and 22 of Provisions of the People’s Supreme Court on Several Issues concerning the Application of 
the Law in Private Lending Cases (最高人民法院关于审理民间借贷适用法律若干问题的规定) (2015). 
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more hostile takeovers are expected to put employees in unfavourable positions, where 
they are vulnerable to unjust treatment, and this is examined in the next section. 
 
1.3 The Vulnerability of Employees in Hostile Takeovers 
 
This section examines the necessity of employee protection in the face of an increase 
in hostile takeovers, wherein employees are particularly vulnerable to unjust treatment 
in this context. The most direct reason is that restructuring of the target firm has been 
widely witnessed to accompany takeovers, especially hostile takeovers, and hence 
workers are more likely to be exposed to risks including changed working conditions, 
increased work intensity, job transfer, and/or mass redundancies.54  
 
The vulnerability of employees in hostile takeovers has attracted a broad range of 
academic interest, which in general covers three aspects. First, going by the theory of 
“the market for corporate control”, takeovers lead to a reallocation of resources that 
aims to improve the efficiency of the target firms, and therefore labour costs are likely 
to be reduced. Second, takeovers lead to a transfer of wealth from employees to 
shareholders, which constitutes a breach of the implicit contract between the employer 
and employees. Third, the corporate governance model of shareholder primacy 
adopted by Chinese laws promotes an inordinate inclination among Chinese firms 
towards the interests of shareholders, leading to employees’ interests receiving less 
consideration in the context of hostile takeovers. All three aspects are examined in the 
remaining sections of this chapter.  
 
1.3.1 Incentives to Improve the Efficiency of Target Companies 
 
The first manifestation of employees’ vulnerability is that new controllers may seek to 
improve the efficiency of acquired companies at the expense of the employees’ 
interests. This is inspired by “the market for corporate control”, where hostile 
takeovers are perceived as a mechanism to discipline incompetent management of 
 
54 J. Cremers and S. Vitols, Takeovers with or without Worker Voice: Workers’ Rights under the EU Takeover Bids 
Directive (European Trade Union Institute-2016) 11. 
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target companies. In summary, the poor management of companies leads to a fall in 
share prices, which in turn encourages takeover attempts. As a result, the threat of 
hostile takeovers stimulates management’s incentive to raise the firm value for fear of 
losing their jobs, because incompetent incumbent management are normally removed 
after hostile takeovers.  
 
This theory is based on two assumptions; the first is that target firms are poorly 
managed before hostile takeovers. The criteria based on which the firm’s management 
can be assessed comes from the agency theory. As defined by Jensen and Meckling, 
“an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) 
engage another person (the agent(s)) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent.” 55 Shareholders and 
management constitute the agency relationship, which originates from the separation 
of management from ownership in modern companies. As highlighted by Berle and 
Means, shareholders who own large companies do not manage it whist those who have 
control over the firm do not necessarily have substantial ownership interests.56 Three 
grounds have been found to explain this separation. Frist, in large corporations that 
feature dispersed ownership, shareholders are expected to be rationally apathetic to 
exercise their voting rights, because “each individual shareholder has only a small 
interest in any given firm”57 and they reasonably assume that their voting cannot make 
any real influence on the result. Accordingly, it is necessary to delegate the 
management control to directors. Second, in the modern economy, a company should 
respond quickly to the market change by taking wise and decisive measures to improve 
competencies of firms. Accordingly, it becomes necessary to hire professional 
managers, who expertise in business and managerial skills. By engaging in day-to-day 
management and operations of the firm, professional managers gain the informational 
advantage over shareholders, making the latter further incapable to retain the firm 
control. Third, with the development of the securities market, shares of large 
corporations can be transferred more freely. Accordingly, some shareholders tend to 
 
55 M. C. Jensen and W. H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure” (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305 at 308. 
56 A.A. Berle and G.G.C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Transaction Publishers-1991) 181. 
57 J. Velasco, “Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously” (2007) 41 U.C. Davis Law Review 605 at 622. 
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focus on short-term gains rather than the firms’ long-term value because they can 
easily sell their shares and quit the company.58 In contrast, managers’ reputation binds 
closely with the firm’s performance, because it will determine their salaries at the next 
stage of their career. In this case, control of managers rather than shareholders is 
compatible with the interest of the firm.  
 
To sum up, the separation of management from ownership increases company benefits. 
This can explain the motivation for shareholders, who act as principals, to hire 
managers for their interests. This is because shareholders are perceived as “residual 
interest holders” in the company, which means that “if the company ceased trading, 
they would have a claim to all the company’s assets once all creditors have been 
repaid.”59 Therefore, to increase the firm value aligns with shareholders’ interests, and 
any managerial behaviours that are not in the best interest of shareholders incur agency 
costs. 
  
Based on the belief that people are self-interest-driven and rational,60 interests of the 
management do not always align with those of shareholders. In order to limit 
divergences from the interests of shareholders, agency costs are incurred, which can 
be divided into three categories. 61  First, shareholders are supposed to bear the 
expenditures of monitoring the behaviour of the management, referred to as 
“monitoring costs”. Second, managers are allowed by shareholders to expend 
resources to guarantee that the management acts in the best of shareholders; if 
managers do not, they are allowed to recover such cost. This is known as “bonding 
costs”. Third, even after monitoring and bonding activities, costs may arise due to 
managers’ non-aligned interests with shareholders, and this is referred to as “residual 
loss”. In addition, by realising that people may not always act in their own interests, 
scholars identified other sources of agency costs, such as managers’ incompetency. 
Inspired by the economic theory of self-control problems, 62  scholars find that 
 
58 J. C. Stein, “Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia” (1988) 96 Journal of Political Economy 61. 
59 D. Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and Materials (Oxford University Press-2012) 175. 
60 This belief can be traced back to Adam Smith. See: A. Simth, The Wealth of Nations (University of Chicago 
Press-2012) 460. 
61 Jensen & Meckling (n 55) at 308. 
62 R.H. Thaler and H.M. Shefrin, “An Economic Theory of Self-Control” (1981) 89 The Journal of Political Economy 
392. This theory perceives individuals as an organization to explain why some individuals may take actions that 
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managers may take actions that are harmful to them as well as shareholders. 63 
Therefore, limiting agency costs is one of the primary objectives of corporate 
governance. Firms with high agency costs normally accompany poor performance. For 
instance, in order to entrench their position, managers tend to offer above-market 
wages or long-term contracts to employees.64 These firms are more attractive for 
corporate raiders and are more likely to be exposed to the threat of hostile takeovers.65 
 
Accordingly, this leads to the second assumption of this theory, which is that a transfer 
of control in takeovers leads to a reallocation of resources and management turnover,66 
thereby mitigating agency costs as well as enhancing the firm performance. In order 
to improve the profitability of acquired firms, the new management adopt measures 
such as “downsizing or relocating operations, which in many cases causes collective 
employee layoffs”.67 
 
It should be noted that the academic literature has diverse views on “the market for 
corporate control”. With regard to the first assumption of this theory, there are scholars 
who have provided evidence that target companies are managed below the average 
level prior to takeovers. 68  However, counter arguments show that there is little 
evidence of the poor performance of target companies prior to takeovers.69 Takeovers, 
therefore, may or may not perform a disciplinary function, as suggested by “the market 
for corporate control” approach. Similarly, when it comes to the second assumption, 
there is no agreement on the impact of takeovers on acquired companies. Some studies 
support the positive impact of takeovers on firm performance,70 which is inconsistent 
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with observations made by other scholars, who have argued that takeovers do not affect 
firm performance, in the US71 and the UK.72  
 
This divergence in academic views is reasonable, since studies on “the market for 
corporate control” are challenging. This is because the result of the research is sensitive 
to the definition of performance, methodology selected, country selected, time period, 
or benchmarks constructed.73 The valuation of target firms is central to this theory. 
However, due to the myopia of the market and volatility of share prices, the valuation 
of the target management may fail to reflect how target firms are managed,74 making 
research that tests the validity of  this theory very difficult. Even in conditions where 
new controllers are willing to pursue better performance by the target firms, the 
acquired firms may not perform as well as expected, due to a failure of management 
or “hubris” of the new controller leading to their overestimation of their ability to 
enhance firm performance.75 As a result, the feasibility of this theory can hardly be 
assessed and proved, which leads to the dissonance witnessed in the conclusions of the 
empirical studies.  
 
“The market for corporate control” explains acquired companies’ incentives to 
improve efficiency and the corresponding negative treatment of employees. However, 
this is not feasible in all types of takeovers. There are various motives for takeovers, 
some of which may not aim at a reduction of agency costs or an improvement in the 
performance of target firms. For instance, acquirers are likely to use takeovers to 
achieve economies of scale, to add complementary resources to the combined firm for 
synergy gains, to save taxes, to achieve monopolies, or to buy “entry” into a new 
business or market.76 Some of these motives do not focus on improving efficiency of 
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the acquired companies, and therefore cannot be explained by “the market for 
corporate control”. That is to say, a reduction of labour costs can only be witnessed in 
certain types of takeovers. To be specific, mass redundancies and a decrease in wages 
are normally observed in takeovers with the objective of a reduction of overcapacities, 
or accompanied by post-takeover restructuring measures, such as downsizing 
overlapping activities, including the removal of production facilities and head office 
administration.77 
 
In conclusion, according to the theory of “the market for corporate control”, workers 
are vulnerable to unjust treatment after takeovers because new management often have 
an incentive to improve the performance of the acquired firms. However, these 
incentives can be hardly assessed or proved. In addition, it should be noted that this 
explanation for workers’ vulnerability is only plausible in certain types of takeovers, 
because not all corporate raiders have an incentive to enhance the target firm’s 
efficiency after the acquisition. Therefore, this thesis moves on to examine the second 
explanation for workers’ vulnerability, which is that hostile takeovers will lead to a 
breach of the implicit contracts between employees and shareholders. 
 
 
1.3.2 A Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers 
 
An Introduction to the Theory of Implicit Contracts 
 
This theory was first put forward by Shleifer and Summers,78 who held that takeovers 
would bring about wealth redistribution and shareholders’ expropriation of rents79 
from employees. This leads to a breach of implicit contracts between employees and 
the company, which are sustained by a management’s reputation for trustworthiness. 
 
77 E. Lehto and P. Bockerman, “Analysing the Employment Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions” (2008) 68 Journal 
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Causes and Consequences (University of Chicago Press-1988) 33. 
79 In the view of economists, rents refer to the return to any factor of production in excess of its supply costs. 




In order to explore this theory, this section starts by introducing the theory of implicit 
contracts. 
 
Implicit contracts arise from the nexus-of-contract theory, which perceives a company 
as “a legal fiction which serves as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among 
individuals”.80 Accordingly, the relationship between the company and employees is 
established through explicit and implicit contracts. Implicit contracts include 
conditions and arrangements that cannot be specified in explicit contracts. In particular, 
due to the complexity of employees’ relationship with shareholders,81 parties cannot 
fully anticipate everything in explicit contracting ex ante. As to circumstances that can 
be predicted, it will be too costly to include everything in explicit contracts. In addition, 
some conditions that relate closely to workers’ interests, such as decisions on takeovers, 
cannot be contracted, because this business operation should be at the discretion of 
management,82  i.e. implicit contracts can “help circumvent difficulties in explicit 
contracting”.83  
 
According to the theory of implicit contracts, employees and the company tend to 
develop a long-term relationship. There are mainly three reasons for this inclination. 
The first reason concerns employees’ risk aversion. Employees need job security to 
avoid negative consequences of involuntary unemployment, such as a loss of income 
for a certain period. As they grow older, this need becomes more urgent, because their 
opportunities for re-employment are expected to decrease.84 The aging problem is 
especially pressing for workers engaged in labour-intensive activities, whose 
productivity is expected to decrease as they get older. As a consequence, they have 
fewer opportunities for re-employment.85 Unlike shareholders, who tend to hold equity 
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in different companies, employees normally have one job, and therefore cannot 
diversify their risks.86 Accordingly, employees’ demand for a long-term employment 
relationship is urgent. In return for treating employees fairly and ethically, the 
company is expected to secure advantages in attracting, retaining, and motivating more 
qualified employees.87 This good reputation of decent human resource management 
practice is also positively related to the firm value, as shown by empirical studies.88  
 
The second reason arises from the “firm-specific human capital hypothesis”. The term 
“human capital” refers to the knowledge and skills that can only be acquired when 
some investments of time and resources are made.89 These investments are shared by 
employees and the employer,90 engendering the need for both parties to have a long-
term relationship. To be specific, when employees are given job security, they are more 
willing to devote themselves to developing firm-specific skills, which is perceived to 
improve the productivity and innovation of the firm.91 These skills may lose their value 
when employees change their job, which is evidenced by a decrease in earnings on 
their next job. 92  Meantime, employees who show a propensity for long-term 
employment are more likely to receive investments by the company in training and 
education.93  These workers may help the company gain a competitive advantage 
against its rivals. Accordingly, the employer tends to bind employees with specialized 
skills by offering higher wages and better welfare. 
 
The third reason is related to the second and considers the costs of layoffs. For the 
employer, a loss of employees with specialized skills leads to a waste of capital 
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expenditure, because no further rewards can be collected from the investments in 
training and education. Likewise, employees who have dedicated themselves to 
developing firm-specific skills are unable to collect further returns when they leave the 
firm, also leading to a loss of capital.94 In addition, arising from their desire for long-
term employment and their trust in the employer, employees tend to accept wages that 
are below the market level, in the hope of being overpaid in subsequent periods.95 
Therefore, involuntary unemployment will raise employees’ opportunistic costs, 
arising from a loss of higher income.  
 
In summary, both the employer and employees have a strong motivation to stabilize 
the employment relationship. However, the employer, rather than employees, is 
normally the party who fails to adhere to implicit contracts. This is because managers 
are comparatively sophisticated and have informational advantages, and they are more 
able to cope with risks arising from a breach of implicit contracts. Since there is no 
legal system for enforcement, employees can only emotionally depend on managers’ 
credibility to realise their promises, such as to retain long-term employment and to 
increase workers’ income in the future. However, this emotional trust is vulnerable to 
a breach in the context of takeovers. 
 
A Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers 
 
A breach of trust is normally accompanied by the replacement of the firm’s managers. 
In order to retain their reputation of trustworthiness, incumbent management are 
committed to upholding employees’ claims. This trust “develops over time based on 
the historical experience that employees and management have with each other”.96 As 
a result, incumbent management tend to safeguard workers’ interests in takeovers, 
sometimes even against shareholders’ interests. The reason for managements’ alliance 
with employees may also be attributed to managers’ pursuance of private interests. For 
managers who have a small equity stake, in order to entrench their positions and 
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maximize the benefits of control,97 they may offer long-term employment contracts to 
employees (as “shark repellents”), thereby reducing the attractiveness of the firm as a 
target.98 In addition to placing obstacles for corporate raiders, this takeover defence 
measure is expected to reduce the profitability of target firms,99 which harms the 
interests of shareholders in target firms. After completion of the takeover, prior 
management are also deemed to hinder firm profitability, since the returns of firms 
that choose to retain prior management tend to be lower than those that changed 
managers. 100  As a result, prior management may conflict with the interests of 
shareholders in target and acquired firms, and therefore a change of management is 
normally witnessed in takeovers. Employees’ trust in prior management is attributable 
to their historical experience, which is not shared with the new management. 
Accordingly, the new management do not share the same level of employees’ trust. 
 
The motivation for new managers to renege on implicit contracts with employees is to 
increase the shareholders’ value, which is mainly through an expropriation of 
employees’ rents.101 To be specific, workers acquiring firm-specific knowledge is 
critical for the generation of economic rents. 102  If workers are not sufficiently 
rewarded for their investments of time and effort by shareholders, their rents are 
deemed to be expropriated. Although scholars have identified value creation effects in 
takeovers, there are also at least partial shareholder gains at the expense of employees’ 
interests,103 leading to a breach of implicit contracts.  
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This thesis provides two examples of new controllers’ measures of restructuring firms 
in the immediate aftermath of takeovers, which are deemed to violate workers trust. 
First, the level of training and education of employees is not taken cognisance of by 
the market or by the future employers. 104  Therefore, workers who have made 
significant firm-specific investments may not be appreciated and valued by new 
managers. They tend to sack senior employees with wages exceeding their marginal 
productivity, who may have been underpaid at the early stage of their career.105 Instead, 
new employees who settle for lower wages may be hired to reduce the costs in 
corporate management. Second, acquired companies may close plants with the 
objective of improving the firm’s profitability, leading to massive layoffs or job 
transfers.106 It is challenging for workers who lose their jobs to find equivalent and 
satisfactory  alternative employment.107 Those who are transferred may be forced to 
accept another job for which they are less qualified due to a lower level of acquired 
training and education. It should be noted that there are some employees who are 
reluctant to accept their new job positions, possibly due to an unwillingness to move 
to other areas where the new plants are located.108 Thereafter, they may choose to 




The theory of implicit contracts is founded on a trust-based framework. Based on trust 
in incumbent management, workers prefer a long-term relationship, and are 
accordingly willing to invest their time and effort in developing their firm-specific 
skills. This in turn is compatible with the employer’s incentive to enhance efficiency 
and retain their reputation of trustworthiness. However, in hostile takeovers when 
managers are normally replaced, a breach of implicit contracts is witnessed, in the form 
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of job losses and wage cuts, since new controllers are not bound by similar reputational 
and economic incentives. This breach leads to the expropriation of employees’ 
interests by the shareholders. 
 
However, it should be noted that severance pay can alleviate employees’ hardship in 
takeovers and compensate their loss of firm-specific investments.109 Nevertheless, 
given the information and power asymmetries, workers can hardly bargain with the 
management and shareholders for satisfactory compensation. This is partially 
attributable to the shareholder primacy model adopted by Chinese corporate laws, 
which causes firms to be excessively inclined towards the interests of shareholders. 
 
1.3.3 Shareholder Primacy Theory 
 
Introduction to Shareholder Primacy 
 
The third explanation of workers’ vulnerability arises from the dominant corporate 
governance model, which is shareholder primacy. This theory requires directors to 
operate a company in the interests of its shareholders,110 which is the predominant 
model of corporate governance in the Anglo-American tradition. The idea of 
shareholder primacy is exemplified by the case of Dodge v. Ford Co: 111  
 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of 
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed to that end. The 
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attend that 
end and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, 
or to the non-distribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote 
them to other purposes. 
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As argued by Deakin, the theory of shareholder primacy originates in “the norms and 
practices surrounding the rise of the hostile takeover movement” in the 1970s and 
1980s.112 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the hostile takeover was a comparatively 
new phenomenon. Faced with unwelcome takeovers, directors might reject the bid 
from outsiders without informing shareholders of the potential bid.113 Shareholders’ 
interests might yield to the overall company interests, especially considering that their 
control over corporate management was weaker due to the increasingly dispersed 
shareholder ownership. With the development of transparency and auditing rules, 
hostile takeovers became possible. In this context, by offering a premium over the 
current stock price, shareholders have the option to sell their shares and thereafter 
concede their control if they think they have no greater gains in the company than their 
financial investments. A changed managerial team which follows hostile takeovers is 
expected to focus on maximising the shareholders’ gains. Accordingly, in the takeover 
resolution, a series of institutional changes clarify the directors’ objective in the 
takeover, which change from the best interests of the company based on their 
understanding to giving advice to shareholders on the financial merits of the takeover 
bid. This is evidenced by the promulgation of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
(1968) in the UK and the William Act (1968) in the US. In summary, the rise of hostile 
takeovers led to a change in directors’ mindset, along with the institutional revolution, 
which confirms contemporary shareholder norms.114 
 
Theories of the Firm that Support Shareholder Primacy 
 
Theories of the firm provide theoretical support for shareholder primacy, the first of 
which is the property rights theory. It has been long argued that the corporation is a 
type of property owned by the shareholders, because shareholders have “the rights to 
possess, use and manage, and the rights to income and capital” 115 The rights of each 
shareholder represent only a fraction of the value of the overall property rights. 
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Accordingly, the directors (agents) appointed by the shareholders (principal) should 
manage the company solely for the interests of the shareholders because the 
shareholders’ property rights are superior to those of other constituents. 
 
The second theory that supports shareholder primacy is the nexus-of-contracts theory. 
It suggests that the firm is “a legal fiction which serves as a nexus for a set of 
contracting relationships among individuals”. 116  Generally, this theory rejects the 
notion that the corporation is a thing capable of being owned, and blurs the boundaries 
of the company.117 Accordingly, shareholders are not the owners of the corporation 
but the residual claimants to the corporation’s assets and earnings.118 Specifically, the 
residual claimant generally means that after bearing the costs including the transaction 
costs,119 the agency costs,120 and the costs of ownership,121 the shareholders enjoy the 
value of the residual claims of the corporation.122 “Those who do not bear risk on the 
margin get fixed terms of trade”,123 and their rights are established through “a mere 
bargained-for contract term”.124 This theory also lays the foundation for shareholder 
primacy. The shareholders hold a privileged position compared with other 
constituencies in the firm, since “for most firms the expectation is that residual risk 
bearers (shareholders) have contracted for a promise to maximize the long-run profits 
of the firm, which in turn maximizes the value of their stock”.125 The directors as the 
agents of the shareholders hold fiduciary duties to the shareholders, and “the obligation 
of corporate directors is to increase the value of the residual claim”.126 
 
This ideology of the shareholder primacy theory can be explained as follows. The 
shareholders (the “principal”), acting as either the owner of the property of the firm or 
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the residual claimants, “have surrendered the right that the corporation should be 
operated in their sole interest”127 to directors (the “agents”), thereby constituting the 
core principal‒agent relationship in corporate governance. From the perspective of the 
shareholders, they have ultimate control over the management of the corporation and 
keep trying to reduce the agency costs arising from the directors’ management. On the 
other hand, the directors hold a fiduciary duty to the shareholders, of maximising the 
profits for the shareholders while avoiding shirking128 and self-dealing.129 In terms of 
the other constituencies, their interests “are only relevant to the degree that they 
contribute to the goal of attaining maximisation of the shareholders’ wealth”. 130 
Although other constituencies may have contractual claims against the firm, the claim 
of the shareholder is at the heart of the firm.131 
 
Shareholder Primacy in Hostile Takeovers and Employees’ Vulnerability 
 
Hostile takeovers are perceived as “an engine of shareholder wealth maximisation”.132 
Considering the disciplinary function as mentioned earlier, hostile takeovers provide 
a mechanism to align managers’ interests with those of shareholders. 133  Besides, 
hostile takeovers are compatible with shareholders’ interests in the context of more 
dispersed shareholding structures. This is because different groups of shareholders 
have widely divergent amounts of information and interests. Therefore, it is difficult 
for shareholders to monitor the management of the board of directors by hiring or firing 
members of the board, since the threshold of shareholding that is necessary to make 
such critical decisions can seldom be reached. However, hostile takeovers enable 
shareholders to overcome collective action problems, such as free-rider problems, as 
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well as to oust directors.134 Incumbent dispersed shareholders have weak control over 
corporate management, and therefore it may be compatible with their best interests to 
sell their shares for a premium. Corporate raiders who gain control of target firms are 
able to replace the incumbent management to enhance the efficiency of corporations 
for better rewards. In addition, as stated earlier, hostile takeovers offer shareholders an 
opportunity to breach implicit contracts with stakeholders including employees, which 
enables them to expropriate the latter’s rents. In hostile takeovers where shareholders 
have a decisive say and aim to pursue shareholder wealth, employees are vulnerable 
to unjust treatment from corporate raiders because their power is comparatively 
diminished, and consequently their interests are subordinated to those of the raiders. 
 
The pursuance of shareholders’ interests at the expense of other stakeholders in hostile 
takeovers has invited much criticism, which will be discussed in Chapter 2. Despite 
the criticism, shareholder primacy remains the dominant corporate governance theory 
and is also generally adopted by Chinese firms. This situation has arisen from China’s 
“corporation without privatization” process of the late 1980s.135 This aimed to reform 
the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) of the old planned economy. These SOEs were 
factories rather than companies in the capitalist economy. Their production was “based 
on administrative orders rather than competitive struggle between rival firms for 
profits and market share”.136 “Corporation” refers to the introduction of the modern 
enterprise system to Chinese SOEs. In this context, the party-state remained as the 
controlling shareholder without any “privatisation” or any real withdrawal from 
corporate governance. In this case, shareholder primacy can be seen as the primacy of 
the party-state in SOEs. Accordingly, the first Company Law as promulgated in 1994 
adopted the model of shareholder primacy, which has been maintained till now and is 
adopted by other rules and regulations in China. It should be noted that these laws, 
rules, and regulations, which are characterised as shareholder-oriented and shareholder 
empowerment, can be also applied to private firms. With regard to the former, both 
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the Company Law and the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in 
China require the board of directors to be accountable to the shareholders.137  In 
takeovers, the board of directors is placed under fiduciary duties and duties of diligence 
to the firm and is required to safeguard the interests of shareholders.138 As for the latter, 
shareholders enjoy a decisive power on vital issues such as the appointment or 
dismissal of non-employee directors and supervisors and in major transactions such as 
takeovers.139 However, despite the fact that the pattern of share ownership is becoming 
more dispersed in China, it remains concentrated enough for majority shareholders to 
exert effective control over corporate governance and decision-making in hostile 
takeovers, at the expense of employees’ interests.140 Admittedly, there are certain rules 
that require other constituencies’ interests also to be considered; for instance, the 
interests of creditors and employees are to be safeguarded as a part of corporate 
governance.141 However, this does not naturally lead to the Chinese laws adopting a 
different corporate governance model from shareholder primacy. Since most banks are 
state owned and workers - theoretically at least - are deemed to be the leaders of the 
state according to Chinese Constitutional Law, these arrangements can be explained 
more as safeguarding the party-state’s interests rather than as adopting a different 
model. Moreover, these rules provide no effective enforcement mechanism, making 
them rarely implementable in practice. This is supported by a survey conducted by 
Weng, who found that although corporate social responsibility is emphasised in 
corporate management, most Chinese practitioners perceive a company as the property 
of the shareholders, and accordingly their interests are prioritised over those of all other 
constituencies.142 
 
The shareholder primacy model adopted by Chinese corporate laws causes firms to be 
inordinately inclined towards the interests of shareholders. This makes workers 
 
137 Article 46 of the Company Law of People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国公司法) (The Company Law of 
PRC) and Article 8 of the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies (上市公司治理准则) (2002). 
138 Article 8 of Takeover Measures. 
139 Article 37 and 99 of the Company Law of PRC. 
140  For instance, according to the statistics collected by CSMAR Solution, by the end of 2014, the largest 
shareholders with shareholding exceeding 50% accounted for nearly 20% of listed companies, available at 
http://www.gtarsc.com. 
141 Articles 37 and 99 of the Company Law of PRC. 
142 C.X. Weng, “Inside or Outside the Corporate Law Box? Shareholder Primacy and Corporate Social Responsibility 
in China” (2017) 18 European Business Organization Law Review 155. 
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vulnerable to unjust treatment, especially in the context of takeovers. However, it 
should be noted that addressing shareholders’ concerns to the exclusion of other 
stakeholders may not positively affect firm value or shareholders’ interests in the long 
run. In addition, whether the maximisation of shareholder value is the only objective 
of firm management should be open to question. These criticisms of shareholder 




The vulnerability of employees in hostile takeovers as discussed in this chapter lies in 
three aspects. Due to the corporate governance model of shareholder primacy adopted 
by Chinese firms, corporate management is devoted to furthering the interests of 
shareholders. Therefore, in the context of takeovers, implicit contracts between the 
employer and employees are expected to be breached to attain the end of shareholder 
value maximisation. This is especially the case in hostile takeovers, when the obstacle 
to a breach of implicit contracts is removed. Since new management are not bound by 
the reputation of trustworthiness of the outgoing management, they are more willing 
to maximise shareholders’ interests at the expense of the welfare of employees. As a 
result, employees tend to be confronted with unfavourable treatment, such as job losses 
or wage cuts. Considering that hostile takeovers are projected to rise in China, more 
workers are expected to experience negative treatment, which is a problem that needs 
to be resolved before it spirals out of control.  
 
The vulnerability of workers in hostile takeovers leads to the requirement for strong 
labour protection mechanism. However, in addition to employees’ demands, it seems 
that improving labour protection and participation aligns with firm interests too, which 






Chapter 2: Theoretical Foundations for Employee Protection 
and Participation in Hostile Takeovers 
 
Various theories can be used to seek a stronger labour protection mechanism in hostile 
takeovers. The first category is corporate governance models that are opposed to 
shareholder primacy, asserting that other stakeholders’ interests should also be 
considered by directors. The second arises from economic considerations, holding that 
taking employees’ interests into consideration in hostile takeovers, especially to 
deepen their involvement, aligns with firms’ interests. Both categories are examined 
in this chapter, in order to justify how employee protection and involvement in hostile 
takeovers aligns with firm interests. 
 
2.1 Challenges to Shareholder Primacy and other Corporate 
Governance Models 
 
The ideology of shareholder primacy has not been left unchallenged. Its dominance in 
corporate governance theory requires corporate management to prioritise shareholders’ 
interests at the expense of those of other stakeholders, including employees. In hostile 
takeovers, directors are encouraged to neglect employees’ claims, especially when 
they conflict with the shareholders’ interests. This is against business ethics, such as 
the ethics applicable to business situations, which may vary in different cultures.143 
Such codes require the management of a corporation to act ethically and take into 
account anyone who might be affected by their actions and decisions. Accordingly, in 
the context of takeovers, employees’ interests should be given reasonable 
consideration, even though they may sometimes be considered an obstacle to takeovers. 
It should be noted that in terms of relations with other stakeholders, shareholder 
primacy holds that “maximizing profits for equity investors assists the other 
constituencies automatically”. 144  This relates shareholders’ value to firm value. 
Accordingly, since maximising firm value will lead to a wealthy firm, which is more 
 
143 B. Tricker and G. Tricker, Business Ethics: A Stakeholder, Governance and Risk Approach (Routledge-2014) 7. 
144 Easterbrook & Fischel, The Economic Structure (n 122) 38. 
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likely to provide employees with better welfare, both shareholders’ and other 
constituencies’—including employees—interests are addressed. However, this may be 
true in certain circumstances only, and may not be valid for hostile takeovers. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, there is no clear evidence showing that target firms improve 
their performance after takeovers, whereas incumbent shareholders quit such firms 
with a premium over the share price. Consequently, employees are exposed to the 
expropriation of rents in this process.  
 
Theories of the firm that support shareholder primacy have also been challenged. As 
to the property rights theory, its support of shareholder primacy does not necessarily 
lead to directors’ neglect of employees’ interests. First, the property right is not 
unrestricted,145 since directors should also serve the interests of stakeholders other than 
shareholders, for ethical reasons. This leads to the notion that the corporation should 
be managed without harming the basic interests of other stakeholders. Accordingly, in 
the context of takeovers, the transfer of control of the firm can be deemed as a transfer 
of property rights by shareholders. Although the new owners (new shareholders) have 
the right to dispose of the newly gained property (the firm), this should not be contrary 
to the employees’ basic welfare. Second, property rights should be understood within 
the context of the fundamental idea of distributive justice, and the principles of 
distribution can be pluralistic. This argument is adopted to support the idea that the 
shareholders are not the only owners. This is because “the property consists of a bundle 
of rights which the owner of property possesses with regard to something- rights to 
possess, use, dispose of, exclude others, and manage and control”,146 and different 
rights of the property of the firm can be distributed to different groups of stakeholders 
based on different principles. For instance, the property can be distributed to the 
shareholders according to their financial investment, while long-standing employees 
can have property distributed according to their human capital. In this regard, 
employees are also perceived as owners of the firm. In the case of a change of the 
controlling shareholders, the interests of employees as co-owners of the firm should 
be reasonably addressed based on their investment (of human capital, etc.) in the firm. 
 
145 R. H. Coase, “the Problem of Social Cost” (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 44. 




According to the nexus-of-contracts theory, the relationship of stakeholders with the 
firm is contractual, whereas shareholders are the residual claimants. However, it does 
not naturally follow from this claim that the non-contractual relationships of 
stakeholders should not be considered by directors. To begin with, the concept of 
contracting needs to be broadly interpreted to include legal and moral issues. This 
argument recognises the incompleteness of contracts, and the use of corporate laws147 
and morality to fill the gaps in open-ended contacts. This supplementation to the 
contract incorporates the legal, and in particular moral, factors into directors’ 
management practices, making it compatible with the stakeholder theory. Second, 
stakeholders incur costs in contracting with firms. In particular, the representatives 
rather than the contractors themselves negotiate the contracts,148 and this relationship 
is similar to the principal‒agent relationship, incurring agency costs. Combined with 
the inequality between the stakeholders and the company, the responsibility of the 
directors should not be limited to performing the terms of the contracts but must also 
include reducing the agency costs and procuring fair bargaining in contracting. Third, 
the shareholders are in reality only rarely the only residual claimants. For instance, 
employees who make human capital investments in the company can also be deemed 
to be residual claimants,149  or stakeholders’ residual claims can be attained from 
contracts ex ante.150 In sum, any constituency that makes firm-specific investments in 
the firm can be treated as a residual claimant. 
 
In this discussion, the incomplete contract theory seems relevant. It posits that a set of 
contracts cannot capture or fully explain the complexity of relationships in a firm.151 
This is because parties cannot fully anticipate everything in contracting ex ante, 
whereas some of the non-specified conditions cannot be contracted ex post. 
Accordingly, there should be some mechanism to fill the gaps or to deal with 
ambiguities in the contracts, in which discretion should be given to those who have 
 
147 Easterbrook & Fischel, The Economic Structure (n 122) 35. 
148 Easterbrook & Fischel, The Economic Structure (n 122) 16. 
149  M. M. Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-first century (The 
Brookings Instituion-1995) 238. 
150 J. R. Macey, “Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory 
of the Firm Perspective” (1999) 84 Cornell Law Review 1266 at 1281. 
151 Grossman and Hart (n 80).  
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residual rights of control, which relate closely to the ownership of the corporation.152 
In this case, it appears that the corporation is deemed a combination, being a nexus of 
contracts as well as a type of property. As identified by Bainbridge, “business 
organization law does have elements of property law, as well as contract law.”153 
According to the incomplete contract theory, there are two relations, namely 
contractual relations and property rights relations. The contractual relationship is 
described first.  
 
One feature of contracts is that the relationship between a company and its 
stakeholders are bidirectional, which means that both parties to the contracts must 
fulfil duties to the other. Those who have contracts with the firm (shareholders, 
employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, the government, etc.) should comply with 
their rights and duties contracted beforehand based on fair negotiation and bargaining, 
while the conditions that are or cannot be specified should be clarified in accordance 
with their relevant residual rights of control. Those parties to the contract, in particular, 
who have all the residual rights of control over the non-specified actions tend to favour 
themselves, which is cause for major concern to the other parties. In a corporation, the 
shareholders are deemed to be the owner of property of the corporation, giving them 
the residual rights of control. Thus, other constituencies who do not have the residual 
rights of control may withhold some of the contract-specific investments for risk 
averse purposes. This is especially the case with regards to the employer-employee 
relationship. There is asymmetry between the employer and employees because the 
latter is economically dependent on the former,154 and “many details of the job to be 
carried out are left to the employer’s discretion.”155 Employees who are aware of their 
inferior residual rights of control over the shareholders may be reluctant to make 
contract-specific investments fearing their potential loss of benefits in non-specified 
conditions. Therefore, the residual rights of control held by shareholders, which are 
 
152 The residual right of control refers to the right to “control all aspects of the asset that have not been explicitly 
given away by contract.” This right is fully illustrated in O. R. Hart, “In Complete Contracts and the Theory of the 
Firm” (1988) 4 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 119 at 123. 
153 S. M. Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance (n 123) 32. 
154 B. Baudry and V. Chassagnon, “The Analysis of Employment Relationship in Contract Economic Theories: A 
Critical Review Based on the Nature of American and French Labor Law” (2018) 27 Economie et Insitutions, 
available at https://journals.openedition.org/ei/6127#tocto3n1. 
155 S. Peck and P. Temple, Mergers and Acquisitions: Motivation (Routeledge-2002) 147. 
 
40 
conferred by their ownership of the property of firm, are detrimental to the benefits of 
the employer and employees. Accordingly, in order to achieve the optimal benefits of 
the contract, employees should be granted some of the residual rights of control.156 
The theoretical basis of this allocation can be examined from the property relationship 
perspective of the firm. 
 
The owners of the property of the firm are perceived to have the residual rights of 
control. In addition to shareholders who make capital investments in the firm, other 
stakeholders, especially employees, also have property rights. Based on the 
fundamental idea of distributive justice, the principles of distribution can be pluralistic. 
This is because “the property consists of a bundle of rights which the owner of property 
possesses with regard to something- rights to possess, use, dispose of, exclude others, 
and manage and control,”157 and different rights of the property of the firm can be 
distributed to different groups of stakeholders based on different principles. For 
instance, a property can be distributed to the shareholders according to their capital 
investment, while long-standing employees can have the property distributed 
according to their human capital. In this regard, employees can be allocated residual 
rights of control due to their ownership of the firm. However, it should be noted that 
although employees have property rights and accordingly residual rights of control, 
these rights are inferior to those of shareholders. Therefore, the property rights of 
shareholders should be subject to certain restraints. 158  The restraints that can be 
suggested that include laws and regulations, such as corporate law, labour law, and 
environmental law. Other restraints involve business ethics or, more precisely, 
corporate social responsibility (CSR).159 Faced with pressures linked to environmental, 
political, and social factors, business ethics require the management of a corporation 
 
156 Grossman & Hart (n 80). 
157 D. Votaw, Modern Corporations (Prentice-Hall-1965) 96. 
158 The restrains can be various, and one should be business ethics, see R.E. Freeman, J. S. Harrison, J. S., A.C. 
Wicks, B.L. Parmar, and S. De Colle, Stakeholder Theory: The State of the Art (Cambridge University Press-2010) 
195-234. 
159  In practice, and as confirmed by various scholars, laws business ethics and CSR are applied throughout 
corporate governance, rather than only to restricted relationships in the corporation. For instance, see K. E. 
Goodpaster, “Business Ethics and Stakeholder Analysis” (1991) 1 Business Ethics Quarterly 53. Here I suggest that 




to act ethically and consider anyone who may be affected by their actions and 
decisions.160 
 
In the context of hostile takeovers, employees should be allocated extra rights from 
the perspective of the contractual relationship as well as the property relationship. For 
the former, hostile takeovers lead to the risk of a breach of implicit employment 
contract. This has been discussed in detail in section 1.2.2. Meanwhile, massive lay-
offs, which are commonly observed in hostile takeovers, lead to employees’ loss of 
property rights. Therefore, it should be noted that the incomplete contract theory 
provides the theoretical grounds for employee involvement in hostile takeovers’ 
decision making.   
 
Recognising the flaws of shareholder primacy and inspired by the development of 
theories of the firm, three leading theories on corporate governance models are 
examined in this section. The first is enlightened shareholder value (ESV), which can 
be presented as something of a modification of shareholder primacy. It similarly 
prioritises shareholders’ interests, albeit over the long term. Therefore, interests of 
corporate constituencies should be considered. The second is the team production 
theory, which perceives a public corporation as a team of members who make specific 
investments in the firm for mutual gains. Accordingly, workers as team members 
should be fairly treated by management. The third is stakeholder theory, which is 
diametrically opposed to shareholder primacy. It asserts that the furtherance of 
shareholders’ interests should not be understood as the sole objective of the directors, 
and therefore directors should be accountable to different stakeholder groups as a 
whole. All these models have systemic flaws if presented as univocal foundations or 
models of corporate governance, but they do provide a response to the criticisms of 
shareholder primacy, and veer towards relatively more stakeholder oriented corporate 
governance models. These models, accordingly, lay potential theoretical foundations 
for employees to express their claims for fairer treatment. This chapter examines these 
 
160 Y. Pesqueux, “Corporate Social Responsibility: The Exhausting of a Management Topic” in A. Tencati and F. 
Perrini (eds), Business Ethics and Corporate Sustainability (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited-2011) 46. 
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theories, with an emphasis on their systemic disadvantages and advantages with regard 
to labour protection.  
 
2.1.1 Enlightened Shareholder Value 
 
“Enlightened shareholder value” can be understood in terms of the proposition that 
addressing shareholders’ concerns to the exclusion of other stakeholders does not 
positively affect shareholders’ interests in the long run.161 It can be contrasted with 
shareholder primacy theory. To be specific, shareholder primacy inculcates in 
directors a short-term focus on shareholders’ interests, which can be deleterious for 
various other groups including employees, and even for the long-term wellbeing of the 
company.162 Accordingly, enlightened shareholder value theory claims that “managers 
should make all decisions so as to increase the total long-run market value of the 
firm.”163 
 
The concept of enlightened shareholder value states that the corporation should be 
managed exclusively for the interests of shareholders. It aligns the shareholders’ 
interests with stakeholders’ claims while recognising the diversity of shareholder and 
other constituencies’ interests.164 This theory holds that the corporation should be 
managed exclusively for the interests of shareholders, as “shareholders are the only 
stakeholders of a corporation who simultaneously maximize everyone’s claim in 
maximizing their own”.165 In hostile takeovers, enlightened shareholder value “allows 
directors leeway to take into account the interests of non-shareholder 
constituencies”,166 as long as these are compatible with firm welfare and shareholders’ 
long-term interests. 
 
161 Deakin (n 111). 
162 L.E. Mitchell, Corporate Irresponsibility: America’s Newest Export (Yale University Press-2001) 185. 
163 M. C. Jensen, “Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function” (2002) 12 
Business Ethics Quarterly 235.  
164 V. H. Ho, “’Enlightened Shareholder Value’: Corporate Governance beyond the Shareholder- Stakeholder Divide” 
(2010) 36 Journal of Corporate Law 59 at 62. 
165 T. Copeland, T. Koller and J. Murrin, Valuation, Measuring and Managing (John Wiley-2010) 22. 
166 S. Deakin, R. Hobbs, D. Nash, and G. Slinger, “Implicit Contracts, Takeovers and Corporate Governance: in the 
Shadow of the City Code” (2002) ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper 254, 






On the other hand, compared to shareholder primacy, enlightened shareholder value is 
stakeholder oriented. The managers have to make decisions while accounting for the 
interests of all stakeholders in their firm, as stakeholders can substantially influence 
the welfare of the corporation. Accordingly, this approach values the building of long-
term relationships, which requires directors to strike a balance between the competing 
interests of different stakeholder groups.167  
 
The UK adopted the ESV theory in the Companies Act 2006, 168  which requires 
directors to have regard for a range of interests, including employees’, in order to 
promote the success of the company. It can be presented as a modification of 
shareholder primacy, where similarly directors with shareholder oversight remain the 
core decision-making authority. 169  However, it should be noted that there is no 
effective enforcement mechanism for workers if directors do not consider their 
interests. In addition, there are some practical difficulties in implementing the 
enlightened shareholder value theory. First, although shareholders’ interests should be 
prioritised under the enlightened shareholder value, by providing directors with 
relatively clear guidance to manage the company in terms of other stakeholders, the 
directors are still empowered to exercise their own preferences in distributing attention 
and resources to different groups of stakeholders, leading to the “two master 
problem”,170 which means that “a manager told to serve two masters has been freed of 
both and is answerable to neither. Faced with a demand from either group, the manager 
can appeal to the interests of the other”. If the discretion of allocating resources 
between different stakeholder groups is left exclusively to the directors in takeovers, 
without an effective mechanism to consult employees as well as other stakeholders of 
the firm, their interests will not be considered properly. Second, as the most influential 
constituency in a firm, who has the power to elect and dismiss directors, undoubtedly 
shareholders’ interests should be given a large measure of attention by the directors in 
almost every case, which means there is no real difference from shareholder primacy. 
 
167 The Company Law Review Steering Group, Department of Trade and Industry, “Modern Company Law for a 
Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework” (2000) 15. 
168 Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 of the United Kingdom. 
169 Ho (n 163) at 62. 
170 Easterbrook & Fischel, The Economic Structure (n 122) 38. 
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This is especially the case in hostile takeovers, where UK laws protect employees’ 
information rights but reject workers’ participation in decision making regarding 
takeovers.171 
 
In terms of the ESV, the short-term focus on shareholder interests tends to overshadow 
other constituencies of the firm, and the firm and shareholders are negatively affected 
in the long run. Therefore, all stakeholders’ claims should receive the consideration of 
directors in corporate governance. This is particularly important in hostile takeovers, 
where incumbent shareholders have a strong incentive to maximise their short-term 
interests at the expense of other stakeholders. In order to alleviate the negative impacts 
of hostile takeovers on the interests of the firm, the claims of stakeholders, including 
employees, should be considered by the directors. However, according to this theory, 
the extent to which employee interests should be considered remain at the discretion 
of directors. This leads to practical difficulties as evidenced in the UK laws that have 
adopted enlightened shareholder value theory. Inspired by this theory, this thesis 
advances the claim that in order for management to be accountable to employees in 
hostile takeovers, where the latter are vulnerable to unjust treatment, an effective 
mechanism should be established involving employees in corporate decision making. 
  
2.1.2 Team Production Theory 
 
The team production theory is revolutionary, in comparison with the ESV approach. 
According to the team production theory, the public corporation is “a team of people 
who enter into complex agreement[s] to work together for their mutual gain”.172 In 
other words, this public corporation is “a nexus of firm-specific investments made by 
many and varied individuals who give up control over those resources to a decision-




171 Section 2.7, 2.11, 24.1, 25.9 and 32.6 of the City Code. 
172 Blair & Stout (n 124) at 278. 
173 Blair & Stout (n 124) at 285. 
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In terms of corporate governance, the team production theory suggests a mediating 
hierarchy model.174 Specifically, there are layers of hierarchy within the firm, with the 
hierarchy at the highest levels having the responsibility to encourage firm-specific 
investments, monitor shirking and rent seeking,175  and to resolve disputes among 
members at the lower levels. Accordingly, the board of directors, which has the 
ultimate decision-making authority and full discretion to mediate conflicts of team 
members with different interests, acts as the top hierarchy structure.176 In this case, the 
directors cannot act as the agents of the shareholders, but as trustees of the corporation, 
or more precisely of the team members. However, in realising the supremacy of the 
directors, the team production theory does not deem it necessary to monitor the 
directors, since directors relate their interests and reputation with the firm, and 
therefore can be restricted by legislation and norms of fairness and trust.177  
 
The team production theory is insightful, because it describes corporate governance 
from a refreshingly new perspective. The interests of firms’ constituents are based on 
their firm-specific investments,178 and accordingly a firm can be deemed as a nexus of 
firm investments. This is distinguished from the property rights and the nexus-of-
contract theories. Relationships between directors and shareholders and other 
stakeholders are deemed as based on trust, which is different from the agency 
relationship as described in other corporate governance models. However, directors, 
who have superiority in corporate governance, are accountable to all members in the 
team, which also therefore leads to the “two master problem”. In addition, the theory 
has some systemic flaws. 179  For instance, the production team are defined as “a 
collection of individuals who are interdependent in their tasks, who share 
responsibility for outcomes, [and] who see themselves and who are seen by others as 
 
174 Blair & Stout (n 124) at 276-286. 
175 Shirking occurs when team members fail to make optimum efforts to exert their responsibility to achieve joint 
success while rent seeking means team members seek to compete for the fixed amount of wealth, which is costly 
in terms of the resources, time and money. 
Blair & Stout (n 124) at 290-292. 
177 Blair & Stout (n 124) at 315-319. 
178 Blair & Stout (n 124) at 295. 
179  See M. M. Bainbridge, “The Case against Blair & Stout’s Team Production Model” (2015), available at 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2015/01/the-case-against-blair-stouts-team-
production-model.html; Also see R. Harris, “The History of Team Production Theory” (2014) 38 Seattle University 
Law Review 537. 
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an intact social entity embedded in one or more larger social systems ....”180 This 
definition perceives the tasks of team members as inseparable, but this does not comply 
with the reality of large firms where the firm’s constituencies may have separable tasks 
rather than inseparable. It also cannot adequately explain the corporate governance of 
firms with a dominant shareholder or other dominant constituent, considering that the 
directors will struggle to play a mediating role in such a case.181  
 
Under the team production theory, the directors hold fiduciary duties to the corporation, 
and accordingly to all team members of the firm. Therefore, in hostile takeovers, 
corporate management have the responsibility to resist the potential takeover if it is 
compatible with the benefit of all members. If the takeover is hostile and favoured by 
shareholders, the directors are obliged to address the conflict between shareholders 
who want to obtain a premium over their shares and stakeholders such as employees 
who are in pursuit of stable employment. However, this may prove difficult in practice, 
as directors are also expected to be negatively affected by the potential takeover. This 
makes them lose their neutral role as a mediator in dealing with conflicts between 
shareholders and employees. Therefore, at least in hostile takeovers, directors should 
not be endowed with the discretion to address the conflicts of team members at lower 
levels of the hierarchy.  
 
In conclusion, the team production theory provides two implications for workers’ 
involvement in hostile takeovers. First, as team members who contribute to the team 
production, employee claims should be considered to encourage their firm-specific 
investments. This positively affects the firm’s welfare. Second, since directors are 
incompetent to act as mediators in addressing conflicts between shareholders and 
employees, there is a risk that directors may take advantage of employee claims to 
safeguard their personal interests. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a mechanism 
for workers to make themselves heard by shareholders without intervention of 
directors.  
 
180 S.G. Cohen and D.E. Bailey, “What Makes Teams Work: Group Effectiveness Research from the Shop Floor to 
the Executive Suite” (1997) 23 Journal of Management 239.  
181 J.C. Coates, “Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable are US Public Corporations” 




2.1.3 Stakeholder Theory 
 
As a theory distinct from shareholder primacy,182 stakeholder theory claims that the 
corporation is required to serve a wider range of interests, which are not subordinate 
to shareholder value.183 In light of increasing business turbulence in the western world, 
globalisation, and ethics becoming a routine factor in a manager’s job, less 
shareholder-oriented corporate governance models were formulated in the 1980s.184 
Stakeholder theory was one of the leading theories among these more egalitarian 
governance models. It cares more about business ethics while focusing on value and 
trade creation and changing the mindset of the managers.185 The idea of this theory can 
be dated back to Adam Smith,186 who raised the concept of “justice and beneficence” 
in business practices. According to these scholars, employees have intrinsic value. 
This is because management decisions, especially those relating to takeovers, 
significantly influence the work environment and conditions, thereby shaping workers’ 
personalities and life. Hence, they deserve to be treated with dignity and fairness.187 
Accordingly, directors’ fiduciary obligations transcend shareholders’ short-term 
interests and are subject to moral duties in their execution, and in any case they go 
beyond mere compliance with laws.188 In addition, in the long-run, companies with a 
record of ethical management are observed to outperform competitors that lack this 
focus.189 
 
Definition of Stakeholders 
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Toronto Press-1998) 243. 
 
48 
Stakeholder theory arguably has remained underdeveloped, since the scholarship on 
stakeholders is a “content free” field with “a muddling of theoretical bases and 
objectives”. 190  Scholars have not even reached agreement on the definition of 
stakeholders. On the other hand, no matter how employees are defined, without doubt 
they fall into the category of “stakeholders”. However, the definition of stakeholders 
determines employees’ relationship with the firm, which affects how they should be 
treated in corporate governance theory. 
 
One of the most cited concepts connects the stakeholders with the corporation through 
“affect” and “affected by”, defining a stakeholder as “any group or individual who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives”.191 This 
definition is so broad that it is capable of including virtually anyone, or any group, 
within the scope of stakeholders. Almost anyone who indirectly or incidentally relates 
to the firm or even anyone who thinks they are affected by the firm can be defined as 
a stakeholder under this definition. In this way, the notion of the stakeholder “risks 
becoming a meaningless designation”. 192  Other researchers see the stakeholders’ 
connection with the company as one that is “dependent for its (the organisation’s) 
continued survival”. 193  This definition greatly narrows down the scope of the 
“stakeholders” and highlights the necessity of the stakeholders for the corporation. 
However, the “survival” standard is obviously too narrow a definition, since it may 
exclude many recognisable stakeholders in terms of our common intuition. For 
instance, in the event of a corporate crisis, employees may face redundancy if their 
employers cut costs. However, when these former employees are laid off, they are no 
longer dependant on the firm for survival, and are therefore excluded from the 
definition of “stakeholders”.  This finding would follow from the organisational 
survival logic, plainly runs counter to the ethical basis of the stakeholder theory. There 
 
190  T. Donaldson and L. E. Preston, “The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and 
Implications” (1995) 20 Academy of Management Review 65 at 73. 
191 Freeman et al, Stakeholder Theory (n 157) 46. 
192 Freeman et al, Stakeholder Theory (n 157) 207. 
193 The first concept of the stakeholder as identified by R.E. Freeman in 1984, was made by the Stanford Research 
Institute in 1963, which was "those groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist." See 
Freeman, Strategic Management (n 183) in 1984 (Reprinted in 2010) 34. R.E Freeman defined stakeholders as 
“any identifiable group or individual on which the organization is dependent for its continued survival.” See R.E. 
Freeman and D.L. Reed, “Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New Perspective on Corporate Governance” (1983) 
15 California Management Review. 88 at 91.  
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have been many other attempts to forge an appropriate definition of the stakeholder. 
Based on different concepts, the stakeholders’ connection with the firm can be rooted 
in contract,194 an exchange,195 legal title, a legal right, a moral right,196 an at-risk 
status,197  or interest in the harm and benefit generated by corporate activity and 
conduct.198 It is difficult to synthesize or harmonise these different accounts. This is 
because these definitions are made under different contexts. With regard to those 
commentators who have tried to expand the scope of the theory by including almost 
everything within the ambit of stakeholders,199 the stakeholder is defined in a macro-
political context. Meanwhile, other commentators deem the stakeholder theory as a 
strategic management approach, and as such practicability counts. Moreover, 
stakeholder theory is dynamic rather than static, 200  considering the constantly 
changing circumstances both outside and inside companies.  
 
Having realised these difficulties, scholars have turned to focus on the attributes of the 
stakeholder: (1) the stakeholder’s power to influence the firm; (2) the legitimacy of the 
stakeholder’s relationship with the firm; and/or (3) the urgency of the stakeholder’s 
claim on the firm.201 With regard to attribute (2), inspired by the incomplete contract 
theory, the legitimacy of employees’ relationship with the firm arises from their 
employment contract with firms and their human capital input in the firm. In the 
context of hostile takeovers, employees are vulnerable to unjust treatment, which 
resonates with attribute (3). Accordingly, the extent to which workers’ interests are 
 
194 Freeman and Evan (n 182). The stakeholders are those who have explicit or implicit contracts with the firm.  
195 For example, in Blair, Ownership and Control (n 148) 202. The corporation should serve parties who have 
contributed inputs to the enterprise, and who as a result, have at risk investments that are highly specialized to 
the enterprise. 
196 A. B. Carroll, Business and Society: Ethics and Stakeholder Management (Cincinnati: South-Western-1989) 57. 
The stakes can be “ranging from an interest to a right (legal or moral) to ownership or legal title to the company’s 
assets or property”. 
197 E.W. Orts and A. Strudler, “The Ethical and Environmental Limits of Stakeholder Theory” (2002) 12 Business 
Ethics Quarterly 215 at 218. Stakeholders are “participants in a business (who) have some kind of economic stake 
directly at risk”. 
198 Donaldson & Preston (n 189) at 85. Stakeholders can be “identified through the actual or potential harms and 
benefits that they experience or anticipate experiencing as a result of the firm’s actions or inactions”. 
199 M. Starik, “Should Trees Have Managerial Standing? Toward Stakeholder Status for Non-human Nature” (1995) 
14(3) Journal of business ethics 207. The stakeholders can even include non-human entities. 
200 V. Luoma-aho and M. Vos, “Towards a More Dynamic Stakeholder Model: Acknowledging Multiple Issue 
Arenas” (2010) 15 Corporate Communications: An International Journal 315 at 316. 
201 R. K. Mitchell, B. R. Agle, and D.J. Wood, “Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining 
the Principle of Who and What Really Counts” (1997) 22 Academy of management review 853 at 865. 
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taken care of in takeovers depends on their power to influence the takeover decision 
based on attribute (1). In this case, a mechanism that empowers workers is needed, in 
order to safeguard their rights in the process of takeovers.  
 
Treatment of Workers in Hostile Takeovers 
 
Stakeholder theory provides workers with a theoretical basis to put forward their views 
on the potential takeover and to negotiate terms and conditions of employment 
contracts comparatively fairly and equally. As to the intensity of legal intervention to 
enhance labour protection, there are three levels posited by scholars:202 1) stakeholders 
should be treated fairly and with respect; 2) the interests of stakeholders should be 
considered; 3) stakeholders should participate in corporate decision-making processes. 
Influenced by this theory, thirty states of the United States have so far adopted 
corporate constituency statutes, which allow officers and directors to give weight to 
the interests of all stakeholders, including employees, in addition to performing their 
fiduciary duties to shareholders.203 They were widely criticised by scholars, since 
incumbent managers might use them to entrench themselves. This might explain the 
poor appeal of these statutes in courtrooms, considering that managers tended to use 
takeover defence tactics to retain their jobs. As a result, these constituency statutes 
have not performed as effectively as expected.204 Another example that is related to 
stakeholder theory is the German co-determination mechanism. Unlike the UK and US 
laws which leave it to the discretion of directors to take employees’ claims into account, 
German corporations have established a practicable and effective mechanism to 
respond to employees’ claims in corporate takeovers. Employees deserve to have a 
voice in the context of takeovers.205 Accordingly, this thesis uses this proposition as a 
role model to resolve the issue of the currently ineffective protection of employees in 
takeovers. Accordingly, a more detailed examination is made in Chapter 4.  
 
 
202 J. Henry, “Missing the Target: Normative Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Governance Debate” (2001) 11 
Business Ethics Quarterly 159 at 167. 
203 J.D. Springer, “Corporate Constituency Statues: Hollow Hopes and False Fears” (1999) 85 Annual Survey of 
American Law 95. 
204 B. McDonnell, “Corporate Constituency Statues and Employee Governance” (2004) 30 William Mitchel Law 
Review 1227. 
205 R. Dahl, A Preface to Economic Democracy (University of California Press-1985) 111. 
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Remarks on Stakeholder Theory 
 
Stakeholder theory provides an inspiring theoretical foundation for employee 
protection in hostile takeovers. However, the relationship between employees and 
directors has not been clarified. Some put forth the stakeholder agency theory,206 
arguing that the connection between the directors and employees parallels the 
principal‒agent relationship between shareholders and employees. Such a parallel 
seems misconceived. This is because in an agency relationship the agent’s authority 
comes from the principal. In corporate governance, employees do not have effective 
powers to appoint or dismiss directors. It should be noted that workers in China have 
the right to elect employee members on the board of directors of companies, which 
may constitute the agency relationship. However, as examined in Chapter 3, these 
elected directors can hardly represent workers’ interests and they are unable to make 
any difference in the decision making of the board of directors even when they speak 
for employees. In addition, even if the connection between employees and directors 
constitutes an agency relationship, directors may also have a relationship with other 
stakeholders such as shareholders and creditors, which again leads to the “two masters 
problem”.  
 
Others scholars raise the “fiduciary stakeholder principle” by holding that like the 
fiduciary duty that directors have towards the shareholders, they also owe such a duty 
to stakeholders.207 However, critics argue that a fiduciary duty to stakeholders other 
than the shareholders may damage the moral basis of the “fiduciary”. 208  More 
specifically, shareholders exhibit control vulnerability and information vulnerability 
to managers. The two types of vulnerability constitute the moral basis for directors’ 
fiduciary duty towards shareholders. The shareholders do not have enough information 
to evaluate corporate management, and even if they have such information, they 
normally lack the wisdom to evaluate the management’s decisions. Therefore, 
directors’ fiduciary duties to shareholders are morally significant. In comparison, 
 
206 C. W. L. Hill and T. M. Jones, “Stakeholder Agency Theory” (1992) 29 Journal of Management Studies 131.  
207 R. E. Freeman, “The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Directions” (1994) 4 Business Ethics Quarterly 
409. 
208 A. M. Marcoux, “A Fiduciary argument against Stakeholder Theory” (2003) 13 Business Ethics Quarterly 1. 
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employees do not have share the same vulnerability, which lacks the moral basis for 
fiduciary duties. The information that employees need is more about the employment 
relationship, and this information can be observed because employees are more aware 
of managers’ performance on the employment contract. In addition, they have the 
discretion to reduce or withdraw their human capital investments in the firm at any 
time because the amount they invest cannot be specified in their contract. In this case, 
directors’ relationship with employees is not morally significant. Hence, uniform 
fiduciary duties to all stakeholders will damage the shareholders’ moral claims on 
directors.   
 
A more recent argument states that stakeholders’ interests should be in harmony, and 
therefore the stakeholders’ interests should be considered as a whole, 209  which 
parallels the team production theory. Similarly, it is a challenge for directors to balance 
interests among different stakeholders and they become vulnerable to the “two masters 
problem”.  
 
This thesis does not aim to refine or develop this theory. Despite the theoretical as well 
as practical difficulties, stakeholder theory provides insights by identifying the 
deficiencies of shareholder primacy and arguing for a stakeholder-oriented corporate 
management model. This also complies with the mindset of managers, since “the vast 
majority of them apparently adhere in practice to one of the central tenets of 
stakeholder theory, namely, that their role is to satisfy a wider set of stakeholders, not 
simply the share owners”.210 
 
In conclusion, both ESV and stakeholder theories highlight the value of stakeholders, 
including employees, to the firm, which evidences the trend for a less shareholder-
oriented approach in corporate governance. In addition, after examining the practical 
difficulties of these stakeholder-oriented models, it is evident that without a 
 
209 R. Phillips, R. E. Freeman and A. C. Wicks, “What Stakeholder Theory is Not” (2003) 13 Business Ethics Quarterly 
479. 
210  T. Donaldson and L.E. Preston, “The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence and 
Implications” in M.B.E. Clarkson (ed), the Corporation and Its Stakeholder (n 188) 184. 
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mechanism to involve employees’ claims in takeover decision-making, they will 
experience challenges in having their interests effectively considered by directors.  
 
2.1.4 German Firms’ Approaches to Corporate Governance 
 
The three corporate governance models provide an insight regarding the inclusion of 
stakeholders’ claims in the mindsets of company directors, as well as regarding 
practical difficulties. As this thesis attempts to introduce the German mechanism in 
order to overcome problems in China, it is necessary to examine the German 
approaches to corporate governance. In order to achieve this objective, scholars have 
provided different models, which are analysed as follows.  
 
The German Variant of Stakeholder Theory  
  
Some stakeholder theorists perceive the German corporate governance model as a 
variant of stakeholder theory,211 especially considering the extensive influences of 
workers on corporate decision making. However, the development of stakeholder 
approaches in Germany is independent from the literature in the US, where the idea of 
stakeholder theory originates.212 In other words, although it is generally agreed that 
stakeholders, especially employees, can actively participate in corporate management, 
the German variation of stakeholder approaches shows a distinct pattern.  
 
First, according to the American stakeholder approach, all groups of stakeholders have 
intrinsic value and therefore should be cared for by directors. However, in German 
companies, in addition to shareholders, the interests of two groups of stakeholders are 
particularly considered by the management, namely creditors and employees.213 This 
arises from the unique economic and historical contexts in Germany, which are 
examined in detail in Chapters 4 and 5. Briefly speaking, the emphasis on creditors’ 
 
211 U. Hansen, M. Bode, and D. Moosmayer, “Stakeholder Theory between General and Contextual Approaches- 
A German Veiw” (2004) 5 Zfwu Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts-und Unternehmensethik 242. 
212  R.E. Freeman, “The Stakeholder Approach Revisited” (2004) 5 Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts-und 
Unternehmensethik 228. 
213  S. Vitols, “Negotiated Shareholder Value: the German Variant of an Anglo-American Practice” (2004) 8 
Competition & Change 357. 
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interests arises from the bank-dominated economy, where banks have a decisive say 
over the funding of the company. The strong labour rights came from the entrenched 
spirit of social democracy and long history of unionism.  
 
Second, different from the US model which leaves the balancing of the interests of 
different groups of stakeholders up to the discretion of the corporate leadership, 
German companies have established an effective scheme for employees to safeguard 
their rights and participate in corporate governance, which is referred to as the co-
determination mechanism. (Details of the mechanism can be found in Chapter 5.) This 
arises from the differences in corporate structures between German firms and those in 
the US. To be specific, directors in the former do not have as strong authority as those 
in the latter in terms corporate governance.  
 
To sum up, the German corporate governance model is stakeholder oriented, compared 
to models based in shareholder primacy, since certain stakeholders have the ability to 
influence corporate decision-making, echoing some key arguments of stakeholder 
theory. Accordingly, it is reasonable that some scholars deem the German model as a 
variant of stakeholder theory. However, stakeholder approaches in Germany are 
developed in distinct contexts from those in the American tradition, and therefore, the 
German model cannot be accurately and fully explained by stakeholder theory. In this 
regard, several theories are provided to explain the German approach to corporate 
governance.  
 
The Collective Voice Model  
 
This model is used to explain the ideology underlying the German co-determination 
mechanism, 214  with an emphasis on the relationship between the employer and 
employees internal to the company. The collective voice model is based on three key 
factors underlying the German context.  
 
 




The first is the incompleteness of the contract, which has been discussed in Section 
2.1. Incomplete contracts are expected to lead to problems for both employers and 
employees. Therefore, a mechanism is needed to address the problems for both sides. 
For employers, they need to avoid employees’ withholding their effort input on the job, 
which will be discussed in Section 2.2.2. In the meantime, workers need solutions for 
when they are treated below their expectations and when their needs are not met. In 
general, under this circumstance, workers have the option to quit their jobs and seek 
better employment. However, due to the low mobility of the German labour market 
(details of which can be found in Chapter 4), workers are more likely to engage with 
their voices, especially when they are collectively represented by a workers’ 
representation mechanism. This can be deemed “a victory for workers who no longer 
need to rely on implicit contracting to secure essential benefits in the workplace.”215 
 
Second, collective voices can more effectively and accurately expressed than the voice 
of each individual. Accordingly, workers are organised to express their claims, giving 
strong voices in the company. To be specific, via the worker representation system, 
workers have more incentives to reveal their preferences. This is because “action of 
the part of others may produce the public good at no cost to that individual.”216 In this 
way, collective and unbiased voices that can reflect workers’ general opinions are 
formed, making the expression more efficient and effective. Undoubtedly, the 
collective voices are expected to increase costs in labour management, which forces 
management to save costs elsewhere. 217  However, this system can also improve 
workers’ effort inputs on the job, which would counteract increased labour costs.218 
 
Third, the effectiveness of the model hinges on how management responds to the 
workers’ collective voices. The positive effects of these voices can be thwarted by 
managements’ unfavourable response. In other words, management should make 
adjustments in response to workers’ collective claims to make the latter a positive force 
 
215 C. Hogan, “Enforcement of Implicit Employment Contracts through Unionization” (2002) 19 Journal of Labor 
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to make the firm prosper in the long run.219 Therefore, the relationship between the 
employer and employees is perceived as a partnership rather than opposition, with an 
emphasis on settling conflicts peacefully and cooperatively.  
 
The collective voice model provides insights in how workers are organised and treated 
by corporate management. In other words, it reflects an ideology of workers’ 
participation in corporate management. However, this model does not identify the 
stakeholder relationship, especially the role of shareholders in German firms. 
Accordingly, the negotiated shareholder value model is suggested to explain the 
German approach.  
 
The Negotiated Shareholder Value Model 
 
As discussed above, the German corporate governance model is traditionally perceived 
as the stakeholder model. However, starting in the 1990s, German companies 
witnessed a fundamental change from a stakeholder-oriented to a shareholder-oriented 
corporate governance model.220 This can be evidenced by the gradual adoption of 
shareholder value by German managers and the introduction of investor relations 
departments in most large German corporations. At the same time, employees could 
still exert substantive influence over corporate decisions through the co-determination 
mechanism. In other words, employees’ role in German firms remained stable against 
the more shareholder-oriented approach.221 In this context, the negotiated shareholder 
value model222 is suggested to describe this change in managerial mindset. 
 
Compared to the traditional German corporate governance model, the negotiated 
shareholder value model integrates shareholders, especially institutional shareholders, 
into a stakeholder coalition. Accordingly, shareholder value should be taken into 
account in corporate governance. However, the German variant of shareholder value 
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shows distinct features of shareholder primacy, which is entrenched in the Anglo-
American tradition. Since shareholders and stakeholders, especially employees, work 
in cooperation, a compromise needs to be reached, which may change the nature of 
the demands of shareholder value.  
 
Based on the description of the negotiated shareholder value, whether the shareholders’ 
interests are prioritised in German companies is subject to negotiations and 
compromises between stakeholders. In this regard, although this model identifies the 
increasing role of shareholders, German firms can still be deemed to adopt 
stakeholder-oriented approaches, especially considering the stability of the co-
determination mechanism in German companies.  
 
Against the background of German firms’ adoption of a more shareholder-oriented 
approach, there are scholars who argue that the co-determination mechanism in 
German firms should be weakened or even abandoned.223 However, this thesis does 
not agree with this argument, especially considering the pivotal role of the co-
determination mechanism in implementing the social policies of Germany, which is 
one of the most renowned welfare states. 
 
German Approaches to Corporate Governance and the Welfare State 
 
As one of the most renowned welfare states, Germany pays particular attention to 
safeguarding workers’ rights. This is not only because of the German history of valuing 
workers’ basic rights (see Section 5.3.2), but it is also due to their contributions to the 
German welfare system, which generally has two aspects. 
 
Frist, workers’ participation in corporate decision making brings considerations of 
social policy to corporate policies, which benefits the public welfare. This is especially 
the case considering workers’ pivotal role in implementing social democracy and 
developing the German economy. By establishing the co-determination mechanism, 
 
223 W. Streeck and C. Trampusch, “Economic Reform and the Political Economy of the German Welfare State” (2005) 
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the state spreads the responsibility for the public welfare and social and economic 
prosperity. According to the view of German courts, the workers’ representation and 
participation mechanism “transcended the mere representation of workers in corporate 
decision-making processes.”224 It does not only serve the interests of workers. Rather, 
it is appropriate for politically securing the German market economy, which serves the 
general public. 
 
Second, the German worker representation mechanism is used as an adjustment device 
for implementing social policies, especially to help maintain social harmony and 
stability. Since in Germany, the collective bargaining between employers and 
employees is independent of state intervention, which is referred to as the principle of 
Tarifautonomie, the co-determination mechanism is decisive in implementing social 
policies promoting welfare through industrial relations.225 Accordingly, guided by the 
state, a compromise between employees and employers is reached. To be specific, 
workers accept the free market system and the management of entrepreneurs whilst 
the latter accept the worker representation mechanism as well as social policies to 
safeguard workers’ interests. 226  This mechanism provides a stable institutional 
framework to resolve conflicts between employees and employers, and through 
frequent interactions and negotiations, these conflicts can be addressed flexibly.  
 
As can be seen above, the workers’ participation in corporate governance arises from 
the state’s need to implement social policies, especially considering that Germany is a 
well-known welfare state. That is to say, beyond the mere economic consideration, the 
entrenchment of the co-determination system in German companies is also out of 
political considerations. Therefore, the value of shareholders' interests has increased, 
but the existing model with a co-determination system and consideration of workers’ 
needs is still too resilient to allow this new valuation of shareholder interests to change 
the governance model much. 
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Macmillan-2018) 127. 
225 C. Trampusch, “Industrial Relations and Welfare States: The Different Dynamics of Retrenchment in Germany 
and the Netherlands” (2006) 16 Journal of European Social Policy 121. 
226 F. Kaufmann, Variations of the Welfare State (Springer-2013) 47. 
 
59 
In conclusion, the German approaches to corporate governance share certain 
similarities with stakeholder theory. However, since the German system is embedded 
in social, economic, and political contexts that are distinct from those in the American 
tradition, the landscape of corporate governance in German firms has its own features. 
In summary, although there is a trend showing that shareholder value is becoming 
more widely adopted in Germany, the entrenchment of the co-determination 
mechanism ensures that German companies continue using a stakeholder approach, 




This section has examined the challenges to shareholder primacy as well as to 
stakeholder-oriented corporate governance models opposed to the former. To be 
specific, prioritising shareholders’ interests whilst neglecting other stakeholders’ 
claims is far from optimal when measured against standards of business ethics. The 
evidence also shows that it is not conducive to firm value. In addition, theories of the 
firm that support shareholder primacy can also explain the connection of other 
stakeholders to the firm. As to the property rights theory, the use of property rights 
should be moral and not harm other stakeholders. Besides, constituents such as 
employees can also be deemed to own the firm. From the perspective of the nexus-of-
contract theory, the relationship of employees with the firm is more than contractual, 
because the contracts can never be complete. Otherwise, they can also be perceived as 
residual claimants due to their firm-specific investments. In this context, the 
incomplete contract theory can perhaps better explain stakeholders’ relationship with 
the firm, which leads to other stakeholder-oriented corporate governance models.  
 
The first is enlightened shareholder value that has been adopted by the UK, which is a 
modification of shareholder primacy. It emphasises the firm’s long-term rather than 
short-term interests. Accordingly, other constituents’ claims should be valued by 
directors since this aligns with shareholders’ long-term interests. However, due to the 
lack of an effective enforcement mechanism, directors’ duties to employees remains a 
“law in the book”. The second is team production theory, which is more revolutionary. 
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It describes a public corporation as a team of members who make specific investments 
in the firm. Directors who have supremacy in corporate management act as mediators 
if there are conflicts among team members. This theory deems directors as trustees of 
the firm, who engage in improving firm value. However, it has limitations in 
describing firms of different types while also leading to the “two masters problem”. 
The third is stakeholder theory, which holds that stakeholders have intrinsic value that 
merits consideration, which is not subordinate to shareholder value. However, this 
theory lacks feasibility in practice because directors being accountable to all 
stakeholders would mean that in fact, they are accountable to none. With regard to 
employees, there is no agreement on their relationship with the firm and the directors. 
At the end of this section, the corporate governance model of German firms was 
examined. Stakeholders in German firms, especially employees, are able to exert 
substantial influence over corporate decision-making, making the model similar to 
stakeholder theory. However, due to the unique economic, social, and political 
background, the German system shows its own characteristics. In brief, the worker 
representation mechanism expresses workers’ collective voices and maintains a 
friendly partnership with employers. This relationship can hardly be altered in the 
foreseeable future, despite the fact that shareholders’ interests are becoming more 
valued by German firms. 
 
Challenges to shareholder primacy and the rise of other corporate governance models 
show a change in directors’ mindset from serving shareholders exclusively to caring 
about other stakeholders’ interests as well. On the other hand, all these shareholder-
oriented models lack practicability. One of the common drawbacks is the “two master 
problem”, making it a challenge for directors to weigh the value of different groups of 
stakeholders. Indeed, it should not be solely at the discretion of directors to balance 
the claims from different constituents. Taking employees, for example, an effective 
mechanism should be established to express their voices to shareholders, which 
impedes directors’ expropriation of other stakeholders’ interests for their own benefits.  
 
In order to maximise shareholders’ interests in the long run, employees’ claims also 
should be valued by management. Stakeholder theorists argue that the interests of 
 
61 
different stakeholder groups should be considered as a whole, and therefore employees’ 
interests should not be subordinated to shareholders’ interests. These theories reflect a 
transformation from shareholder-oriented models to stakeholder-oriented models, 
which suggest that management should pay attention to employees’ claims.  
 
From an examination of the practical difficulties of these stakeholder-oriented theories, 
it is clear that employees’ interests cannot be left entirely to the discretion of the 
management. Instead, an effective employees’ participation mechanism should be 
established to ensure that employees’ views are expressed and valued. The German 
model of corporate governance provides such an effective mechanism.  
 
2.2 Economic Grounds for Enhanced Employee Participation 
in Hostile Takeovers 
 
Having identified a sound theoretical foundation for the enhanced involvement of 
employees in takeovers, this section moves on to explore the economic grounds for 
doing so, with the objective of proving that deeper labour participation positively 
affects firm value.  
 
One of the major concerns about the enhancement of labour protection in the context 
of hostile takeovers is its potential negative impact. In particular, there are scholars 
who argue that a major improvement in the level of labour protection will lead to the 
reduction in takeover activities and the removal of any consequent economic gains to 
both acquirers and target firms.227 This argument is plausible, since enhancing workers’ 
bargaining power is expected to raise compensation in layoffs, and accordingly 
increase the costs of a takeover and the subsequent restructuring. On the other hand, it 
should be noted that employees tend to resist takeovers that may hurt the firms’ long-
term interests,228 while the treatment of workers is one of the key determinants of the 
 
227 O. Dessaint, A. Golubov, and P. Volpin, “Employment Protection and Takeovers” (2017) 125 Journal of Financial 
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success of a takeover.229 Conceivably, a moderate level of employee protection and 
involvement aligns with a firm’s economic interests, being reflected mainly in three 
aspects. First, it helps to improve workers’ productivity, which is conducive to firm 
value. Second, it mitigates risks of employers’ holding up employees’ firm-specific 
investments when faced with hostile takeovers. Third, given a higher level of employee 
supervision over management in takeovers, shareholder‒management costs are 
expected to reduce. These three aspects are analysed below.  
 
2.2.1 Positive Correlation of Employee Involvement with Productivity 
and Firm Performance 
 
Empirical studies show that employee involvement correlates positively to firm 
productivity. 230  According to the incomplete contract theory, which holds that 
employees’ relationship with firms cannot be fully contracted, how much effort 
employees should provide on their job cannot be specified in advance in explicit 
contracts.231 Therefore, one of the key objectives for employers is to encourage and 
maximise their efforts in order to improve productivity. This thesis holds that 
employees’ participation in corporate management can help achieve these objectives, 
since it relates positively to employees’ job satisfaction, job commitment, and 
accordingly productivity.232 Empirical studies also support the positive correlation of 
employees’ participation with firm performance. This subsection describes these 
aspects step by step, to identify how an employee participatory management 
mechanism can positively affect firm value. 
 
Job satisfaction is defined as “a pleasure or positive emotional state resulting from the 
appraisal of one’s job or job experience”.233 In general, firms offering a higher degree 
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of job satisfaction are more likely to thrive and prosper.234 There are empirical studies 
showing that “the effect of an increase in the establishment’s average level of 
employee job satisfaction on productivity is positive”.235 However, this correlation is 
stronger in manufacturing industries than non-manufacturing industries. This 
difference can be explained especially by considering job satisfaction as just one 
determinant of productivity. The productivity of non-manufacturing industries is 
affected by factors such as customer policies and market demand in addition to job 
satisfaction, whereas for manufacturing industries productivity is largely determined 
by the workers’ efforts. Whether workers are willing to put greater effort into their 
jobs depends mainly on their satisfaction. In addition, not all dimensions of job 
satisfaction can motivate workers to improve their productivity. According to the two 
factor theory model formulated by Frederick Herzberg,236 there are two dimensions to 
job satisfaction, which consist of motivating and hygiene factors. Only the former can 
improve employees’ motivation to work, while the latter refers to those factors whose 
absence makes workers less industrious. However, labour empowerment is deemed a 
motivating factor, and employee participation can boost workers’ satisfaction, 
accordingly, improving their productivity. In the context of takeovers, unjust treatment 
arising from a change of management is expected to increase employees’ job anxiety. 
For fear of losing their jobs or a change in work conditions or policies, levels of job 
satisfaction are expected to decrease due to the absence of job security, which is a 
hygiene factor according to the Two Factor Theory Model. Such anxiety accumulated 
over time leads to workers’ difficulty in coping with job demands and inhibits workers’ 
new learning in their jobs. In this context, when workers’ future is unpredictable, a 
mechanism that facilitates information sharing and employees’ participation can help 
to alleviate this job anxiety. This can counteract the negative impact of potential 
takeovers on firms’ productivity.237 
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Job commitment refers to “the relative strength of an individual's identification with 
and involvement in a particular organization”.238 Factors of job commitment include: 
(1) the alignment of individual values with the values and objectives of the firm; (2) 
workers’ willingness to put in considerable effort for the organisation; (3) workers’ 
desire to maintain a long-term relationship with the firm.239 Unlike job satisfaction, 
which is an attitude towards certain aspects of a job,240 job commitment emphasises a 
workers’ bond with the firm, and accordingly the latter is deemed a better predictor of 
productivity than job satisfaction. 241  Empirical studies evidence the positive 
correlation between employees’ deeper participation and job commitment242 as well 
as between job commitment and productivity.243 This is reasonable, since workers’ 
involvement in corporate decisions is expected to bond workers closely with the firm, 
and accordingly they tend to care more about the firm’s long-term value. In this case, 
they have more incentive to make firm-specific investments, such as investing time 
and effort to improve their firm-specific skills, which positively affects their efficiency 
as well as productivity. Empirical studies illustrate that with stronger job commitment 
workers are more likely to be innovative at work244 and exhibit a greater willingness 
to make concessions, such as working overtime voluntarily, which may increase the 
enterprise’s investment in capital.245 Another consequence is that workers become 
more open to engaging in positive discretionary behaviour, such as providing 
assistance to colleagues, adhering to specific rules, and making suggestions to improve 
effectiveness.246 To sum up, stronger job commitment is expected to improve workers’ 
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willingness to put effort into their jobs, and accordingly to improve productivity. If 
workers are endowed with information and participation rights in the context of 
takeovers, when workers are particularly vulnerable to unjust treatment, they are 
expected to have stronger job commitment, which positively affects the firm’s 
productivity. 
 
In conclusion, establishing an employee participatory mechanism in the context of 
hostile takeovers has a positive impact on job satisfaction and job commitment, which 
improves firms’ productivity. However, despite the increased productivity, a stronger 
employee protection and participation mechanism can be a double-edged sword. This 
is because this mechanism has been witnessed to enhance the bargaining power of 
employees,247 which in turn encourages their rent-seeking behaviour. This normally 
results in higher wages and costly labour welfare programmes at the expense of the 
firm’s profits. Workers fighting for their interests may force shareholders to settle for 
a smaller slice of the pie of firm value, although the increase in workers’ productivity 
increases the overall size of the pie. Given this scenario, arguments that stronger labour 
protection does have negative 248  or neutralising 249  effects on the economic 
performance of firms are equally valid, as explained below. 
 
The dominance of any stakeholder group will lead to an expropriation of resources or 
assets from other groups. Accordingly, excessive labour costs arising from workers’ 
increasing bargaining powers are naturally detrimental to firm and shareholder value. 
However, if increased productivity can compensate for the rising labour costs, it is a 
mechanism worth introducing. As identified by previous studies, workers’ 
participation in decision-making (which is measured by employees’ representation on 
the board) and firm value form an inversely U-shaped relationship. To be specific, 
“The prudent use of labour in corporate governance can be value enhancing. Excessive 
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influence of labour, on the other hand, may create a firm that is a ‘country club’ for 
workers”. 250  This can explain why studies repudiate the advantages of labour 
protection and intervention. Although this is based on statistics collected from 
Germany, Chinese firms are expected to follow a similar pattern. Accordingly, if 
workers’ involvement remains at a moderate level, the increased productivity can 
compensate for the costs arising from workers’ participation, which means the 
mechanisms prioritising employee participation in corporate decision-making are 
worth introducing. Unlike German companies, which are renowned for strong 
employee empowerment, Chinese workers have no effective channel to raise their 
voice with management. Hence, as long as workers’ involvement does not exceed a 
moderate level, establishing a workers’ participation mechanism is expected to be 
value enhancing. It should, however, be noted that no uniform optimal level of workers’ 
participation that can maximise firm value can be applied to all companies. The 
appropriate level of employee participation may vary depending on the industry and 
on the specific conditions of a firm, which need to be explored on a case-by-case basis 
in practice.  
 
2.2.2 Employee Participation to Forestall Hold-up Problems 
 
Hold-up problems are central to the incomplete contract paradigm; they refer to a 
situation in which two parties to a contract may be in a position to work efficiently but 
choose to refrain from doing so due to the incompleteness of the contract.251 Hold-up 
problems can occur when two features are present.252 The first is that the parties to the 
contract have made investments prior to the transaction. This can be deemed as the 
preparation for the performance of the contract. The second feature is that the optimal 
level of investments cannot explicitly be specified in the contracts. Both these features 
are found in an employment relationship. 
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With regard to the first feature of prior investments, both the employer and employees 
are expected to invest their resources, time, and effort. For instance, workers may 
move to apartments nearby the workplace for convenience. They may also engage in 
improving their firm-specific skills, while the employer may invest money and 
resources to training them. The costs of these investments are sunk253 in performing 
the employment contract. Unlike other contracts where transactions are made on an 
equal footing, employees and the employer are bound together in a subordination 
relationship, 254  subjecting employees to the orders and regulations made by the 
employer. Therefore, employees are exposed to risks of being held up by the employer.  
 
Regarding the second feature, details of employee behaviours cannot be contracted,255 
and they accordingly have the discretion to decide on the efforts that they are willing 
to make on the job. Therefore, they tend to withhold their firm-specific investments in 
performing the employment contract. Admittedly, employers may have a supervision 
system that aims to discipline workers if they shirk responsibilities, such as in case of 
absenteeism. However, the gap between employees obeying the work policies and 
regulations and their maximising efforts on their job is significant, mainly because the 
optimal levels of employees’ investments cannot be agreed upon by the employer and 
employees beforehand. Therefore, when confronted with any uncertainty about the 
employer’s willingness to invest in the employment relationship or tendency to 
expropriate employees’ gross gains in performing the employment contract, 
employees tend to withhold their first specific investments. 
 
As examined in Chapter 1, takeovers expose employees to the risks of a breach of 
implicit employment contracts and the employer’s expropriation of their rents. 
Therefore, when a takeover is anticipated, due to the asymmetry of information 
between employees and management and the predicted dramatic change in the firm, 
the future position of the employees after a takeover is outside the scope of their 
existing contract with the employer.256 Given their low bargaining power to seek fair 
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treatment,257 then in order to reduce their costs, employees become reluctant to invest 
further, since their underinvestment cannot be recognised by the employer or the court. 
Such reluctance is stronger when employees have accepted low wages in the hope of 
a long-term employment relationship and above-market wages in the future, making 
them more likely to withhold their investments towards their employer when 
confronted by takeovers. In the contractual relationship, the employer can hardly be 
expected to gain sufficient returns from their investments, even though they may invest 
in vocational training or develop an incentive mechanism.  
 
The hold-up problems in the context of takeovers adversely affect the value of the 
target firm, since they lead to a reduction in productivity, especially considering that 
most hostile takeovers may take several years. For target firms, the decrease in firm 
value may lead to a decline in their attractiveness to corporate raiders, and accordingly 
incumbent shareholders may obtain a lower price premium. The decrease in firm value 
also reduces the likelihood of a value increasing takeover. 258  This is because in 
takeovers, as mentioned above, shareholders are deemed to expropriate rents from 
employees. On the other hand, employees may restrict their productive efforts to 
forestall potential takeovers, so that the acquirers have less to expropriate. Therefore, 
they may end up expropriating only a fraction of the increase in firm value. In the event 
that the hostile takeover is successful, workers who withhold their investments may be 
undervalued by the new management, and accordingly they may receive worse 
treatment than expected, even extending to job loss or wage cuts. 
 
The hold-up problems can be effectively addressed if the information is complete, 
while both employees and employers have the capability to know the efforts which the 
other party is putting into their jobs. In this case, all the contingencies can be foreseen, 
and therefore there will be no hold-up problem.259 In this regard, it is necessary to 
establish a mechanism to improve employee involvement in the context of takeovers. 
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For one thing, this promotes information flow, which for employees reduces the 
uncertainty about their treatment following a takeover. For another, it provides 
employees with an opportunity to participate in takeover decisions, which strengthens 
workers’ bonds with the firm, thereby mitigating the likelihood of employees 
withholding their firm-specific investments. Deeper involvement is normally 
accompanied by a positive level of employee protection, which is deemed to be 
effective in overcoming hold-up problems.260 
 
2.2.3 Reducing Agency Costs 
 
Almost any contractual relationship in which one party (the “agent”) promises to 
undertake performance of services to another party (the “principal”) is subject to a 
principal‒agent problem. Agency costs arise due to the conflict of interests between 
the principal and the agent. In general, three generic agency problems arise in business 
firms.261 The first agency relationship issue exists between shareholders and hired 
managers. The second involves the conflict between majority and minority 
shareholders. The third agency problem arises from firm owners’ opportunistic 
behaviour towards parties (including employees) contracting with firms. From the 
perspective of economists, employee involvement in takeover decisions can address 
the first and third problems.  
 
In this context, these two sets of agency relationships are discussed: the first arises 
from the shareholder‒management nexus, which is the core agency relationship in 
corporate governance, wherein employees are empowered to perform the supervision 
function, which helps to reduce agency costs. We analyse below how workers’ 
participation can reduce these two sets of costs. The second is between the employer 
and its employees. In the employment relationship, workers have a propensity to 
withhold efforts, leading to agency costs. Workers’ involvement in takeover decisions 
can reduce such costs, making them more willing to increase their efforts on the job.  
In this section, the first core agency relationship is firstly discussed.  
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Shareholder‒Manager Agency Relationship 
 
The shareholder‒manager relationship constitutes the core principal‒agent 
relationship in business firms. The shareholders, acting as either the owner of the 
property of the firm under the property rights theory or the residual claimants under 
the nexus-of-contract theory, “have surrendered the right that the corporation should 
be operated in their sole interest”262 to managers. Managers, with distinct interests 
from the shareholders, may engage in forms of behaviour that reduce or destroy the 
maximisation of firm value, such as shirking, 263  self-dealing, 264  or seeking high 
management remuneration or business opportunities. These opportunistic behaviours 
mainly arise from the managers’ authority over corporate management as well as the 
employees. Such authority relations “generate the structural preconditions under 
which employer opportunism is most likely to be encouraged; namely, information 
impactedness, small numbers, and availability of a tool (decision by fiat) which is 
tailor-made for unilateral pursuit of self-interest”.265 To be specific, managers are 
normally reluctant to provide optimal information, considering that all pieces of 
information are transmitted to management. This is because “bargaining power is 
generally correlated with information, [and] centralization of information, [which] 
without access to it when necessary, can lead to its hoarding and misuse”.266 Therefore, 
managers may have an incentive to withhold some information to achieve better 
salaries and promotion. Employee involvement can facilitate the sharing of 
information, which constrains managers’ opportunistic behaviours. However, this may 
compromise the efficiency of management decisions, since the centralisation of 
information on which decisions are based makes for greater efficiency.267  In this 
regard, promoting information sharing between employees and management is the 
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second-best option, but can prevent managerial opportunistic behaviour which may 
hurt the interests of the firm. In addition, managers’ opportunistic behaviour may 
hinder employees’ innovation, which negatively affects shareholders’ interests. This 
is because managers have a strong incentive to make it seem that the innovative ideas 
originate from them rather than the employees. Hence, they may take credit for 
employees’ innovations so as to justify their high salaries and promotions.268 In this 
regard, productive workers tend to serve managers’ private interests, which limits the 
scope for workers to be motivated to engage in innovative practices. This lowers the 
profits for shareholders as well as the remuneration of employees, as the latter’s 
innovative ideas are not recognised by their superiors. Such opportunistic behaviour 
can also be eliminated through employees’ cooperation with managers. Admittedly, 
reverse monitoring of managers cannot solve managerial opportunism fully, due to the 
significant leeway they enjoy and the costs to efficiency. However, an employee 
involvement scheme can provide a useful addition to the current corporate governance 
system.  
 
In hostile takeovers, target firms, normally with dispersed shareholding structures, are 
subject to informational asymmetries, collective action problems,269 and shareholder 
myopia. 270  Therefore, shareholders do not have “the information or incentives 
necessary to make sound decisions”271 to maximise their interests as well as the firm 
value. As a result, managers may take advantage of insider information and advanced 
managerial capability, which leads to the higher incidence of opportunistic 
behaviour.272 For instance, in order to frustrate takeovers, managers may resort to 
value reduction strategies such as selling valuable assets or divisions at a discounted 
price (referred to as “the sale of the crown jewels”), which lowers the attractiveness of 
target firms. This normally leads to a decrease in a firm’s valuation, which lowers 
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share prices if takeovers are frustrated, whereas target firm shareholders’ returns from 
takeovers are reduced if takeovers are accomplished. Both results are non-value 
maximising and are deemed to increase agency costs. Another explanation of 
managerial opportunistic behaviour arises from real earnings management, which 
refers to “normal operational practices with the primary objective of meeting near-
term earnings goal”. 273  Since predators normally target companies with weak 
governance, real earnings management—such as cutting research and development 
budgets—may lower the attractiveness of target firms and may thus sacrifice firms’ 
long-term interests,274 thereby impairing shareholders’ interests. 
 
If workers can effectively participate in takeover decisions, such strategies adopted at 
the expense of shareholders and firm value can be forestalled. As insiders in the firm, 
shop-floor employees are clearly aware of the condition of firm assets such as 
company equipment, buildings, vehicles, and accordingly their approximate value. 
Therefore, if any valuation is carried out under the supervision of the employees, it is 
challenging to sell assets at below-the-market prices if workers’ voices can be heard 
and valued by shareholders. Moreover, the sale of firm assets, especially plants and 
divisions, is expected to change relevant shop-floor employees’ work conditions, 
leading to reduced job tenure and security. 275  Workers therefore have a strong 
incentive to call out managers’ opportunistic behaviour and convey news of such 
conduct to shareholders who have decisive powers over asset sales, in order to repel 
any corresponding adverse changes in their own life. In addition to curtailing managers 
using takeover defence tactics at the expense of shareholders’ interests, workers’ 
participation in the process of takeovers can prompt the management to enhance 
transparency and make them accountable for their decisions.276 This is particularly the 
case in the context of China, where the labour market is under-developed. Workers 
will struggle to find jobs elsewhere, making them bind closely with the firm, and 
 
273 Y. Zhao, K.H. Chen, Y. Zhang, “Takeover Protection and Protection and Managerial Myopia: Evidence from Real 
Earnings Management” (2012) 31 Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 109. 
274 K.A. Gunny, “The Relation between Earnings Management Using Real Activities Manipulation and Future 
Performance: Evidence from Meeting Earnings Benchmarks” (2010) 27 Contemporary Accounting Research 855. 
275 B. Black, H. Gospel, and A. Pendleton, “Finance, Corporate Governance and the Employment Relationship” 
(2007) 46 Industrial Relation: A Journal of Economy and Society 643. 
276 A. Christie and J. Zimmerman, “Efficient vs Opportunistic Choices of Accounting Procedures: Corporate Control 
Contests” (1994) 69 The Accounting Review 539. 
 
73 
accordingly they have a strong incentive to provide a check on any managerial 
incentives for opportunism.  
 
For instance, in a management buyout of Pingdingshan Cotton Textile Co. Ltd in 2010, 
laid-off workers protested against an undervaluation of firm assets and the 
management’s tunnelling behaviour, which was caused by the latter’s collusion with 
the auditor. 277  In such cases, if workers are given co-determination rights and 
accordingly able to exert a real influence on takeovers, such a loss of firm assets may 
be effectively avoided. This is because, as insiders, the shop-floor employees are 
clearly aware of the conditions of firm assets such as company equipment, buildings, 
vehicles, and accordingly their approximate value. In addition, workers’ participation 
in the process of takeovers can prompt the management to enhance transparency and 
make them accountable for their decision-making, especially considering the workers’ 
active role and ability to exert direct influence over managers. This is expected to 
reduce the chances of the management’s manipulation in takeovers. Hence, employees 
are at an advantage in safeguarding firm assets compared with other stakeholders. Such 
advantages are even strengthened, considering that workers in China historically were 
perceived as the owners of firms and had the tradition of actively participating in firm 
management and supervision over executives.278 
 
The differences in the objectives of shareholders and workers may conceivably 
constitute an obstacle to workers supervising the management, and therefore workers 
may not care about the loss of firm assets but may only consider their private interests. 
This is plausible, since each group of stakeholders has an incentive to maximise their 
own interests, and accordingly the stronger power of employees is expected to 
intensify their distributional conflict with shareholders. That is to say, workers fighting 
for their interests may lead to shareholders getting a smaller slice of the pie of firm 
value. However, whether this hurts their interests is debatable, since stronger worker 
involvement is expected to increase productivity, making the “pie” larger. However, 
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it should be noted that in terms of supervision of the management in takeovers, workers’ 
interests align with those of shareholders. This is because shareholders and employees 
are both against the managerial pursuit of private interests. The rationale of the former 
is the objective of shareholders to reduce agency costs, arising from their agency 
relationship with the management. Although the relationship between employees and 
the employer is perceived as a contractual rather than agency relationship, managers’ 
opportunistic behaviours, such as unfair layoffs, may breach employees’ implicit trust 
in the management.279 In the context of takeovers, the undervaluation of the firm’s 
assets will reduce the overall takeover returns, which eventually reduces shareholder 
gains and the money allocated for workers’ arrangements. On the other hand, in terms 
of the distributional conflict between shareholders and employees, a worker 
representational participation system can carry workers’ voices directly to the 
shareholders, which can minimise managerial opportunistic behaviour whereby they 
seek to enhance their private benefits on the pretext of safeguarding employees’ 
interests. 
 
Another concern expressed is that it may not be feasible for workers to supervise the 
behaviour of management in takeovers. To begin with, shop-floor workers may lack 
knowledge and experience in supervising the management. However, this 
apprehension is invalid since the supervision of managers does not require workers to 
possess any managerial ability, as these are skills that management have ostensibly 
mastered. As insiders and significant stakeholders in the company, workers have first-
hand information on production and firm assets, which are not shared even by 
supervisory members. As a supplement to the supervision organ, workers only need to 
express their voice from their own perspective. It is at the discretion of shareholders 
to determine whether to treat them as valid. Another factor that affects the 
practicability of workers supervising managers is asymmetry of information. 280 
However, this view is not reasonable when it comes to workers’ rights being involved, 
since employees being informed in time and adequately is a prerequisite to the exercise 
of their participation right. 
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The Employer‒Employee Agency Relationship 
 
The employer and employee relationship is also subject to agency problems, and it is 
the objective of the employer to minimise them. Scholars have identified several forms 
of withholding efforts in the employment relationship based on workers’ performance 
and motivation, which include shirking, job neglect, free riding, and social loafing.281 
The first two forms focus on workers’ performance when they work alone. Shirking 
occurs when workers have a tendency to put in less effort and have more leisure time 
at work,282 while job neglect is a variation of shirking, referring to the phenomenon of 
employees using work time for non-work-related purposes.283 The last two forms 
occur in the group context, and have similar meanings. Free riding occurs when 
workers draw benefits from group work but do not bear their proportionate costs in the 
realization of that benefit,284 whereas social loafing emphasises the  incentives of 
workers to reduce their level of effort because it is impossible for others to determine 
each of their respective contributions.285 It has been suggested that behaviour such as 
shirking and job neglect can be addressed by close monitoring by their supervisors or 
the adoption of a preventive incentive mechanism such as paying above-average wages. 
However, such discipline is deemed as too costly for firms, since supervisors also need 
to be paid, 286  whereas managers can hardly monitor employees directly. 287 
Accordingly, incentive mechanisms such as a compensation policy scheme have 
gained more support.288 However, this may lead to the free-rider problem and social 
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286 J.H. Pencavel, “Work Effort, On the Job Screening, and Alternative Methods of Remuneration” in S. Polanchek 
and K. Tatsiramos (eds), 35th Anniversary Retrospective (Research in Labor Economics, Vol. 35) (Emerald Group 
Polishing-1997) 537. 
287 P. Cappelli and K. Chauvin, “An Interplant Test of the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis” (1991) 106 The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 769. 




loafing, since any individual’s failure to contribute full efforts does not affect the 
group’s performance. Therefore, it is claimed that this problem can be mitigated by 
establishing a high trust relationship,289 and an employee participation scheme is one 
attempt to encourage this relationship. In addition, surveys find that most workers can 
detect whether their colleagues are shirkers, and they are willing to take active action 
such as speaking to shirkers or reporting to supervisors if there is an employee 
involvement mechanism.290 Hence, establishing an employee involvement mechanism 
can also function in reducing employer‒employee agency costs.  
 
In the context of hostile takeovers, workers tend to withhold efforts at work due to 
uncertainty about their treatment following restructuring after the takeover. If workers 
can obtain information and actively participate in takeover decisions, their trust in 
managers is more likely to rise, and therefore they are more likely to put in effort in 




This section has examined the economic rationales for employee involvement in 
corporate governance, laying the economic grounds for improved worker participation 
in hostile takeovers from three perspectives. First, deeper involvement of employees 
in corporate management improves workers’ job satisfaction and job commitment, 
which positively affects firm productivity and value. In this light, if workers are 
allowed to participate in takeover decisions, when they are particularly vulnerable to 
unjust treatment, firms’ productivity is likely to be positively affected, due to the rise 
in job satisfaction and job commitment. Second, inspired by the incomplete contract 
theory, employees’ investments in the employment contractual relationship cannot be 
specified in advance. Accordingly, when employees feel uncertain about their future 
following any likely restructuring after takeovers, they tend to withhold their firm-
specific investments. Since hostile takeovers may take years to be completed, hold-up 
problems tend to negatively affect firm productivity, which lowers returns for the 
 
289 W. Ouchi, “Markets, Bureaucracies and Clans” (1980) 25 Administrative Science Quarterly 129. 
290 R. Freeman, D. Kruse and J. Blasi, “Workers Responses to Shirking under Shared Capitalism” (2008) No. w14227 
National Bureau of Economic Research, available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w14227.pdf. 
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incumbent shareholders. In addition, this increases the chances of negative treatment 
of employees due to their poor performance. Third, employee involvement in takeover 
decisions can reduce the costs of two sets of agency relationships: the shareholder‒
manager relationship and the employer‒employee relationship. With regard to the 
former, employees have an incentive to place checks on managerial opportunism, and 
an employee involvement scheme can provide such channels. In hostile takeovers, this 
can effectively forestall managers’ opportunistic behaviour for their own benefit at the 
expense of employees and shareholders. As for the latter, an employee involvement 
mechanism can deter workers’ tendency to withhold effort during their work. In hostile 
takeovers, when workers are more likely to withhold their efforts at work, their 
participation in the takeover decision can help to establish a high trust relationship 
with the employer, thus precluding such tendencies.  
 
In conclusion, an employee involvement scheme in takeover decisions can positively 
affect workers’ productivity both before and during hostile takeovers, which positively 
affects firm value. However, excessive labour intervention in takeover decisions may 
raise labour costs significantly, exceeding the increase in productivity and leading to 
a decrease in firm value. Therefore, employee involvement should be maintained at a 
carefully tailored, moderate level. 
 
Having built the theoretical and economic framework for enhancing labour 
participation mechanism in Chinese takeover law, this thesis moves on in Chapter 3 to 
identify the factors that deter effective employee protection in Chinese firms. It then 





Chapter 3: Labour Participation Mechanisms in the Context 
of Hostile Takeovers in Chinese Firms 
 
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is clear that workers need to be protected and 
involved in hostile takeovers, given their vulnerability to unjust treatment. However, 
the existing employee protection and participation mechanism in Chinese firms is 
perceived as ineffective, which runs against the interests of employees as well as the 
firm as a whole. The objective of this chapter 3 is to examine the reasons for this 
ineffectiveness and provides directors to resolve these problems, and it begins with a 
summary of the extant employee participation mechanism in Chinese firms. 
 
3.1 A Summary of the Legal Framework 
 
In the context of takeovers, workers are concerned about two aspects: the takeover’s 
impact on the employees and on the target firms when employees are transferred to a 
new employer. The former is related to employee’s contracts, whereas the latter 
concerns participation rights in decision-making. Turning to the first concern, Articles 
33 and 34 of China’s Labour Contract Law291 provide as follows: 
 
Article 33: An employer’s change of name, legal representative, key person-in-
charge or investor shall not affect the fulfilment of employment contracts. 
Article 34: In cases of firm mergers, splits, or other circumstances, the original 
employment contracts remain valid. Such contracts shall be performed by the 
new employer, who succeeds the rights and obligations of the aforesaid 
employer. 
 
These rules can be applied to sales of both undertaking(s) and shares, which includes 
hostile takeovers. The new employer is obliged to inherit the employees of the target 
company, along with their employment contracts. However, considering that takeovers 
 
291 The Labour Contract Law of People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国劳动合同法)(2012) (The Labour 
Contract Law of PRC). 
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often lead to the restructuring of the firm, it is inevitable that certain terms in the 
contracts are modified, although this should be agreed upon by both the employer and 
employees.292 The trade union is the organ that negotiates the collective employment 
contracts with the management of the acquirer company.293 Thereafter, the contract 
drafts should be referred to the Workers’ Congress for approval.  
  
As regards participation rights, workers can participate in takeovers at both the 
establishment and board levels. The core institutions at the establishment level are the 
trade union and the Workers’ Congress, which is confirmed by the Company Law294 
as follows: 
 
Article 18: To make a decision on restructuring or any important issue relating 
to business operations… a company shall solicit the opinions of its trade union 
and shall solicit the opinions and proposals of the employees through the 
Workers’ Congress or in any other ways. 
 
The scenario where a firm is acquired has been interpreted as included within the 
phrase: “important issue relating to business operations”, and therefore the trade union 
and the Workers’ Congress should be informed and consulted directly before the 
takeover decision is made.295 
 
Employees can also express their voice through their representatives on the board of 
directors (BoD) and the board of supervisors (BoS).296 These are the core management 
and supervision organs in Chinese firms, which can directly participate in takeover 
decisions, although the shareholder assembly retains its decisive power. The 
institutional structure is illustrated in diagram 1. 
 
292 Article 35 of the Labour Contract Law of PRC. 
293 Article 20 of the Trade Union Law of Peoples’ Republic of China (中华人民共和国工会法) (2009) (The Trade 
Union Law of PRC). 
294 The Company Law of PRC. 
295 Although a workers’ right to be informed is not explicitly provided for in this rule, I assume Chinese legislation 
endows workers with such right because it is a pre-condition of being consulted that one is first informed. 




Diagram 1: corporate organs in Chinese companies 
 
Chinese laws appear to provide strong protection for the employees in a firm, but in 
fact their actual functioning is weak in practice. Since the trade union has the right to 
nominate and the Workers’ Congress can elect their representatives on the BoD,297 
these two organs are located at the centre of the labour participation mechanism in 
takeovers. Therefore, this chapter first examines the effectiveness of the employee 
participation mechanism at the establishment level. 
 
3.2 The Workers’ Congress 
 
This section starts with a brief description of the Workers’ Congress, and thereafter 
moves on to identify the reasons why this organisation cannot function well under the 
existing corporate governance system in China. 
 
3.2.1 Introduction to the Workers’ Congress 
 
The Workers’ Congress is an institution that allows employees to directly participate 
in the management of an enterprise.298 It is currently prevalent in both state-owned and 
privately-owned enterprises. 299  Under this mechanism, employees or their 
 
297  Article 38 of the Provisions on the Democratic Management of Enterprises (企业民主管理规定) (2012) 
(Democratic Management Measures). 
298 People.cn (人民网), “Three. Workers' Congresses and Self-governance of Enterprises” (2017), available at 
http://en.people.cn/92824/92845/92869/6439952.html. 
299 As at the end of 2012, 80.8% of enterprises with trade unions had established the Workers’ Congress system. 
See All-China Federation of Trade Unions Research Department, 2012 Trade Union Organisation and Work 
Development Statistics (2012 年 工 会 组 织 和 工 会 发 展 状 况 统 计 公 报) (2013), available at 
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representatives (if the number of employees exceeds 100)300 are organised by the trade 
union to hold meetings at least annually. The main functions of the Workers’ Congress 
in corporate governance are as follows:301  
 
1. To be consulted on vital matters such as the business management and vital matters 
that closely relate to the labour interests, including work hours, labour welfare, and 
occupational safety and health; 
2. To deliberate and approve collective employment contracts; 
3. To elect or recall employee representatives to or from the board of directors and the 
board of supervisors; 
4. To supervise the firm’s implementation of labour laws and regulations and appraise 
the work of the central management of the enterprise; and 
5. In state-owned enterprises, to deliberate upon and approve plans for layoffs and the 
resettlement of employees in the enterprise’s merger, split, restructuring, or 
bankruptcy.302 
 
When the Workers’ Congress is not in session, the trade union is obliged to oversee 
the board of directors to implement the decisions of the Workers Congress.303  
 
Based on the above description, workers’ participation in business management 
through the Workers’ Congress appears to be extensive. However, employees’ voices 
are in effect not heard or valued by the BoD, for two main reasons. The first is that it 
is an institution that was embedded in the old planned and socialist economic system, 
making it incompatible with the modern corporate governance system that has been 
transplanted from western countries. The second is the ineffectiveness of the trade 
union which is to guarantee the performance of the Workers’ Congress. This is because 
the trade union is obliged to organise the meetings of the Workers’ Congress and urge 
and oversee the BoD to implement the decisions of the Workers’ Congress. Therefore, 
whether the Workers’ Congress functions effectively depends heavily on the attitude 
 
stats.acftu.org/upload/files/1370483520528.pdf. 
300 Article 8 of Democratic Management Provisions. 
301 Article 13 of Democratic Management Provisions. 
302 Article 14 of Democratic Management Provisions. 
303 Article 22 of Democratic Management Provisions. 
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and approach of the trade unions. Their ineffectiveness attenuates the functions of the 
Workers’ Congress to a large extent. The first reason is analysed in the subsection 
3.2.2 and 3.2.3 whilst the second is examined in section 3.3. 
 
3.2.2 The Workers’ Congress’ Incompatibility with the Corporate 
Governance System in China  
 
In order to examine how the Workers’ Congress is incompatible with modern 
corporate governance in China, this subsection first introduces the history of the 
Workers’ Congress to identify its original role in Chinese firms. It then goes on to 
describe the current corporate governance system in China and examines how the 
Workers’ Congress cannot fit properly into this system.  
 
The Workers’ Congress: Some History 
 
The mechanism of the Workers’ Congress has experienced a chequered history, with 
“sudden surges into activity and lapses into formalism”.304  
 
This organ was designed to demonstrate the workers’ role as the “master” of the 
enterprise.305 In 1949, with the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the 
working class’s leading role was confirmed in constitutional law.306 Thereafter, in the 
then operational business enterprises, the Workers’ Representative Committee (the 
predecessor of the Workers’ Congress) acted as the decision-making or ‘authority 
organ’ to some extent as well as the supervisory organ.307 The ‘authority organ’ is a 
reference to the committee’s substantial effects on decision making regarding major 
issues concerning the management of enterprises. The ‘supervisory organ’ stressed its 
 
304 X. Zhu and A. Chen, “Staff and Workers’ Representative Congress” (2005) 37 China Sociology and Anthropology 
6 at 8.  
305 ACFTU, the Resolution concerning the Current Task of Chinese Staff Movement (关于中国职工运动当前任务
的决议) (1948) available at http://px.workercn.cn/c/2011/02/19/110210152352995960548_2.html. 
306 Article 1 of Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (中国政治局协商会议
共同纲领) (1949). This acted as a temporary constitutional law until 1954, when the leading role of the workers 
was further confirmed in the first formal constitutional law in China.  
307 Z. Xie, “The Remodelling of the Position and Function of the Workers’ Congress” (“职代会定位与功能重塑”) 
(2013) 35 Chinese Journal of Law (法学研究) 110. 
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supervisory power over the factory director, who took full responsibility for the 
management and operation of the enterprise.308 In particular, workers had the right to 
make suggestions to the factory director on all major issues regarding business 
management as well as to the superior government body to remove the factory director 
if necessary.309 In effect, the supervisory power of the workers was guaranteed by the 
state during this period, especially considering the latter had an urgent need to 
consolidate its political power.  
 
However, the support of workers’ participation rights from the state became attenuated 
as the needs of the state changed, especially during political movements such as the 
Anti-Rightist Movement and the Cultural Revolution.310 In the ensuing political chaos, 
the employees’ representative committee was encouraged to deviate from its 
supervisory function and focus on the political movement instead.311 
 
Starting from the end of the Cultural Revolution, the Workers’ Congress experienced 
a revival until the early 1990s. During this period, workers’ rights to participate in the 
democratic management of the enterprise, the basic form of which was the Workers’ 
Congress, was confirmed in law.312 This was mainly due to the impact of the “Polish 
Crisis”, when workers organised and rebelled against the communist regime in Poland 
in the 1980s. In order to avoid a similar crisis in China, labour interests once again 
were emphasised by the state, and accordingly the Workers’ Congress became more 
active. 313  This is demonstrated by a survey on the functioning of the Workers’ 
 
308 Chapter 3 of the Implementing Regulation on the Establishment of the Factory Management Committee and 
Factory Workers’ Representative Meeting in State-operated and Public-operated Enterprises (关于在国营公营工
厂企业中建立工厂管理委员会与工厂职工代表大会的实施条例) (1950). 
309 The Central Committee of CPC, The Directive Concerning Several Important Problems in Regard to the Working 
Class (关 于 研 究 有 关 工 人 阶 级 的 几 个 重 要 问 题 的 通 知) (1949), available at 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66664/4493186.html. 
310 S. Zheng, “Chinese Staff Congress System: The Past, Present and Future” (2012) The Japan Institute for Labour 
Policy and Training Comparative Labour Seminar 131, available at 
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/reports/documents/jilpt-reports/no.11_china.pdf. 
311 H. Cai and X. Li, “The Practice Research on the System of Staff Representative Committee in SOEs” (国有企业
职 工 代 表 大 会 制 度 时 间 研 究) (2014) 5 Opening Times (开 放 时 代), available at 
http://www.opentimes.cn/Abstract/1979.html. 
312 Article 48 of The Law of the People's Republic of China on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People 
(中华人民共和国全民所有制企业法) (1988). 




Congress, which found that workers indeed enjoyed high participation rates in the 
management of the enterprise.314  
 
However, the Workers’ Congress gradually became formalistic when the modern 
corporate governance system was introduced in the early 1990s. Since then, the 
Workers’ Congress has become incompatible with the extant corporate governance 
system in China. This incompatibility is analysed in detail in subsection 3.2.3 below. 
 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the history of the Workers’ Congress. First, the 
effectiveness of the functioning of the Workers’ Congress depended heavily on the 
state’s willingness to safeguard labour interests in the planned economy, and this 
organ’s reliance on the state has continued until now. Although the state has reduced 
its intervention in the corporate governance of both state-owned and private-owned 
enterprises substantially, the influence of the state in labour protection is still enormous. 
This is mainly because the trade unions, which are responsible for organising the 
Congress and implementing employees’ decisions, is under the leadership of the 
Communist Party of China (the sole ruling party of PRC), similar to the situation in 
the past. Therefore, the party and the state’s strong motivations for safeguarding the 
interests of the workers affect the effectiveness of the trade unions, and accordingly 
the Workers’ Congress to a large extent. This is discussed in greater detail in section 
3.3 below, which mainly discusses the ineffectiveness of the trade unions. 
 
The second conclusion is that the Workers’ Congress was originally designed in a 
totally different corporate structure from that prevailing today. In the old planned 
economy where almost all of the enterprises were state-owned, the factory director 
was the management organ whilst the Workers’ Congress and the trade unions mainly 
acted as the supervisory organs. The supervisory power of workers came from the 
notion that the workers were in some vague way the owners of the enterprise,315 which 
 
314 X. Zhu and P. Chen, “Workers’ Congress: Institutionalised Voice Channel for Workers” (职工代表大会：职工
利 益 的 制 度 化 表 达 渠 道?) (2002) 3 Opening Times (开 放 时 代), available at 
http://ww2.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/Details.aspx?id=2267. 
315 See L. Sun, Transformation and Fracture: The Transition of Social Structure after the Reform (转型与断裂：改
革以来中国社会结构的变迁) (Tsinghua University Press-2004) 240.  
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was due to their role as the masters of the state. At this time, the workers were deemed 
to benefit from the “iron rice bowl”, which was a reference to “the system of 
guaranteed lifetime employment in state enterprises”.316 With such a high level of job 
stability, workers could freely express their discontent without worrying about losing 
their jobs. However, in the modern corporate governance system, the board of 
supervisors is the main supervisory organ, and this has replaced most of the 
supervisory power of the Workers’ Congress. In addition, workers have changed from 
being the vague owners of the firm to employees under a contractual relationship, 
which means that their jobs are not as stable as before, and the source of their 
supervisory function in corporate governance had to undergo a corresponding change. 
The main reason for workers to supervise the management of the board of directors 
seems to be that they closely relate their welfare with the firm, and their participation 
in corporate governance positively relates to the firm value, which is elaborate in 
section 2.2.  
 
The Current Role of the Workers’ Congress in Firms 
 
The preceding discussion made the point that the Workers’ Congress was embedded 
in the old planned economy where the structure of corporate governance and relevant 
governance bodies were completely different. Starting from the early 1990s when the 
modern enterprise system was introduced into China, a series of corporate laws were 
promulgated, including the first Company Law in 1993. 
 
Briefly, in accordance with Chinese laws,317 the organisational structure of Chinese 
firms consists of three bodies, with the shareholder assembly as the authority organ, 
the BoD as the management organ, and the BoS as the main supervisory organ. The 
functions of these organs seem distinct and mutually exclusive, leaving no room for 
the Workers’ Congress to perform its functions to safeguard the interests of labour.318 
The Workers’ Congress with decidedly Chinese features found it challenging to fit 
 
316 BBC News, “Iron Rice Bowl” (2017), available  
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/special_report/1999/09/99/china_50/iron.htm. 
317 In particular the Company Law of PRC. 
318 S. Zheng (n 310) 145. 
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within the new-established legal system. Two aspects of this incompatibility are now 
examined. 
 
First, the Workers’ Congress is no longer able to exert substantial influence over the 
decision-making process regarding major issues. Using takeovers as an example, the 
shareholder assembly has the power to approve or reject a takeover plan, whereas the 
Workers’ Congress only has the right to be consulted. In order to approve or reject a 
potential takeover plan, the BoD need only persuade the shareholder assembly, 
rendering the suggestions from the employees futile if their opinions conflict with 
those of the shareholders.319 However, if the workers think their views are not fully 
respected by the BoD, they may shirk or even maliciously stop their work,320 which 
may delay or even frustrate the process of the takeover. In response to this potential 
conflict, since there is no rule on when the Workers’ Congress should be consulted, 
the BoD tends to inform the workers of the takeover just before the takeover is 
completed,321 leaving very little time or room for the workers to frustrate the takeover. 
Even where the BoD breaches the requirement of implementing the mechanism of the 
Workers’ Congress, there are few effective remedies for the workers. For instance, the 
trade union has the power to request the BoD to correct their conduct, but the laws do 
not provide further remedies when the BoD rejects such requests. 322  Therefore, 
workers tend to be forced to agree with the takeover plan even when their interests are 
neglected, especially when there is evidence showing that any expression of dissent 
will increase the workers’ chances of being laid off.323 
 
Second, the supervisory function of the Workers’ Congress was replaced by the BoS 
to a large extent, which has weakened the former’s power as a result. According to 
 
319 Article 4 of the Labour Contract Law of PRC. 
320 P. Li, “Beyond the Failure of Promulgation of the Regulations on the Democratic Management of Enterprises” 
(广东企业民主管理条例难产背后) (2010). Economy and Nation Weekly (财经国家周刊), available at 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20101011/12188757381.shtml. 
321 This is the case in China Resources Healthcare Group Ltd.’s takeover of a hospital in Jilin Province in 2016. See 
Tencent News, ”Doubts on of CR Medical’s Acquisition of The 4th Hospital of Jinli University” (华润医疗收购吉大
四院遭质疑) (2017), available at http://stock.qq.com/a/20161228/002581.htm.  
322 Article 19 of the Trade Union Law of PRC.  
323 J. Andreas, "Losing Membership Rights: The Impact of Eliminating Permanent Job Tenure on Power Relations 
in Chinese Factories" in C, Estlund, “Will Workers Have a Voice in China’s “Socialist Market Economy”? The Curious 
Revival of the Workers Congress System” (2013) New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers 
(Paper 440) 9. 
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Chinese Company Law,324 the BoS has the power to oversee the work of the BoD and 
the senior management financially and legally. It is also a supervisory organ to 
safeguard the interests of labour, considering that the employee representatives should 
comprise no less than one-third of the composition of the BoS.325 Since the division of 
powers between the BoS and the Worker’s Congress has not been clarified in 
legislation,326 there is a huge functional overlap between these two organs. However, 
compared with the Workers’ Congress, the BoS has more effective mechanisms to 
implement its supervisory power, if they find that the activities of the BoD or senior 
management are against the laws or hurt the interests of the firm. For example, they 
can propose to hold an interim meeting of the shareholder assembly to request the 
shareholders to correct the conduct of the BoD or the senior management, or they can 
directly sue in court.327 On the other hand, the Workers’ Congress is not allowed to 
communicate with the shareholders or sue in court, making its supervisory functions 
more formalistic. 
 
In short, the supremacy of the shareholder assembly renders the Workers’ Congress’s 
ex ante participation rights in major decisions of the company quite redundant, 
whereas the BoS weakens the ex post supervisory function of the Workers’ Congress. 
As the basic mechanism of democratic management for employees, the Workers’ 





The Workers Congress was designed in the old planned economy, where the corporate 
governance structure and the role of the workers in the firm were totally different from 
what obtains today. Except for the periods of political turbulence in China, the 
Workers’ Congress could exert extensive influence on decision making regarding 
 
324 Article 51 and 53 of the Company Law of PRC. 
325 The BoS is also blamed as ineffective in both its supervisory functions and labour protection, and this is 
discussed in section 3.4. 
326 Y. Li, Z. Guo, and Y. Bai, “Legal Suggestions for the Workers’ Congress’s Participation in Corporate Governance” 
(“职工代表大会参与公司治理的法律完善”) (2013) 6 Journal of China Academy of Governance (国家行政学院
学报) 59 at 61. 
327 Article 53, 149, and 151 of the Company Law of PRC. 
 
88 
major issues of business management whilst having the supervisory power over the 
factory director. However, under the current corporate governance system, which is 
transplanted from other countries such as the UK, the US, and Germany, the Workers’ 
Congress cannot function well. For example, since the shareholder assembly has the 
power to decide on major issues of business management, the BoD tends to treat 
suggestions from the employees as pointless or even an obstacle to implementing the 
decisions made by the shareholder assembly. In addition, the supervisory power of the 
BoS overlaps with that of the Workers’ Congress. Since the BoS has more powerful 
mechanisms in place to excise their power, such as suing the BoD in court, the 
supervisory functions of the Workers’ Congress are further reduced. 
 
As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, the Workers’ Congress for its effectiveness relies 
heavily on the trade unions, but the latter are ineffective, as the next section explores.  
 
3.3 The Trade Unions 
 
Similar to the Workers’ Congress, the trade union seems to provide strong protection 
to the employees in the firm, but in fact their actual functioning is weak in practice. 
This section provides a brief introduction of the Chinese trade union to examine the 
seemingly strong protection it offers, before identifying the reasons of its 
ineffectiveness. 
 
3.3.1 Introduction to the Trade Unions in China 
 
The trade union is another basic form of democratic management for workers and it 
can provide strong protection for the workers in Chinese firms. This point can be 
substantiated in light of its functions, which are stipulated in the Trade Union Law as 
follows:328 
 
1. To participate in decision-making on major issues concerning labour interests. In 
the context of takeovers, in addition to the Workers’ Congress, the trade union is 
 
328 Article 19-28 of the Trade Union Law of PRC. 
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another organ that must be consulted by the BoD. 
2. To organise the Workers’ Congress and assist in the implementation of the 
decisions of the Workers’ Congress. If the firm prevents the work of the Workers’ 
Congress, the trade union has the power to request corrections.  
3. To oversee whether the BoD and the senior management infringe labour interests. 
If there is an infringement such as unjustified dismissal or non-payment of salaries, 
the trade union is obliged to request corrections or to report to the government. If 
the firm breaches any collective employment agreements, the trade union can also 
initiate legal action against the firm.  
4. To help resolve labour conflicts between the employer and the employees. 
 
In terms of the first function, the reason for the ineffectiveness of the trade unions is 
similar to that applicable in the case of the Workers’ Congress, which was discussed 
in Section 3.2.2. In brief, the trade unions cannot exert any material influence on the 
decision-making of the BoD, which renders any consultation with the trade union 
meaningless.  
 
Two factors render the trade union ineffective in the other three functions. The first is 
the dual objective, which is caused by the organisational structure of the trade union 
system in China. The second is a lack of independence from the firm. The next two 
subsections respectively examine these problems. 
 




In addition to safeguarding the interests of the workers, the trade union has the 
objective of serving the interests of the party-state, which is a reference to the close 
ties between the interests of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the state. The 
additional objective regarding the party-state is attributable to the two organisational 
structures to which the trade union is subordinated. These structures can be seen in 
diagram 2. 
 
Diagram 2: the organisational structures of the trade union in the Chinese company 
 
The first is that the trade union should primarily be led by the CPC committee in the 
firm.329 The objectives of the CPC are to implement the policies of the party-state and 
oversee the management of the firm in case it adversely affects the latter’s interests.330 
Such leadership of the CPC committee gives the trade union an additional objective, 
which is to safeguard the interests of the party-state. Where the party-state’s interests 
conflict with the those of the employees, the trade union cannot fully support the 
workers, but must instead act as a “transmission belt” to help the party-state negotiate 
with the employees.331 A more severe problem will be generated in the case of state-
owned enterprises, where the leaders of the CPC committee are also senior managers 
of the firm. This can be illustrated by the takeover of Tuopai Shede Wine Co. Ltd in 
 
329 Article 20 of Measures for Election of the Trade Union Chairman in an Enterprise (企业工会主席产生办法) 
(2008). 
330 A detailed description of the role of the CPC committee in the Chinese company is made in section 4.3.1. 















2016. In this case, the trade union was silent in face of the harm caused to the interests 
of labour, mainly because the takeover was a decision made by the party-state.332 
 
The second is that the trade union operates under a hierarchical system, at the top of 
which one finds the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU). This 
organisational structure further strengthens the control of the party-state over the trade 
unions. In particular, the trade unions at all levels should be under the leadership of 
the party-state, which is demonstrated by the party-state’s power to appoint leaders.333 
In addition, any workers’ organisation operating outside this system is deemed to be 
illegal,334 thereby eliminating any possibility of the emergence of any trade union 
outside the control of the party-state.  
 
These organisational structures date back to the old planned economy. At that time, 
the leadership of the party-state was reasonable to some extent, since the workers did 
not have the capability to participate in the democratic management and needed help 
from the party-state.335 However, such paternalistic control by the party-state is not 
advisable nowadays, especially considering the emergence of more than 50 labour 
organisations outside the abovementioned hierarchical system as of 2013.336  This 
phenomenon is representative of the increasing need of workers for independent trade 
unions, although these organisations were repressed in the end due to their illegal 
status.337  
 
A question may arise that since private firms’ connection with the party-state is not as 
close as that in state-owned enterprises, therefore it should rarely be seen that the 
interests of the party-state are prioritised at the expense of employees’ welfare. 
 
332 Sina Finance, “Arrangements of Employees in the Case of Mixed Ownership Reform of Tuopai Shede” (从沱牌
舍得集团混改看国企员工安置) (2016）, available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2016-04-08/doc-
ifxrcizs7010376.shtml. 
333 The Regulation on the Selection and Appointment of the Party and Government Leaders (党政领导干部选拔
任用工作条例) (2014). 
334 Article 2 of the Trade Union Law of PRC. 
335 P. Li (n 320). 
336  Y. Xu, “Labor Non-governmental Organizations in China: Mobilizing Rural Migrants” (2013) 55 Journal of 
Industrial Relations 243 at 246. 
337 J. Howell, “Shall We Dance? Welfarist Incorporation and the Politics of State-labour NGO Relations in China.” 
(2015) 223 China Quarterly 702. 
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However, the fact is that in China which adopts the state-capitalist system where the 
party-state retains commanding heights in the Chinese economy, 338  corporate 
decisions are significantly affected by the party-state, mainly through regulatory and 
non-regulatory methods.  
 
As for the former, private firms are regulated by administrative organs such as CSRC 
(the department that regulates and supervises the capital market, including listed 
companies) and the Ministry or Bureau of Human Resources and Social Security 
(which is an institution that has the responsibility to regulate the labour market, 
promote employment, and procure social security). These administrative organs may 
affect major corporate decisions through regulatory governance measures, such as 
administrative approval, orders, or instructions. This is especially the case in takeovers, 
which attract much attention from the CSRC,339 which is the principal organ that has 
discretion to approve or veto a takeover plan.  
 
As regards the deployment of non-regulatory methods, since all the major banks in 
China are state-owned, firms having strong political connections will increase their 
chances of receiving loans, possibly at a lower cost.340 In addition, the firms with a 
close relationship with the party-state are more likely to benefit from favourable 
government policies, such as tax reductions341 or subsidies.342 Such a relationship with 
the party-state is mainly formed for two reasons. The first is the government’s 
dependence on local firms for tax revenues and the execution of policy objectives. To 
be specific, the amount of tax revenue is an important criterion to assess the 
performance of the local government, while there are also some policy objectives, such 
as increasing the volume of exports, which need solid support from local companies. 
 
338 I. Bremmer, “State Capitalism Comes of Age” (2009) 88 Foreign Affairs 40. 
339 It has been reported that the CSRC have issued 361 Inquiry Letters relating to takeovers and their subsequent 
restructurings in 2017, which significantly shapes the takeover decisions of listed firms in China. Securities Times 
CN, “Strict Overseeing Becomes Common; Mergers and Acquisitions Attract More Attention from CSRC” (2018), 
available at:  http://www.stcn.com/2018/0102/13874472.shtml. 
340 C.K.W. Chow, M.K.Y. Fung, and K.C.K Lam, “Investment Opportunity Set, Political Connection and Business 
Policies of Private Enterprises in China” (2012) 38 Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 367. 
341 W. Cui, “Taxation of State-Owned Enterprise: A Review of Empirical Evidence from China” (2015) in Liebman 
and Milhaupt (Eds.), Regulating the Visible Hand (n 135) 154. 
342 U.C.V. Haley and G.T. Haley, Subsidies to Chinese Industries: State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and Trade Policy 
(Oxford University Press-2013) 2. In 2015, 2752 listed companies obtained RMB 167.3 billion from the government, 
available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2016-05/06/c128962597.htm. 
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The second is the personal relationship between the members of the management and 
government officials. Although the administrative organs have procedural rules on 
how to implement their powers, “real authority in China is concentrated in the hands 
of political elites and is not subject to systematic monitoring by the public or politically 
independent institutions”.343 Therefore, a close relationship with the key figures in the 
government will enhance firms’ intimacy with the government, thereby helping them 
avoid arbitrary administrative actions. As a result, even in private firms where the 
party-state does not have controlling shareholding, the party-state retains a close 
relationship with the firm, making the interests of the party-state a pivotal 
consideration in takeover decisions.  
 
Hence, the organisational structures that are in place make the trade unions under the 
leadership of the party-state very powerful rather than the workers, and thereby reduce 
their labour protection function. Confronted by the interests of the party-state, the 
interests of labour will be even less protected since the party-state’s interests are 
normally prioritised in the Chinese context.  
 
3.3.3 A Lack of Independence from the Firm 
 
The major role of the trade unions is to protect the workers from the firm, which means 
that a lack of independence from the firm will attenuate their functions substantially. 
This lack of independence has two main aspects:  
 
First, the chairman of the trade union normally holds a concurrent post as a senior 
manager in the firm, 344  which is not prohibited by Chinese law. 345  The senior 
management leader may improve the status of the trade union within the firm,346 but 
 
343 C.J. Milhaupt and W. Zheng, “Why Mixed-ownership Reforms cannot fix China’s State Sector” (2016) Paulson 
Policy Memorandum 14, available at http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/PPM_SOE-
Ownership_Milhaupt-and-Zheng_English_R.pdf. 
344 X. Liu and Q. Zhang, “Survey on the Concurrent Post of the Chairman of the Trade Union” (关于工会主席兼职
情况的调查) (2010) 4 Chinese Workers’ Movement (中国工运) 19. According to this survey, 79.5% of the 
chairmen have a concurrent post in the enterprise. 
345 Article 9 of the Trade Union Law of PRC. 
346 Sina Finance, “On the Management’s Concurrent Post as the Trade Union Chairman” (从工会主席被炒谈经理
人员兼职工会干部) (2004), available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/review/20041109/12161142099.shtml. 
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diminishes its actual function. To begin with, they may find themselves struggling to 
spare enough time and energy to trade union matters in addition to their daily 
management roles.347 A more severe problem will arise from their dual objectives. As 
senior managers, they are subordinate to the BoD and are obliged to implement its 
decisions. However, as chairman of the trade union, they are supposed to resist these 
decisions if they are contrary to the interests of the workers, but in such an event they 
tend to obey the decisions of the BoD because it has the power to change their 
occupational role, reduce their salaries, or even terminate their employment contract 
for reasons of serious negligence.348 Since “serious negligence” has not been defined 
by Chinese law, the BoD can use dismissal as a threat when the leaders challenge the 
BoD from the perspective of labour protection. For instance, the trade union chairman 
in a firm in Beijing was dismissed due to his negligence as a senior manager, but he 
claimed that his dismissal was attributable to the fact that he had reported the firm’s 
labour protection problems to the media in order to urge the firm to safeguard workers’ 
interests, which damaged the firm’s social image.349  As a result, the trade union 
chairman had to rely heavily on the BoD and the firm, thereby diluting the performance 
of the trade union in safeguarding labour interests.350 
 
The second is that the trade union depends on the firm financially. According to the 
Trade Union Law, the funds of the trade union come from five sources: 1) membership 
dues paid by workers; 2) a monthly allocation from the firm, which should be equal to 
2% of the employees’ overall wages; 3) income allocated by the enterprise to which 
the trade union is subordinated; 4) subsidies from the government; or 5) others.351 The 
second and third sources come from the company and constitute the largest proportion 
of the trade union’s funds, whilst the money from the other sources is minimal.352 
 
347 Liu & Zhang (n 344). 
348 Article 18 of the Trade Union Law of PRC.  
349 China News, “The First Dismissal of Trade Union Chairman in Beijing; Rights of Trade Union Cadres Attract 
Attention” (“北 京 首 现 工 会 主 席 被 开 除;工 会 干 部 权 益 引 发 关 注”) (2017), available at 
http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/2004/Sep/653208.htm. 
350 In a strike in southern China, the trade union was criticised for standing for the employer. Sina News, “Workers 
in Nanhai Toyota Return to Work: A Partial Victory For Workers” (南海本田复工：工人局部性胜利 ) (2017) 
available at http://style.sina.com.cn/news/2010-06-03/094562469.shtml. 
351 Article 42 of the Trade Union Law of PRC. 
352 X. Xu and Q. Wu, “Academic Analysis of the Nature and Characteristics, and the Core Functions of the Trade 
Union” (对中国工会性质特征和核心职能的学术辨析) (2011) 5 Journal of Humanities (人文杂志) 165 at 166. 
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Although the non-payment of trade union funds by the firm is against the law,353 this 
financial reliance on the firm will further reduce the independence of the trade union 




In conclusion, although the trade union seems to have extensive power to safeguard 
the interests of labour, its actual influence is weak, and the reasons can be summarised 
as follows: 
 
In addition to the objective of safeguarding the interests of employees, the trade union 
is obliged to serve the interests of the party-state, which is attributable to the 
organisational structure of the trade union in the industrial relations system in China. 
Accordingly, the trade union cannot support workers when their interests conflict with 
those of the party-state. 
 
The trade union cannot effectively challenge the BoD even when the interests of labour 
are damaged. This is because the trade union leaders normally hold concurrent 
positions in the firm as senior managers, making them subordinate to the BoD. The 
BoD has the power to decide their remuneration or even dismiss them, making the 
leaders of the trade union reluctant to express dissenting opinions.  
 
3.4 Board Representation 
 
Unlike the trade union and the Workers’ Congress which can only participate in 
takeovers by management informing and consulting them, the representation of 
employees on the board of a firm provides a direct channel for workers to gain access 
to information and express their views on takeover decisions. According to Chinese 
laws, workers have the right to elect their representatives on the BoS as well as the 
BoD. Considering that reasons leading to their ineffectiveness are similar, this section 
focuses on the BoD for research purposes. 
 




Since employee representation on the BoD is not required by Chinese laws, which are 
different from those governing the BoS, the popularity of employee directors is low.354 
Such low popularity is also due to the notion that these employee representatives 
cannot effectively influence the management and operation of the company. We now 
turn to elaborate upon the various reasons in the discussion that follows. 
 
In terms of their role on the BoD, the employee directors are clearly both the directors 
of the company as well as the employees.355 These representatives are in essence 
employees, so they are usually relegated to an inferior status compared to their 
colleagues on the BoD, who belong to the management team.356 Such employees tend 
to look up to the other directors in the hope of chances of promotion and salary 
raises.357 As the representatives of employees, they are elected to express workers’ 
voices, whereas the directors hold the responsibility of maximising the interests of the 
company. The interests of employees cannot always align with the company’s, 
rendering the employee directors’ mission conflicted. There are scholars suggesting 
that the priority of the employee directors’ job is to serve the best interests of the 
company, but concerning the issues directly relating to the interests of the employees, 
they should act as the representatives of the employees. 358  However, considering 
employees’ close connections with the company, it is impossible to differentiate 
between the interests of employees and those of the company, and this makes it 




354 According to the survey conducted by the China Academy of Social Sciences, there are few employee directors 
in the top 100 listed companies in China. See Xinhua News, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2008-
10/27/content_10257079.htm. 
355 G.Hu, “The Flaws and Revision of the Employee Directors System in SOEs” (国有公司职工董事制度不足及其
修正) (2010) 11 Social Science (社会科学) 95 at 96. 
356 S. Kuruvilla, C.K Lee, and M.E. Gallagher, From Iron Rice Bowl to Informalization: Markets Workers, and the 
State in a Changing China (Cornell University Press-2011) 3. 
357 J. Yi in a discussion chaired by H. Guo, “The Unexpected Employee Directors in SOEs” (变味的国企职工董事) 
(2011) 2 Directors of Board (董事会) 26, available  
at https://finance.ifeng.com/leadership/yygl/20110215/3409216.shtml. 
358 J. Yi in Guo (n 357). 
359 G. Hu (n 355) at 97. 
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In addition, the elected directors cannot effectively represent the interests of employees 
due to their close connection with the management and CPC committee of the firm. 
They are marked as the “noble employee directors” by Chinese scholars,360 since they 
rarely come from shop-floor employees of the company. Specifically, the candidates 
for the employee director role are nominated by the trade union,361 and are normally 
designated as chairman or appointed to other senior positions in the trade unions by 
the CPC committee in the firm. 362  Therefore, such an election in the Workers’ 
Congress becomes a mere formality and cannot truly reflect the will of the workers. 
The chairman of the trade union, who is a member of the CPC committee (a detailed 
introduction to the CPC committee internal to the firm is made in section 4.3.1), 
normally holds a concurrent job in the management team. As a result, whether they 
can protect the interests of employees is highly doubtful if there is a conflict of 
interests.363 Admittedly, the representatives cannot and should not be from the workers 
on the shop-floor, since they are normally too anonymous to be elected by the Workers’ 
Congress whilst tending to be incompetent to deal with the management and operation 
of the company. However, considering that the firm is obliged to provide the employee 
directors with necessary training and services to help them perform their duties,364 the 
employees’ problems of incompetence can be solved to a large extent if such 
obligations of the firm can be performed effectively. 
 
As mentioned above, employees can also perform supervision functions through their 
representatives on the BoS. As the main supervisory organ, the BoS can seldom 
function well, especially in the context of takeovers. This ineffectiveness is examined 
in Chapter 4, with a comparison to the German co-determination system.  
 
 
360 Z. He in Guo (n 357). 
361 Article 38 of Democratic Management Provisions. 
362 Z. He in H. Guo (n 357). The employee directors are normally the chairman of trade union and may also include 
the senior management or CPC cadres.  
363 H. Huang, “Thinking on the Employee Director System in SOEs” (关于在国有企业中设置职工董事制度的思
考) (2011) 2 Shanghai Lawyer (上海律师), available  
at http://www.lawyers.org.cn/info/2f44afedbd2047719b211c96be4d083f. 
364 Article 13 of Regulations on the Performance of Responsibilities by Employee Directors on the Board of Directors 
in Central SOEs (董事会试点中央企业职工董事履行职责管理办法) (2009). 
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3.5 To Resolve Chinese Problems by Legal Transplantation 
 
This thesis attempts to solve Chinese problems in the context of hostile takeovers in 
the securities market by adapting German co-determination mechanism. This 
methodology is referred to as legal transplantation, which is a concept that describes 
“the moving of a rule or a system from one country to another, or from one people to 
another”.365  Chinese legislators have a tradition of transplanting many rules from 
different jurisdictions such as the UK, the US, and Germany to reform their own legal 
system, especially in commercial laws.366 Accordingly, this thesis holds that the most 
effective and efficient way to resolve Chinese problems in this context would be a 
legal transplantation, which is one of the most common ways in China for legal 
developments. However, legal transplantation remains controversial. Before 
introducing the German system to address Chinese hostile takeovers, it is necessary to 
examine the country argument. 
 
To be specific, Legrand denied that the law is largely autonomous, instead stating, “the 
law lives in a profound way within a cultural-specific- and therefore contingent- 
discourse”.367 “There are degrees of transferability”,368 and the extent to which the law 
in a country is transferrable depends on the degree of its embeddedness in its national 
life.369 Therefore, if the legal system is rooted in a country’s specific contexts, legal 
transplantation is highly likely to fail, especially on condition that the social-political 
context are completely different between transplanting countries and receiving 
countries. Empirical observations supported this proposition. For example, Turkey 
adopting the Swiss Civil Code was rejected, at least in rural areas. Similarly, Islamic 
countries have difficulty in adopting western family laws, especially in terms of 
improving women’s status. In addition, even though the migration of legal rules is well 
adapted into the local legal system, their implementation may leave different 
 
365 A. Watson, Legal Transplant: An Approach to Comparative Law (University of Georgia Press-1993) 21. 
366 For instance, Chinese takeover rules adopted mandatory bid rules which originated in the UK.  
367 P. Legrand, “The Impossibility of Legal Transplants” (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law 111. 
368 Kahn-Freund (n 15) at 6. 
369 W. Ewald, “Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants” (1995) 43 The American Journal of 
Comparative Law 489 at 495. 
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consequences from their origins, due to the divergence of social, cultural, and political 
contexts.370  
 
This proposition is reasonable to an extent, as it identifies the difficulty in legal 
transplants. Specifically, there is a risk that the migrating rules cannot meet the 
lawmaker’ expectation due to resistance from the domestic socio-political 
environment and the foreign rules’ incoherence with the country’s historical, cultural, 
and political backgrounds. However, this proposition does not constitute an obstacle 
in employing legal transplantation to solve problems in China, and the reasons are 
provided below. 
 
First, legal transplantation, which is widely used in the context of legal convergence, 
positively affect national economies. The theory of legal transplants raised by Watson 
was largely based on observations. In other words, it had already been well accepted 
by legislators before the theory was initiated and debated, especially in the emerging 
economies. Legal transplantation, which is under the context of global legal 
convergence, can be traced back to Medieval lex mercatori.371 With the increase of 
cross-border transactions and the development of the global commercial and capital 
market, legal certainty and predictability are highly valued, and these virtues are 
perceived to enhance competition.372 The wide use and introduction of commercial 
and corporate laws of western styles promote the convergence of the global legal 
system. In the long run, this convergence provides legal certainty and predictability in 
cross-border transactions, which tend to stabilize and strengthen national 
economies.373 Some countries may face difficulties in adapting foreign commercial or 
corporate laws into their domestic markets. However, it is expected to bring more 
benefits than harms to national economies, especially considering that legislators 
reserve the discretion to amend transplanted rules in their implementation. Rules can 
be modified according to the local environment and the change of circumstances. 
 
370  M. Langer, “From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the 
Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure” (2004) 45 Harvard International Law Journal 1. 
371 C.M. Schmitthoff, Commercial Law in a Changing Economic Climate (Sweet & Maxwell- 1981) 24. 
372 B.A. Markell, “A View from the Field: Some Observations on the Effect of International Commercial Law Reform 
Efforts on the Rule of Law” 6 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 497. 
373 L.A. Mistelis, “Regulatory Aspects: Globalization, Harmonization, Legal Transplants, and Law Reform- Some 




Second, legal transplantation is one of the most convenient means of legal 
development and legal reform. There is no need to struggle to design a new rule by 
lawmakers to solve a problem because another country has already addressed such an 
issue.374 As discussed, the concern of the viability of this legal transplantation is raised 
due to the different social, political and economic context between countries. However, 
the problem can be alleviated to some extent due to improved international cooperation 
in modern times. In this context, “ideas and knowledge deriving from the positive or 
negative experience a legal system has made with regard to a statue”375 can be more 
effectively and thoroughly transferred to the host country in order to avoid problems. 
In addition, deeper international cooperation can help the recipient country draw 
advice from international agencies as well as experts. This can be exemplified by the 
United States Agency for International Development, which helped the former Soviet 
Union countries to establish the market-oriented judicial system.376 No legal system is 
perfect, but if a host country can continuously obtain technical assistance, the 
transplanted rules can be more readily adapted into the domestic contexts. 
 
Third, the social, cultural, and economic environment of the host country is dynamic 
and not static. It is admitted that some foreign rules may be difficult to apply in with 
the domestic environment at the time of transplantation. However, it indeed helps or 
is expected to solve some problems that arise with legal and economic development. 
For instance, Japan imported directors’ fiduciary duty from US law in 1950377 and 
became orphaned for a long time “by the distinctive institutions characterizing Japans’ 
high economic growth period, which helped prevent the taking of corporate 
opportunities and other self-dealing by directors”. 378  However, with the rise of 
takeovers in Japan, directors’ fiduciary duty could help restrict their improper conduct 
to reap large benefits in the change of control of the target firm. Therefore, whether 
 
374 T.W. Waelde and J.L. Gunderson, “Legislative Reform in Transition Economics: Western Transplants- A Short-Cut 
to Social Market Economy Status” (1994) 43 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 347. 
375 Mistelis (n 373) at 1064. 
376 J. DeLisle, “Lex Americana: United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the 
Post-Communist World and Beyond” (1999) 20 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 
179 
377 Article 254-3 of the Commercial Code of Japan (1950). 
378 H. Kanda and C.J. Milhaupt, “The Director’s Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate Law” (2003) 51 The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 887 at 898. 
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imported rules are coherent with the local context should not be examined at the time 
of or immediately after transplanting. Instead, if they are compatible with the country’s 
needs for development or are expected to exert positive impacts in the future, they still 
deserve to be imported.  
 
Fourth, although the law cannot be isolated from its political, social, and cultural 
contexts, the law cannot be simply perceived as the result of a country’s specific 
background. On the other hand, the domestic environment can also be largely shaped 
by legal reforms. This can be exemplified by the economic reform of 1980s in China, 
which started from a series of legal reforms.379 When the party-state decided to start 
the market-oriented economic reform, the cultural and social backgrounds in China 
made laws that aimed to encourage commercial activities unacceptable. Instead, they 
were more approving of the old planned economy before the reform. At the time, the 
party-state chose to transplant laws from the UK, the US, and Germany, which were 
ahead of China in terms of economic development. Although “reformers were eager 
to learn from foreign experience, they were unsure as to which model was suitable to 
China”.380 Certain modifications were made to make the foreign rules adaptable for 
Chinese contexts, while these transplanted rules helped gradually establish the market 
mechanism in China.  
 
Based on the analysis presented above, the contrary proposition to legal transplants 
cannot constitute an obstacle to introducing the German mechanism in China. On the 
other hand, it provides the inspiring insight that the legal transplantation should be 
careful, so the introduced system is accepted by the host country. Accordingly, this 
thesis provides three principles which the introduced co-determination regime should 
conform with. First, the imported rules should be compatible with the Chinese 
domestic environment. Considering that China is undergoing a great economic 
transition, the introduced system should be a particularly good fit for the Chinese 
economic system and its needs for development. Second, the German co-
 
379 D.C. Clarke, “What’s Law Got to Do with It-Legal Institutions and Economic Reform in China” (1991) 10 UCLA 
Pacific Basin Law Journal 1. 
380 L. Tan and J. Wang, “Modelling an Effective Corporate Governance System for China's Listed State-Owned 
Enterprises: Issues and Challenges in a Transitional Economy” (2007) 7 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 143. 
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determination regime is able to effectively address workers’ vulnerability in the firm 
as well as in the context of hostile takeovers. Third, it should be well adapted into the 
current corporate laws system. These principles are examined in the following chapters 
respectively. In Chapter 4, by comparing the economic system between China and 
Germany, the thesis presents that it is coherent with Chinese state capitalist system and 
fulfil China’s demands for economic development. The German system’s capability 
to improve workers’ involvement in hostile takeovers is described in Chapter 5. In 
Chapter 6, the thesis attempts to make certain modifications to the German system, so 




The chapter discusses the ineffectiveness of the labour participation mechanism in 
takeovers, which in general lies in three aspects. First, the labour protection 
mechanism, especially the Workers’ Congress, was embedded in the erstwhile Chinese 
planned economy, making it a challenge to adapt it to modern corporate governance 
mechanisms. Second, the role and function of employee participation institutions make 
employee representatives unable to uphold employees’ claims against those of the 
party-state and the firm. The third aspect is attributable to the deficits of the legal 
framework. In particular, there are no explicit procedural rules or effective 
enforcement mechanisms to guarantee that workers’ information and participation 
rights are adequately protected. 
 
These problems provide insights on the direction of travel for the improvement of 
labour participation mechanisms in Chinese takeovers. First, the mechanism should fit 
in with the takeover process and work coherently with the major corporate organs in 
takeovers, including the BoD and the shareholder assembly. Second, these institutions 
should express the voice of workers, especially those from the establishment level, 
without yielding to those of the firm and the party-state. Accordingly, employee 
representatives should contain a significant proportion of shop-floor employees. 
Besides, they should not be exposed to risks such as a reduction in their earning 
capacity or being sacked for discharging their responsibilities towards employees. 
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Third, employees’ voices should be effectively collected and valued by the 
management and the shareholder assembly. In order to achieve this objective, explicit 
procedural rules should be introduced to guarantee that workers are informed timely 
and thoroughly of a potential takeover. The takeover decisions should consider 
workers’ opinions and be predictable and transparent for employees, and the 
management should be accountable for performing their obligations. 
 
In order to resolve Chinese problems, the thesis attempts to transplant rules from 
German co-determination to Chinese firms. Before moving on to introduce the 
mechanism and examining its advantages in employee participation, a series of 
questions should be posed. First, why is this the German mechanism the most 
appropriate model chosen to be introduced? Second, considering that the introduction 
of German co-determination may lead to a different landscape of Chinese firms’ ways 
of dealing with industrial relationships, is it coherent with the Chinese economic 
system? This thesis uses the varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach, which focuses on 
firms’ ways of coordination with other economic actors, to justify the introduction of 
the German co-determination scheme to Chinese firms. Chinese firms share a high 
level of similarity with their German counterparts in their coordination with other firms, 
but their treatment of workers is distinct. This leads to institutional incoherence, which 
tends to negatively affect the Chinese economy. Therefore, it is plausible that the 
German co-determination mechanism is coherent with the Chinese economic system, 
and will positively affect the Chinese economy. In addition, it can help address the 





Chapter 4: Justifying the Introduction of the German Co-
Determination Model: the VoC Approach 
 
The idea of taking the German co-determination mechanism as a role model to 
improve employee protection in hostile takeovers in Chinese firms is inspired by the 
varieties of capitalism approach. Depending on how firms resolve coordination 
problems central to their competencies, political economies are divided into various 
types. Coordinated market economies (CME) and liberal market economies (LME) 
“constitute ideal types of a spectrum along which many nations can be arrayed”.381 
Due to the difference of social regulations, infrastructural institutions, political 
systems, culture, and history, the best practice of a specific kind of society may vary. 
Therefore, firms in different countries tend to display distinct strategies in industrial 
relations, including how workers are treated in takeovers. For instance, workers in 
CMEs, which are modelled on Germany, have broader and deeper participation in 
takeovers than those in LMEs, which are modelled on the US and the UK. 
 
Despite its influential innovations in the field of political economy, the VoC approach 
finds it a challenge to accommodate the LME-CME value systems in the Chinese 
context.382 Instead, China is carving its own path of exploring capitalism based on its 
indigenous political, cultural, and legal backgrounds, characterised as the state 
capitalist system. This refers to the economy where the government attempts to “meld 
the powers of the state with the powers of capitalism”.383 Although the Chinese path 
may be located beyond the VoC spectrum, the VoC approach can provide inspiring 
directions for China’s economic transformation, especially considering that there is no 
standard recipe for a country’s economic development.384 Compared to the LME, the 
Chinese state capitalist system seems to resonate more with the CME model, especially 
the German economy. Therefore, the German co-determination mechanism is highly 
likely to provide Chinese private firms in hostile takeovers with inspiring experience 
 
381 Hall and Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism (n 17) 8. 
382 T. Saich, The Blind Man and the Elephant: Analysing the Local State in China (Routledge-2009).  
383 The Economist, “The Visible Hands” (2012)), available at http://www.economist.com/node/21542931. 
384 M.K. Whyte, “Paradox of China’s Economic Boom” (2009) 35 The Annual Review of Sociology 371. 
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and is more likely to be fit into the Chinese economic system and to foster a robust 
Chinese economy. 
 
This chapter begins with an introduction to the VoC approach, with an emphasis on 
the characteristics of the CME in Germany. This is followed by a comparison of the 
Chinese economic system with the German CME as well as the LME to show that the 
Chinese capitalist system shares more characterises with the former. In the end, 
evidence is provided to show that the German co-determination system is compatible 
with the Chinese economic system and explains how the introduction of the former 
into China can be expected to have a positive impact on Chinese economic 
transformation. 
 
4.1 An Introduction to the VoC Approach 
 
The VoC approach to the political economy provides a framework for explaining 
institutional variations among different capitalist economies. This approach is based 
on the conception that a firm is relational, and therefore the firm’s competency depends 
crucially on its ability to coordinate with a wide range of actors both internal and 
external to the firm.385 This firm-centred approach focuses on five spheres in which 
firms interact with other actors: industrial relations, vocational training and education, 
corporate governance, inter-firm relations, and relations with employees, three of 
which are related to coordination with employees. Different economies show distinct 
characteristics in resolving these coordination problems, and LMEs and CMEs lie at 
the poles of a spectrum, along which most nations can be plotted.  
 
The key difference between CMEs and LMEs is that the former relies on non-market 
relationships to resolve coordination problems and construct their core competencies, 
whereas the latter do so via hierarchies and competitive market arrangements.386 Firms 
in CMEs access capital on terms that are relevant independent of fluctuations in 
profitability. Firms that are not sensitive to change in profitability tend to rely on a 
 
385 Hall & Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism (n 17) 6. 
386 Hall & Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism (n 17) 8. 
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strong labour force to achieve long-term returns on assets.387 Conversely, LMEs rely 
on highly competitive markets, and therefore the related labour markets are more fluid 
and maintained by formal employment contracts. In general, there are three aspects 
that reflect the differences between LMEs and CMEs in coordination with workers: 
 
First, with regard to industrial relations, workers in CMEs tend to be organised and 
have a higher level of membership in trade unions. Bargaining over wages and working 
conditions tends to be at the industrial, sectoral, and national level. In contrast, workers 
in LMEs are less organised and wage negotiations are held at the company level and 
more individually. Second, given the strong support from labour organisations, 
workers in CMEs are expected to maintain long-term employment and therefore are 
inclined to cultivate firm or industry specific skills, while their LME counterparts are 
more likely to gain general skills that can be easily transferred to other jobs, since 
labour markets are comparatively fluid. Third, to ensure that employees coordinate 
well with others to improve the competencies of the firm, workers in CMEs have a 
deeper participation in corporate decisions, which can be exemplified by the German 
co-determination mechanism; this is rarely found in LMEs, where management are the 
major decision-makers. 
 
The VoC approach has spawned influential accounts in the field of comparative 
political economy, albeit with certain limitations. First, the approach is limited by its 
“methodological nationalism”. 388  To be specific, this approach tends to analyse 
economies statically, without adequately considering the impacts of global economic 
integration on restructuring capitalist systems in a particular nation. Second, it fails to 
“account for the pronounced interpenetration and mutual dependence of capitalist 
economies”.389 Third, it is preoccupied with limited, formal registers of institutional 
variety and accordingly unable to fully explain a new type of capitalism, including the 
Chinese model.390 However, it should be noted that by realising these limits the VoC 
 
387  M. Aoki, “The Contingent Governance of Teams: Analysis of Institutional Complementarity” (1994) 35 
International Economic Review 657. 
388 J. Peck and N. Theodore, “Variegated Capitalism” (2007) 31 Human Geography 731. 
389 J. Peck and J. Zhang, “A Variety of Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics” (2013) 13 Journal of Economic 
Geography 357. 
390 N. Fligstein and J. Zhang, “A New Agenda for Research on the Trajectory of Chinese Capitalism” (2011) 7 
Management and Organization Review 39. 
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approach is enriched and becomes more complicated. Consequently, this approach 
remains “a rich seam to mine, capable of accommodating new developments, and 
theoretically flexible enough to branch out into new arguments”.391  
 
Accordingly, although the Chinese state capitalist system is conceived as being located 
beyond the CME‒LME continuum, analysing the Chinese system using the VoC 
approach is able to provide an inspiring direction for augmenting employee protection 
in hostile takeovers in China, more so during the current Chinese economic 
transformation. The next section examines the Chinese state capitalist system before 
comparing it with CMEs, which are modelled on German capitalism, as well as LMEs, 
which are modelled on the US and UK systems. 
 
4.2 The Chinese State Capitalist System under the VoC 
Approach 
 
China has scarcely been discussed under the VoC approach, which situation has 
mainly arisen from scholars’ debate over the specific variant of the economic system 
of China. Therefore, in this section, the Chinese economic system and its main features 
are first discussed, followed by a comparison of the Chinese economic system to the 
principal two models of the VoC approach. 
 
Divergent views concerning the nature of Chinese capitalism arise from scholars’ 
different assessments of the weight of the importance of the party-state and market 
forces in the Chinese economy. For instance, some scholars contend that, given the 
grip of the party-state over the Chinese economy, the latter can hardly be considered 
as functionally capitalist.392 Meanwhile, other researchers have recognised the positive 
role of private forces in the Chinese economic transformation, 393  and therefore 
perceive it as a new-found variant of capitalism,394 or refer to the Chinese model as a 
 
391 B. Hancke, M. Rhodes, and M. Thatcher (eds), Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: Conflict, Contradictions, and 
Complementarities in the European Economy (Oxford University Press-2007) 9. 
392 M.W. Meyer, “Is it Capitalism” (2011) 7 Management and Organization Review 5. 
393  N.R. Lardy, Markets over Mao: The Rise of Private Business in China (Peterson Institute for International 
Econmics-2014).  
394 G. Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-first Century (Verso-2008) 327. 
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“statist market economy”. 395  This debate gradually came to an end when the 
expression “state capitalism” was coined by The Economist in 2012. 396  The 
introduction of state capitalism identifies both the existence and significant roles of 
the party-state and the capitalist tool in the Chinese economy whilst leaving it open to 
continuing competition between the party-state and the private sector. In fact, although 
the party-state maintains its dominance in the Chinese economy, its attitudes towards 
the private sector determine the latter’s vitality. Therefore, an examination of the role 
of the party-state in the Chinese economy is key to understanding how private firms 
coordinate with other factors in China. 
 
Concerning the state capitalist system in China, the party-state is firmly pushing 
forward market-oriented reform, 397  which has made remarkable achievements. 398 
However, the party-state maintains its commanding heights,399 and therefore if the 
market fails to work, or works against the interests of the party-state,400 the party-state 
intervenes mainly through two mechanisms: 1) a high degree of direct participation in 
the economy, particularly through SOEs; 2) nondemocratic forms of public 
governance.401  These two mechanisms and their impact on the private sector are 
discussed in the following subsection. 
 
4.2.1 The State-owned Enterprises  
 
SOEs refer to enterprises of which the state is the controlling shareholder. However, 
there is no generally agreed standard of what proportion of shareholding makes the 
state a controlling shareholder. But for the purposes of this research, relying on 
 
395  The model emphasizes the goal of collective interests and social equality through extensive government 
intervention and state building for the restructuring of economics and politics. See D. Farnham, The Changing 
Faces of Employment Relations: Global, Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives (Red Globe Press-2015) 272. 
396 The Economist, “The Rise of State Capitalism” (2012), available  
at http://www.economist.com/node/21543160. 
397 The Central Committee of the CPC, Decisions of Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some 
Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform (中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的
决定) (2013). 
398 China has become the second largest economy only after America. 
399 Bremmer (338). 
400 M.E. Gallagher, “The Social Relations of Chinese Capitalism”. (2015) in Liebman and Milhaupt (Eds.), Regulating 
the Visible Hand (n 135) 226. 
401 Liebman and Milhaupt (Eds.), Regulating the Visible Hand (n 135) xiv. 
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administrative policies, a company is an SOE if the state is the largest shareholder and 
its holding exceeds 30%.402  
 
Generally, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) of the central, provincial, or local governments performs the investors’ 
functions and enjoys the investors’ rights and interests on behalf of the state,403 making 
these companies and their subsidiaries SOEs.  
 
In general, SOEs affect private firms in three ways. The first is through monopolies, 
especially considering that the SOEs are the mainstay of China’s economy due to their 
robust role in the Chinese economy.404 Its monopolies are supported by the party-state 
and are widespread in major industries including the energy, mining, and infrastructure 
sectors. 405  The second is through competition as well as partnership. With the 
implementation of the Chinese ‘open-up’ policy, private enterprises are being 
gradually allowed to access industries that were wholly state owned before. On the 
other hand, SOEs are attempting to penetrate the whole economy by acquiring private 
shares, which is one of the objectives of the mixed ownership reform. In this case, an 
increasingly intense public‒private competition as well as broader public‒private 
coordination are observed. It should be noted that neither the competition nor the 
coordination can be established on a fair basis, especially considering the party-state’s 
grip on the Chinese economy through non-democratic regulations.  
 
 
402 According to Article 5 of the Opinions on the Code of Conducts of the State Shareholder Exercising Shareholder 
Rights in the Joint Stock Company (股份有限公司国有股东行使股权行为规范意见) (1997) (ineffective), on the 
condition that the state is the largest shareholder, it is the absolute controlling shareholder if its shareholding 
exceeds 50% while the relative controlling shareholder if its shareholding is between 30% and 50%. It is noted that 
a few other administrative departments such as the Ministry of Finance act as state shareholders. 
403 Article 4 of the State-owned Assets of Enterprises Law of PRC (中华人民共和国企业国有资产法) (2008). 
404 Although during the SOE reforms, the role of SOEs in the economy is declining, it still makes huge contributions 
to national GDP and tax revenues. See the statistics in A. Hu, X. Zhang, N. Gao, “SOEs: The Important Foundation 
of Safeguarding China’s Financial Capability” (国有企业: 保证中国财政能力的重要基础) (2016) 2 Journal of 
China National School of Administration (中国行政学院学报) 19. 
405 There are certain categories of industries that the government does not allow or only allows the private sector 
to enter if it has permission. See the State Council of PRC, Opinions on Implementation of the System of the 
Negative List of the Market Access of the State Council (国务院关于实行市场准入负面清单制度的意见) (2015) 




4.2.2 Non-democratic Public Governance 
 
In addition to the ownership stake, the party-state can exert its influence over the 
market through regulatory and non-regulatory governance. The former is through 
administrative authorities. There are generally three relevant administrative bodies in 
the context of this paper, namely SASAC, CSRC, and the Ministry or Bureau of 
Human Resources and Social Security (HRSS). SASAC has the authority to oversee 
private firms wherein the party-state exerts control via a shareholding. CSRC is the 
department that regulates and supervises the capital market, including listed companies. 
HRSS has the responsibility to regulate the labour market, promote employment, and 
establish social security, and accordingly employee protection in private firms is under 
the supervision of the HRSS department.  
 
These administrative organs may affect how private firms coordinate with other actors 
through regulatory governance, such as administrative approval, orders, or instructions. 
In the current round of reform, admittedly, the party-state plans to marketise the 
Chinese economy, and therefore regulatory administrative intervention in the economy 
is expected to reduce. 406  However, given the party-state’s dominant role, 
administrative intervention is expected to remain at a high level, and the minor 
reduction of regulatory governance is likely to be largely offset by non-regulatory 
governance. 
 
In the non-regulatory field, proximity to the party-state will secure private firms’ 
survival and prosperity. Since all the major banks in China are state-owned, firms with 
strong political connections will have a greater chance of receiving loans, possibly at 
a lower cost.407 In addition, firms with an intimate relationship with the party-state are 
more likely to obtain favourable government policies, such as tax reductions408 or 
subsidies.409 Such a close relationship with the party-state is mainly formed for two 
 
406 The Central Committee of the CPC, Decisions (n 397). It should be noted that other evidence shows that this 
trend is expected to come to a halt, and this is discussed in a separate section. 
407 C.K.W. Chow et al (n 340) at 367. 
408 W. Cui (n 341) at 154. 
409 Haley & Haley, Subsidies to Chinese Industries (n 342) 2. In 2015, 2752 listed companies obtained RMB 167.3 
billion from the government, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2016-05/06/c128962597.htm. 
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reasons. The first is the government’s dependence on local firms for tax revenues and 
the execution of policy objectives. To be specific, tax revenues are an important 
criterion to assess the performance of the local government, while there are some 
policy objectives, such as increasing the volume of exports, which need solid support 
from the local companies. The second is the personal relationship between the 
management and government officials. Although the administrative organs have 
procedural rules on how to exercise their powers, “real authority in China is 
concentrated in the hands of political elites and is not subject to systematic monitoring 
by the public or politically independent institutions”.410 Therefore, a close relationship 
with the key figures in the government will enhance firms’ intimacy with the 
government, thereby helping them avoid arbitrary administrative action. 
 
As seen from afar, the party-state occupies the commanding heights of the Chinese 
economy and is able to affect private firms as well as other market actors through SOEs 
and its public governance. In the context of the VoC theory, private firms’ relationship 
with the party-state can largely shape how they resolve coordination problems, and 
therefore is central to their competencies. In the next section, a detailed analysis of the 
Chinese capitalist system is made through the lens of the VoC, in order to identify why 
Chinese private firms can draw valuable lessons from the CME model of the German 
style. 
 
4.2.3 An Analysis of the Chinese State Capitalist System through the 
VoC Lens 
 
Explorations of the Chinese system have resulted in divergent conclusions. Witt holds 
that Chinese capitalism “looks more like an LME than a CME”,411 while other scholars 
tend to compare the Chinese system with CME-like capitalism.412 Some think it more 
closely related to French capitalism.413 All these scholars recognise the dominance of 
 
410 Milhaupt & Zheng (n 343) at 14. 
411 M.A. Witt, “China: What Variety of Capitalism” (2010) INSEAD Faculty & Research Working Paper 2010/88/EPS, 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1695940. 
412 P. Nolan, Integrating China: Towards the Coordinated Market Economy (Anthem Press-2007). 
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the party-state in the Chinese economy, and this is the key point that makes it deviate 
from the typical model of either CMEs or the LMEs. However, it would be too hasty 
to reach any conclusion without a detailed analysis of how the political system, culture, 
and history affect the ways in which firms resolve coordination problems. Therefore, 
these previous works are unable to comprehensively describe the Chinese economic 
landscape. Striking a different path from these arguments, the analysis in this thesis 
suggests that the contemporary Chinese model shows characteristics of both poles of 
the VoC spectrum. To be specific, similar to the German style CMEs, Chinese firms 
rely more on non-market interactions among economic actors, and employers are 
geared towards information sharing. On the other hand, employees in Chinese firms 
are less organised due to the ineffectiveness of the trade union and the Workers’ 
Congress, and the comparatively high turnover rates incline towards the LME model. 
It should be noted that in both CMEs and LMEs coordination at the levels of the 
employer and employees work in synergy. Therefore, the different styles in which 
Chinese firms interact with other firms (CME style) and with their employees (LME 
style) leads to a contradiction, which is detrimental to both the Chinese economy and 
the employees’ interests. 
 
Accordingly, CME and LME elements of the Chinese economy are identified in this 
section, before examining the negative effects of these contradicting styles on the 
Chinese economy and on workers in the private sector. 
 
4.3 A Comparison of German CMEs and the Chinese Economy 
 
CMEs tend to “provide companies with access to finance that is not entirely dependent 
on publicly available financial data or current returns”.414 Financiers in CMEs tend to 
rely on private or inside information, which is relatively independent of fluctuations 
in profitability, with the objective of generating long-term returns. Therefore, access 
to this “patient capital” makes firms more likely to engage in research and 
development (R&D) as well as educating and training employees. Similar 
 
414 Hall & Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism (n 17) 22. 
 
113 
characteristics can be found in the Chinese economy, where share prices do not entirely 
reflect firms’ financial reality and firms’ long-term returns are valued. The conclusion 
is inescapable that both types of economies’ deviation from an entirely market-
oriented mechanism is due to their dependence on dominant forces other than 
dispersed institutional investors as in the LMEs. The difference is that the market in 
Germany is bank-led, whereas the Chinese system is state-led. Although the party-
state in China functions differently from banks in Germany, Chinese firms tend to 
value more their long-term returns under its leadership, which is similar to their 
German counterparts’ experience under banks’ leadership. 
 
Given the lower level of dependence on publicly available information, better forms 
of private information sharing between economic actors, especially firms and their 
financiers, should be established in CMEs. In Germany, financiers’ access to firms’ 
information is through cross-shareholdings and joint membership in industrial 
associations, as well as managers’ and technical personnel’s personal relationships 
with counterparts in other companies. The first emphasises the firms’ shareholding 
interactions with other economic actors; the second refers to institutional interaction, 
whilst the third type of coordination is through interpersonal relationships. In this sense, 
Chinese private firms share a high degree of similarity with their German counterparts. 
However, due to the different political and historical backgrounds, these mechanisms 
are less effective in the Chinese market in terms of coordination among economic 
actors. Instead, there are other mechanisms unique to the Chinese economy, such as 
the party-state internal to the firm and the guanxi networks.  
 
Accordingly, the comparison of the Chinese and the German economies lies in two 
aspects. First the dominant forces, namely banks in Germany and the party-state in 
China, are examined, with an emphasis on their similarities and differences in fostering 
national economic performance. The second aspect is an investigation of the 
shareholding, institutional, and interpersonal ways of coordination in the Chinese and 




4.3.1 The Dominant Forces in the German and Chinese Economies 
 
There is widespread agreement that commercial banks in Germany are able to 
substantially coordinate economic activities throughout the nation. There are three 
institutional sources for major banks to exercise “influence over firms to help 
coordinate decisions and relations between them”.415 First, major banks in Germany 
have extensive shareholdings in industry. The level of bank control is somewhat 
exaggerated due to prevalence of the proxy-voting system,416 which enables banks to 
vote through far more shares than they have direct ownership of.417 For instance, as 
Nibbler observes, three major banks in Germany—Deutsche, Dresdner, and 
Commerzbank—owned 6.8% of the equity of their own shares, but the average size of 
proxies was 17.6%. 418  Second, these bank shareholders can exert control over 
corporate management through shareholder seats on the corporate supervisory board, 
which monitors the decision-making of the management board and managerial 
performance. Even in firms where half of the supervisory board is constituted of 
employee representatives, the chairman of the board is elected by shareholders, over 
whom bank shareholders have substantial influence, with a casting vote in the event 
of a tie in decision making. Third, financing in Germany is bank-based, where bank 
loans account for a large proportion of firms’ liabilities. This is distinct from the 
market-based economy in other countries, especially the US, which is characterised by 
strong and fluid capital markets.419 Firms’ heavy reliance on bank finance shields 
corporate managers from short-term imperatives driven by equity investors’ 




415 R. Deeg, “The State, Banks, and Economic Governance in Germany” (1993) 2 German Politics 149. 
416 This refers to the situation when bank shareholders delegate their representatives to vote on behalf of them. 
417 J. Franks and C. Mayer, “Ownership and Control of German Corporations” (2001) 14 The Review of Financial 
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418 M. Nibler, “Bank Control and Corporate Performance in Germany: The Evidence” (1998). PhD Dissertation 
Cambridge University.  
419 S. Vitols, “Changes in Germany’s Bank-Based Financial System: A Varieties of Capitalism Perspective” (2004) 
Discussion Paper SP II 2004 Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, available  
at https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/51230/1/38574787X.pdf. 
420 P.D. Culpepper, “Institutional Change in Contemporary Capitalism: Coordinated Financial Systems since 1990” 
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A similar pattern can be found in China in terms of the party-state’s ways of 
influencing firms’ coordination activities. First, the party-state has extensive 
shareholdings in Chinese industries, including both the state and private sector. For 
instance, the party-state indirectly owns shares through state agencies, such as SASAC 
of the central, provincial, or local governments, and the Ministry of Finance.421 On 
behalf of the state, these agencies perform investors’ functions and enjoy the investors’ 
rights and interests,422 in addition to supervising these firms and their subsidiaries as 
supervision administration and regulator. These state-owned enterprises are the 
mainstay of China’s economy due to their robust role in the Chinese economy423 and 
their monopolies in major industries including the energy, mining, and infrastructure 
sectors. 424  The party-state extended its share ownership to the private sector by 
initiating the mixed ownership reform in 2015, which encourages the party-state to 
invest in private firms that are perceived as promising.425 Second, similar to German 
banks, the party-state in China can participate in and supervise corporate management, 
albeit not through representatives they directly appoint. The party-state engages in 
corporate affairs through the CPC committee internal to the firms, which is unique to 
the Chinese context. According to the constitution of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC), a party organisation426 should be formed within an entity if there are at least 
three members of the CPC. 427  Therefore, considering the large number of party 
members in China,428 a CPC committee exists in almost every private firm. The role 
of the party-state in a private firm can be seen in diagram 3. It should be noted that 
these party-state organisations are not corporate governance organs, and their 
responsibility is not to engage in corporate management. However, members in the 
 
421 Generally, non-financial SOEs are under the purview of the SASAC at different levels whilst the Ministry of 
Finance acts as the state agency in financial SOEs. 
422 Article 4 of the State-owned Assets of Enterprises Law. 
423 Although during the SOE reforms, the role of SOEs in the economy is declining, it still makes huge contributions 
to national GDP and tax revenues. See the statistics in Hu et al (n 404). 
424 There are certain categories of industries that the government does not allow or allow only the private sector 
to enter subject to permission. See the State Council (n 389) and Ministry of Commerce (n 405). 
425 The State Council, Opinions of the State Council on the Development of Mixed –ownership Economy(国务院关
于国有企业发展混合所有制经济的意见) (2015). 
426 Article 6 of Organisational Regulation of CPC on Grass-roots Work in Organs of the Party and Government (中
国共产党党和国家机关基层工作组织条例) (2010). 
427 Article 29 of The Constitution of the CPC of China (中国共产党党章) (2012). 
428 As of 2015, the membership of the CPC exceeded 88 million. See Statistical Bulletin of CPC in 2015 (2015 年中
国共产党党内统计公报), available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0701/c404684-28514117.html. 
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CPC committee are deemed as key personnel of the firm, since they normally hold 
concurrent positions in the senior management teams. Therefore, they may have easy 
access to private firms’ financial statements, which provides an important channel for 
the party to monitor firms.429  
Diagram 3: the role of the CPC committee in Chinese firms 
 
Moreover, private shareholders and senior management are not able to dispose of this 
supervision by dismissing their party leader, since that is the prerogative of the party-
state. Third, firms with close political connections in China have a better chance of 
securing funds. Firms’ connections with the party-state play an important role in 
explaining firms’ financial condition, especially considering the extent of 
misallocation of credit by dominant state-owned banks.430 Further evidence shows that 
party membership can help private firms to obtain loans from banks or other financial 
institutions.431 In addition, Chinese firms with strong political connections run a lower 
risk of rejection of their initial public offerings (IPO), and are observed to perform 
better subsequent to their IPOs.432 This is mainly due to the party-state’s leadership of 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission and stock exchanges. Due to the 
deviation of the stock market from the market mechanism, empirical studies show that 
there is no observable relationship between the stock market and the real economy.433 
 
429 W. Shi, L, Markoczy and C.V. Stan, "The Continuing Importance of Political Ties in China" (2014) 28 The Academy 
of Management Perspectives 57 at 63. 
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431 H. Li, L. Meng, Q. Wang, and L. Zhou, “Political Connections, Financing and Firm Performance: Evidence from 
Chinese Private Firms” (2008) 87 Journal of Development Economics 283. 
432 X. Bao, S. Johan, K. Kutsuna, “Do Political Connections Matter in Accessing Capital Markets? Evidence from 
China” (2016) 29 Emerging Markets Review 24. 
433 L. Pan and V. Mishra, “Stock Market Development and Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from China” (2018) 
68 Economic Modelling 661. 
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Instead, Chinese stock markets are policy oriented, tending to react actively to changes 
in administrative policies.434 Therefore, being better informed about and prepared for 
policy changes is key to stabilising and improving share prices, the precondition for 
which is a sound relationship with the party-state. In this sense, Chinese firms depend 
more extensively and deeply on the party-state in financing, compared to their German 
counterparts who depend on the banks.  
 
Both German and Chinese economies have dominant forces—banks and the party-
state respectively—leading to a high degree of similarity in firms’ coordination 
activities. First, firms’ affiliation with the dominant forces improves their competency. 
This arises from banks’ and the party-state’s extensive shareholdings as well as their 
participation in corporate management, and from their decisive say over firms’ 
financing. Second, firms’ reliance on banks and the party-state in Germany and China, 
respectively, makes corporate managers shy away from being pressured for short-term 
gains and focus instead on their firms’ long-term value, especially considering the 
weak functioning of the stock market in both economies.  
 
At the same time, it should be noted that the Chinese state-led economy displays 
certain differences from the German bank-led economy. To be specific, the party-state 
has a more extensive and deeper impact on the Chinese economy and private firms 
than banks in Germany. The grip of the party-state makes the state’s political 
objectives one of the most important considerations in Chinese corporate management. 
In addition, the different ways of influencing private firms in the two systems lead to 
different patterns of firms’ coordination activities, and this is illustrated in the 
following three sections.  
 
4.3.2 Cross-Shareholdings Among Firms 
 
 
434 Y. Wang, J. Tsai, and Q. Li, “Policy Impact on the Chinese Stock Market: From the 1994 Bailout Policies to the 
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Cross-shareholding refers to situations in which two or more firms each hold shares in 
the others. In German CMEs, “dense networks of cross-shareholding” 435  are 
commonly used to facilitate the sharing of information and resources as well as 
strengthen long-term coordination among different firms. These ownership 
collaborations also make hostile takeovers difficult to execute,436 thereby enabling 
corporate managers to focus on long-term interests that deviate from the stock price 
maximisation path.437 
 
In comparison, cross-shareholdings in Chinese private firms follow different paths 
since their development is generally guided by the party-state. The cross-shareholding 
arrangements in the Chinese market emerged much later than in the German market. 
The emergence of the development of cross-shareholdings in China dates back to 
1986.438 These shareholding arrangements were introduced in the context of the state-
owned enterprise reform and aimed to diversify the concentrated shareholding pattern 
caused by the dominance of the party-state.439  Cross-shareholdings are a strategy 
commonly used by state-owned enterprises to evade the minimum registered capital 
legal requirement for a firm’s initial public offerings, especially considering that most 
firms were short on capital at the early stages of the Chinese economic reform. This is 
because the equities of each firm may be counted twice in a cross-holding 
arrangement,440 enabling state investors to use fewer funds for more registered capital. 
The second milestone of the cross-shareholding structure was the mixed-ownership 
reform started in 2005. This reform marketizes state-owned enterprises by attracting 
private strategic investors and also boosts the private economy by investing state 
capital in private firms. Accordingly, cross-holdings are one of the most effective 
arrangements to achieve both these objectives and are, therefore, encouraged by the 
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party-state.441 It should be noted that cross-shareholding is a commonly used technique 
by the party-state to achieve its objectives, but the private sector shows a different 
pattern.  
 
Cross-shareholdings were established much later in private firms than in the public 
sector. They are prevalent in the Chinese capital market, usually to strengthen firms’ 
collaboration activities.442 However, their development remains at an early stage, and 
a series of problems tend to arise. First, due to double counting, cross-shareholdings 
may result in inflated registered capital and hurt interests of investors.443 Second, such 
interlocked ownerships among firms may “foster a moral hazard among incumbent 
managers (insider control)”, which normally results in “low performance due to either 
over-investment or low effort levels in relation to capital and labour input”.444 Third, 
strategic alliances between firms in the same industry may also lead to a monopoly. 
Accordingly, the party-state takes a cautious attitude towards the development of 
cross-shareholdings. For instance, cross-shareholdings between listed firms and their 
subsidiaries are forbidden by two major stock exchanges in China.445 It should be 
noted that these rules constitute the party-state’s first attempt to regulate firms’ cross-
shareholding arrangements. Compared to the German market which has detailed 
regulations on such equity linkages,446 the party-state and Chinese economy are not 
fully ready to cope with complex situations during the enforcement of cross-
shareholdings, especially in private firms where the party-state does not have direct 
shareholding control. Hence, further measures to regulate cross-shareholding 
 
441 The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council, Guide Opinions of Central 
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务院关于深化国有企业改革的指导意见) (2013). 
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arrangements can be expected, which may hinder their development and use in the 
Chinese economy.  
 
In conclusion, similar to German firms, cross-shareholdings in Chinese firms play a 
significant role in both the private and public sectors. However, unlike their German 
counterparts, the cross-shareholdings in Chinese firms cannot play a significant role in 
the firms’ coordination as the development of cross-shareholdings remains at an early 
stage. In addition, considering the unpredictability of the party-state in solving 
problems that arise from these arrangements, private firms tend to avoid or be prepared 
for a change in their shareholding structures at any time,447 which is time-consuming 
and costly. 
 
4.3.3 Institutional Coordination  
 
An institutional method of coordination is through a business or employers’ 
association. This method was one of the key components that led to Germany’s post-
war economic success. 448  Although evidence shows a downward trend in the 
membership of German institutions from the 1990s,449 the employers’ association 
maintains a pivotal role in various spheres of the German economy. In general, the 
contributions of business associations can be categorised as market-supporting and 
market-complementing activities. 450  The former refers to business associations 
pushing underperforming states to provide public goods while the latter emphasises 
the associational behaviours that facilitate the coordination of economic actors. 
Accordingly, this section focuses on the latter. To ensure these associations function 
effectively, they have been granted certain governance powers, “with the state 
awarding its outcome legally binding status”.451 In general, the functions of these 
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institutions are based on the following two aspects. First, joint membership in these 
institutions enables the sharing of information and subsequently facilitation 
technological improvements, standard settings, and vocational training.452 Any free-
rider or opportunistic behaviours are monitored by the associations and sanctioned 
with a loss of reputation.453 Actors with low reputations tend to be deterred from 
further participation in business associations, which substantially reduces their 
competency. Second, these firms have the right to establish or join employer 
associations that represent employers in collective bargaining negotiations with 
employees represented by trade unions.454 This is not discussed in detail in this section 
as it does not closely relate to coordination among firms.  
 
The activities of Chinese business associations show patterns similar to their German 
counterparts in improving firms’ coordination, albeit with certain differences that are 
mainly caused by the leadership of the party-state. Chinese scholars have reported that 
these organisations substantially impact Chinese firms’ coordination455 and help their 
members engage in vocational training, new business exploration, technology 
production and improvement, and brand promotion. In addition, these institutions 
promote collaborative activities among their members. Chinese firms do not show a 
fair amount of enthusiasm for participating in the activities of these organisations, as 
is evidenced by a low ratio of membership fee payment. 456  This is because the 
establishment of almost all the Chinese business associations are led by the party-state, 
leading to disorganised administrative and associational functions. For instance, the 
key personnel of these organisations hold concurrent administrative positions while 
their funds are allocated by the government; therefore, these organisations are 
normally perceived as branches of the government.457 As a result, Chinese business 
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associations tend to represent the interests of the party-state rather than those of  
business or industry as a whole, attenuating their active participation in the activities. 
Realising this problem, the party-state plans to reduce its intervention by removing the 
organisations’ administrative and financial affiliations to the government.458 However, 
the party-state would retain its control over these organisations via the CPC committee. 
Therefore, while the impact of the party-state on the work of business associations is 
expected to become weaker, the former will retain its decisive say. Therefore, these 
organisations can hardly play as active a role in the firms’ coordination as their German 
counterparts. In addition to the coordination function, industrial associations in China 
similarly represent the employer group in collective bargaining. 459  However, this 
function is perceived as formalistic for two reasons. First, as mentioned above, these 
associations struggle to represent the employers’ interests due to the presence of strong 
administrative intervention. Second, the trade unions which are supposed to bargain in 
favour of the interests of the workers are also under the leadership of the party-state. 
Therefore, in the collective bargaining process, both the parties endeavour to reach an 
agreement in a timely manner and at low cost, rather than speak up for the groups they 
represent. 
 
Compared to the institutionalised method of cooperation among German firms, 
Chinese private firms have an effective approach to coordination through their internal 
CPC committees, as mentioned above. These CPC committees show high-level 
integration and collaboration as they are all under the leadership of the party-state. The 
party-state provides various platforms to connect these party-state committees, 
including meetings or training sessions organised for their cadres. Accordingly, these 
party members are obliged to share information with the government and colleagues 
in other firms to ensure that the market, as a whole, works in compliance with the 
policies and guidelines of the party-state. Considering the party-state’s level of 
authority in the Chinese economy, these party organisations provide direct and 
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effective ways of coordination compared to industrial associations. However, whether 
such involuntary collaborations comply with the firms’ economic interests is doubtful 
as, occasionally, their economic interests would be subject to political objectives such 
as safeguarding national security and sovereignty. 460  For instance, overseas 
investments in Chinese firms in industries of information and communication 
technology are restricted by the party-state,461 which may be opposed to these firms’ 
interests but compatible with the objective of safeguarding national security.  
 
In conclusion, Chinese employers’ associations function in ways similar to their 
German counterparts, but their role in the Chinese market is much weaker. The core 
reason is the intervention of the party-state which makes these so-called “civil 
associations” indistinguishable from administrative organs. Therefore, these business 
associations can hardly represent the employers’ interests, especially when there are 
conflicts of interest with the party-state. This attenuates the firms’ enthusiasm to 
coordinate with one another through their business associations. In addition to the 
institutional cooperation approach prominent in Germany, Chinese firms can 
cooperatively work with other economic actors through their internal CPC committees 
but not exclusively for their economic interests. Occasionally, they would be subject 
to the party-state’s political objectives, which is frequently observed under the Chinese 
state capitalist system. 
 
4.3.4 Interpersonal Relationships in the Economy 
 
The dense interpersonal networks linking “the managers and key technical personnel 
inside a company to their counterparts in other firms”462 facilitate the firms’ process 
of information sharing with other economic actors. Such interpersonal relationships 
are cultivated based on trust. Trust is defined as a set of expectations that other people 
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cares and can be believed in imperfectly defined future situations.463 In Germany, 
interpersonal coordination methods are prevalent in small firms, where “firms seem to 
cooperate without formal contracts or backup from a well-functioning legal 
system”.464 Such interpersonal relationships are also valued in large firms since mutual 
trust among the key personnel enables the development and operation of shareholding 
and associational arrangements through information sharing and other forms of 
collaboration.465 Any opportunistic or miscreant behaviours may cause a breakdown 
of interpersonal trust, which disrupts the reputation of reliability and negatively affects 
the institutional and shareholding networks. Therefore, although interpersonal 
relationships are prevalent in the German economy, they function as supplements for 
shareholding and institutional coordination. 466  It should be noted that levels of 
interpersonal trust vary in different countries.  
 
Coordination among Chinese firms particularly relies on guanxi, i.e. interpersonal 
connections rooted in Chinese traditional culture. It is “based implicitly (rather than 
explicitly) on mutual interest and benefit. Once guanxi is established between two 
people, each can ask a favour of the other with the expectation that the debt incurred 
will be repaid sometime in the future”.467 Guanxi networks serve as a form of social 
currency which enables corporate managers to gain access to scarce information, 
resources, and even favourable treatment. 468  Unlike the German market where 
interpersonal relationships mainly function through inter-firm cooperation, guanxi 
networks also connect private firms with the party-state, which is essential for business 
success in the Chinese economy.  
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According to an observation by the Poulson Institute, “Although China has many law-
making institutions and procedures that resemble those typically found in developed 
markets, real authority in China is concentrated in the hands of political elites and is 
not subject to systematic monitoring by the public or politically independent 
institutions”. 469  This highlights the significance of private firm managers’ 
relationships with these political elites with real power for personal gains or to better 
firm performance. This is because the latter are able to decide how they supervise, 
regulate, or facilitate corporate businesses and management. Evidence shows that 
entrepreneurs in the private sector with strong political connections enhance their 
firm’s performance “in terms of sales, number of employees, and equity value”.470 
Guanxi can be established with the party-state elites through various ways. First, strong 
connections can be developed with officials who have worked in SOEs or even the 
government. For example, Wang Shi, the founder and chairman of Vanke, the largest 
real estate developer in China, served the Guangdong provincial government before 
starting his own business. Second, some SOEs get transformed into private forms 
during SOE reforms, which was the case with Ping An Insurance, and therefore the 
management’s political ties with officials are inherited and maintained. Third, the 
representatives of the People’s Congress and members of the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference are usually leaders of private firms, including board 
chairpersons or managers, and the abovementioned two institutions work closely with 
the party-state,471 which provides them with abundant opportunities to socialise with 
government officials. 
 
It should be noted that guanxi networks also prevail in inter-firm relationships, 
especially because they are considered as integral parts of people’s lives, particularly 
their business lives.472  Guanxi can be established through shared aspects such as 
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family backgrounds, place of origin, experiences, educational affiliation, and other 
dimensions.473  A firm is more likely to establish sound collaborations with other 
economic actors who have good personal relationships with key personnel in the firm. 
Trust at the personal level can be transferred to the organisational level.474 For instance, 
in knowledge-intensive industries, guanxi can be cultivated through knowledge and 
information exchanges, which further strengthen the firm’s alliances.475 In addition, 
although the patron–client exchange is generally subject to the market, better personal 
relationships tend to facilitate the exchange of goods and services.476 
 
Compared to Germany, interpersonal relationships play a highly significant role in the 
Chinese economy. Some argue that this is because the Chinese market lacks a stable 
legal and regulatory environment that allows for impersonal dealings, and therefore 
guanxi connections are deemed as substitutes for formal institutional support.477 This 
may explain the Chinese situation to some extent. However, with the development of 
the Chinese capital market, guanxi networks are thought to be less significant and 
durable than before.478 Since it is a prominently rooted in Chinese culture,479 such 
interpersonal relationships are expected to prevail in business in China even once the 
legal framework is well established and operational. 
 
In conclusion, unlike the German market where interpersonal relationships are 
considered supplementary to the firms’ shareholding and institutional ways of 
coordination, guanxi networks are perceived as essential for firms’ success in China. 
Establishing and maintaining sound personal relationships with key personnel in other 
firms also facilitates coordination at the institutional level, which, in turn, strengthens 
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the interpersonal connections. Although guanxi networks are deeply rooted in Chinese 
culture, it is generally agreed that the main reason for Chinese firms’ high dependence 
on interpersonal relationships to improve their competencies is due to the 
underdeveloped legal and regulatory frameworks. Firms’ excessive reliance on 
interpersonal relationships with implicit commitments instead of explicit contracts or 
institutional frameworks may diminish transparency, predictability, and accountability, 
which is against the demands of the market. Therefore, although guanxi is expected to 
retain its extensive impact on the Chinese market in the future, a more detailed and 




This section compared German and Chinese firms’ methods of coordination with other 
firms. In general, these economies show a high degree of similarity due to their low 
reliance on market mechanisms and similar ways of coordination. First, the Chinese 
party-state plays a similar role to banks in Germany in terms of their extensive 
shareholding and impact on corporate management. In particular, the decisive say of 
the party-state and German banks over firms’ financing in their respective countries, 
alleviates the pressure of securing short-term gains and allows the firms to focus more 
on long-term value. Additionally, instead of following the market mechanism, firms 
in both these countries coordinate with other firms through cross-shareholdings, 
institutional coordination, and interpersonal relationships. It should be noted that due 
to their differing historical and political contexts, Chinese firms’ ways of coordination 
are slightly different from their German counterparts. First, due to the party-state’s 
dominance in the economy and deep participation in corporate management, economic 
actors in China need to take political objectives into consideration. Second, with the 
prevalence of guanxi relationships in China, firms’ ways of coordination are central to 
their competencies while their organisational coordination is comparatively ineffective. 
 
Under these unique political and cultural contexts, Chinese firms have different ways 
of coordinating with workers. For instance, Chinese workers’ participation in 
corporate governance is much less effective than their counterparts in Germany. This 
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can be evidenced by the fact that Chinese firms do not have the German co-
determination mechanism which empowers employee representatives to directly 
supervise corporate management. The coexistence of the German coordinated 
corporate structure and Chinese ways of treating workers may lead to incoherence, 
thereby negatively affecting the firm innovation. Therefore, this thesis suggests that 
workers’ participation in corporate management should be improved, especially in 
hostile takeover decision-making as the workers would be vulnerable to unjust 
treatment in such situations. This is discussed in the next section. 
 
4.4 Grounds for Introducing the German Co-Determination 
Mechanism in Takeovers from the Perspective of China 
 
The Chinese economy shows a high degree of similarity to its German counterpart in 
the method of coordination among different firms, albeit with certain variations due to 
their differing political contexts. However, the Chinese industrial relation landscape is 
unique compared to that in place in both CMEs and LMEs; the methods of 
coordination that contradict lead to institutional incoherence, negatively affecting 
incremental and radical innovations. Hence, adapting the German model of industrial 
relations to the Chinese context would be beneficial for Chinese economic 
development.  
 
This section begins with an examination of the mixed features of CMEs and LMEs 
that can be found in Chinese firms. Then, it moves on to validate the negative impacts 
of institutional incoherence on economic performance by analysing supporting and 
opposing arguments. Finically, it explains how Chinese institutions, especially those 
for employment relations, negatively affected the Chinese firms’ innovative and 
economic performance during the economic transition. 
 





The VoC argument suggests that a country’s satisfactory levels of long-term economic 
performance depend on its institutional complementarities. As defined by Hall and 
Soskice, “two institutions can be said to be complementary if the presence (or 
efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or efficiency of) the other”.480 In general, 
institutional complementarities are widely observed in either LMEs or CMEs, and 
national economies with mixed features are deemed to be incoherent. 481  This 
incoherence is observed in China.  
 
As analysed above, Chinese firms are highly similar to their counterparts in Germany 
in terms of coordination among firms, albeit with certain differences. On the other 
hand, when it comes to firms’ coordination with workers, the landscape within which 
Chinese firms operate is starkly different to their German counterparts and share some 
features with firms in LMEs. This sub-section compares the coordination methods of 
workers in China, Germany, and LMEs to clarify whether there is any lack of 
institutional coherence in China. 
 
First, in Germany, workers have strong bargaining power against employers to set 
wages, work conditions, benefits, and other aspects of workers’ compensations and 
rights. This can be attributed to the independent unions, workers’ representation on 
supervision boards, and workers’ representation at the establishment level.482 To be 
specific, collective bargaining is primarily conducted at the industry level between 
strong trade unions and employers’ organisations on a fair and equal basis. Workplace 
and board-level participation, which is influenced by trade unions, can safeguard 
workers’ information and participation rights in issues that directly relate to their 
interests. 483  Their strong bargaining power can also attribute to workers deeper 
participation in corporate governance and affairs that are relevant with the interests of 
labour. This is discussed in a separate chapter in detail. 
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Second, CMEs are known to place a strong focus on vocational training. These firms 
are willing to pool resources to help develop workers’ firm-specific or industry-
specific skills, in contrast to LMEs where companies play a weak role in occupational 
training, and workers are usually educated in general skills.484 This is mainly for two 
reasons. For one, the German economy does not rely heavily on the market relationship 
between employees and employers to regulate the relationship with the labour force. 
Accordingly, employers are more willing to allocate a large share of costs towards 
improving their employees’ skills and less worried that workers might leave their jobs 
after completing their training, especially compared to those in LMEs with flexible 
and fluid labour markets.485 With low levels of labour turnover, the employers are 
willing to establish a solid cooperation system with their employees, which positively 
affects the latter’s productivity.486 Second, the German model of industrial relations 
and vocational training has certain historical origins. For instance, the apprenticeship 
system used in German training institutions can be traced back to the guilds in the 
Middle Ages.487  
 
In comparison, the Chinese economy shows a different organisational landscape for 
the relationship between the employees and employers. Although similar workers’ 
representation mechanisms exist at both the board and establishment levels, they are 
criticised as having low efficiency. Hence, German-style collaboration between the 
employees and employers has not been established. Instead, industrial relations in 
China are dominated by the party-state, to which the employees as well as employers 
are subordinated. As analysed in an earlier chapter, workers in China cannot actively 
participate in collective bargaining, and worker representation and participation 
mechanisms cannot effectively express workers’ voices. Accordingly, these systems 
are perceived as formalities, and whether they can work effectively depends on the 
willingness of the party-state.488 With respect to vocational training and education 
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(VET), the Chinese system is underdeveloped. Compared to the German system, VET 
in China has three characteristics. First, unlike the German dual system in which 
educational institutions and firms both play an active role in VET,489 the Chinese 
mechanism primarily relies on the former.490 Second, instead of industry-specific or 
firm-specific skills, the Chinese VET mechanism places emphasis on improving 
workers’ general skills, which is similar to that of LMEs. This is evidenced by the fact 
that students who go to vocational schools are normally perceived as bad compared to 
their peers who go to schools for general education.491 Third, the general skills that 
workers acquire through the Chinese VET mechanism do not align with the firms’ 
needs. Therefore, there is a surplus of Chinese workers, and they are criticised as 
delivering low-quality work.492 
 
Employer–employee cooperation is much weaker in China than in Germany, which is 
evidenced by low employee empowerment and the firms’ passive role in VET. In this 
regard, the firms’ relationship with their employees seems to be inclined towards 
LMEs rather than CMEs. This is evidenced by statistics showing that the employee 
turnover rate has remained at approximately 20% in recent years.493 However, unlike 
workers in LMEs, who rely heavily on the market mechanism, the labour market in 
China is much less fluid and flexible. This is partly due to the hukou system, which is 
said to “differentiate residential groups as a means to control population movement 
and mobility and to shape state developmental priorities”.494 The hukou system is 
deemed to restrict transregional labour movement, since workers who do not have a 
residential status cannot enjoy residential welfare such as local healthcare, housing 
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assistance, and education assistance.495 In addition, a prerequisite for the economy’s 
reliance on the market is the rule of law, which facilitates good faith, market stability, 
fairness, predictability, and confidence.496 The Chinese labour market is criticised for 
its ineffective legal system although there is a seemingly strong mechanism for 
employer–employee collaboration. This is discussed in detail in a separate chapter, but 
this situation reduces both the firms’ and workers’ reliance on the Chinese labour 
market. Therefore, an employee turnover rate that is similar to countries in LMEs is 
not caused by a developed market mechanism. Instead, interviews attribute this high 
rate to a lack of training schemes, unsatisfactory work environments, insufficient 
consideration for the employees’ welfare, and so on.497 These problems can all be 
addressed by enabling workers’ participation in corporate management, which is 
discussed later on in this section. 
 
In conclusion, although the Chinese economy shows a high degree of similarity to 
German CMEs, the firms’ relations with workers exhibit some characteristics that can 
be found in LMEs. However, due to their unique Chinese context, these firms struggle 
to rely on labour markets to coordinate with workers. This leads to a certain degree of 
institutional incoherence that may negatively impact the Chinese economy. 
 
4.4.2 The Impact of Institutional Incoherence on the Economy 
 
As suggested by the VoC argument, a country’s satisfactory level of long-term 
economic performance depends on its institutional complementarities. For example, 
the CME economy being dominated by a few parties makes it less dependent on the 
market mechanism. Accordingly, a firm’s low sensitivity to market profitability may 
reinforce long-term employment. This is normally accompanied by strong 
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employment protection and participation in corporate governance due to the demand 
for increased productivity. Therefore, when institutions are incoherent, they cannot 
effectively cooperate in national economies, and this may negatively affect overall 
economic performance.  
 
However, it should be noted that whether institutional incoherence negatively impacts 
upon economic performance is debatable, and arguments exist for both sides. On the 
one hand, multiple empirical studies provide evidence highlighting the comparative 
advantage of institutional coherence in innovation and economic performance. 498 
Accordingly, national economies with a lack of institutional complementarities exhibit 
a comparative disadvantage in terms of both incremental and radical innovation.499 On 
the other hand, the opposing evidence posits that institutional incoherence does not 
necessarily lead to a negative impact on the level of a country’s innovation.500 First, 
evidence shows that some national economies achieve sound innovative performance 
but conform to neither the CME nor the LME structures.501 This opposes the argument 
that institutions in such national economies are incoherent. This counterargument is 
tenable since the institutional structures of either economy cannot be completely 
applied to all the countries of the world, even though CMEs and LMEs provide 
seemingly ideal market economy models, due to the differences in the countries’ 
historical and cultural backgrounds. Therefore, national economies with mixed 
features of CMEs and LMEs can also be advantageous for incremental and radical 
innovation if they are compatible with the country’s background. Second, these 
advantages may vary depending on factors other than institutional coherence, such as 
regional and sectoral differences.502 This argument holds true since, even with the 
same institutional structures, firms across different regions or industries may have 
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different innovation demands and capabilities. However, this does not counter the 
relevance of institutional complementarities in innovation and national economies. It 
points out that to achieve high levels of innovation performance, institutional 
structures should not be strictly adopted but remain flexible for firms to modify 
according to their regions and industries. Third, internationalisation exerts external 
pressure on national economies to partially change institutions and forces firms to 
make certain adaptations that fail to conform to the ideal LME and CME types.503 
Again, this argument does not counter the relevance of institutional coherence in 
national economies, but it emphasises the dynamic nature of the VoC approach;504 i.e. 
the ideal model of institutional structures in national economies may change based on 
external pressures such as globalisation. Therefore, although some institutions are 
embedded in specific historical and political contexts, they cannot remain static and 
must be reformed if external and internal factors make current institutions 
incompatible with the need for economic development.  
 
In summary, CME and LME models provide a benchmark for the Chinese economy. 
However, whether economic institutions are incoherent depends on their historic and 
political contexts, which vary across industries, and their dynamic or static natures. 
Thus, if institutional structures have the mixed features of LMEs and CMEs, this does 
not naturally lead to a lack of complementarities. Whether the current Chinese 
institutional framework negatively affects the Chinese economy is discussed further in 
the following section. 
 
4.4.3 Institutional Incoherence of the Coordination of Chinese Firms 
 
The forms of coordination of Chinese firms are embedded in certain historical and 
cultural backgrounds. However, while these methods were feasible in the past, they 
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are incompatible in current circumstances and hinder the Chinese economy’s need for 
incremental innovation.  
 
Compatibility with Chinese Labour-intensive Economy 
 
China was renowned for its labour-intensive industries, including manufacturing and 
construction industries. The economy did not have a high skilled labour demand before 
the economic transition starting from 2012,505 when labour intensive industries were 
dominant in the Chinese economy. Therefore, a well-developed VET mechanism was 
not necessary. In addition, a wide range of products made in China had a price 
advantage over overseas competitors. Low labour costs were one of the main 
contributors to the “China prices”,506 and firms preferred to not invest in work training 
schemes to maintain the competitiveness of their products. Another consequence of 
this demand for competitive pricing was low employee empowerment. This was 
because stronger labour rights tended to make the management consider the workers’ 
interests more, leading to increased labour costs and lowered profits. Another factor 
that contributed to the low levels of worker empowerment was the high surplus of 
unskilled labour. These workers were mainly from the rural sector and worked in the 
manufacturing and construction industries in the urban sector.507 Due to the residential 
restrictions arising from the hukou system, as mentioned earlier, their residential 
statuses in the cities were temporary. Therefore, these rural workers could not form 
stable and long-term employment relationships with the firms. While some of them 
voluntarily chose to leave their jobs, on the other hand, the employers could dismiss 
such low-skilled workers with low costs. This is because the labour laws in China 
lacked an effective enforcement mechanism.508 In addition, these low-skilled workers 
were vulnerable to unjust treatment since most of them were uneducated and lacked 
sufficient money to hire legal counsel.509 Since the cost of firing employees was low 
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and the firms could easily find alternatives due to the high surplus of unskilled labour, 
the turnover rates were high in China. Accordingly, the firms did not find it necessary 
to maintain their workers’ loyalty or feel motivated to collaborate effectively with 
them. 
 
In conclusion, the Chinese institutional structure is compatible with the economic 
context before the economic transition. In the present scenario, Chinese firms cannot 
rely on the market mechanism due to the party-state’s dominance over the economy. 
Therefore, the firms’ methods of coordination with other firms display the 
characteristics of CMEs. Further, Chinese firms do not have de facto strong 
collaboration with their workers, resulting in high turnover rates similar to LMEs. This 
arises from China’s labour-intensive economy, which features a high labour surplus 
and low labour costs. However, it lacks the effective market mechanism that is widely 
found in LMEs, which distinguishes it from the latter.  
 
Incompatibility during the Economic Transition 
 
The current round of economic transition started in 2012,510 when the party-state 
attempted to transition from a labour-intensive economy with a low-skilled labour 
demand to an economy emphasising innovation and requiring high-skilled 
employees.511 As a result, the Chinese economic transition resulted in weak employer–
employee collaborations incompatible with their developmental goals.  
 
The increased needs for innovation can be exemplified by the rapid growth of Chinese 
firms’ expenditures on R&D from RMB 36.25 billion in 2005 to RMB 120.13 billion 
in 2017.512 Innovation in the Chinese economy is cultivated based on two aspects. First, 
the high-tech industry is deemed to be the strategically leading industry in the national 
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economy by the party-state. China “plays a significant role in the international high-
tech production chain”. 513  Second, stronger innovative capabilities are needed to 
enhance the efficiency of even the manufacturing industry, which is characterised by 
low-skilled labour, by improving the production process, reducing the consumption of 
energy and raw materials, and improving product quality.514 
 
Under the context of the VoC, there are two types of innovation: radical and 
incremental. This thesis maintains that innovation in China shows more characteristics 
of incremental innovation and, accordingly, considers the CME model as one that is 
suitable to be introduced as compared to the LME model. As defined by Hall and 
Soskice, the former “entails substantial shifts in product lines, the development of 
entirely new goods, or major changes to the production process” and the latter is 
“marked by continuous but small scale improvements to existing product lines and 
production processes”. 515  Hence, the manufacturing industry seems to require a 
capacity for incremental innovation while radical innovation is especially important in 
high-tech industries. Due to the distinct institutional features of CMEs and LMEs, 
incremental innovation gains more support in CMEs while radical innovation gains 
high support in LMEs. Therefore, the adoption of the CME mechanism is conducive 
to the development of the manufacturing industry. Considering the significant role of 
the high-tech industry in the Chinese economic transition, as mentioned above, the 
LME institutional framework seems more likely to be adopted. However, and 
especially considering the major path to innovation taken by Chinese firms, this is not 
actually the case. Unlike companies in LMEs that are highly innovative right from the 
start, most Chinese companies start off as imitators.516 Driven by the rapidly changing 
demands of customers and a highly competitive market, these firms are forced to 
innovate at an incremental rate to survive.517 Although Chinese firms’ are criticised as 
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lacking innovative capability, they have quick responses to a variety of consumers’ 
needs. This is particularly the case considering that Chinese people have increased 
demands for consumption. 518  This can be exemplified by the rising trend of 
consumption expenditure from RMB 13,471 in 2010 to RMB 19,852 in 2018.519 
Accordingly, Chinese firms endeavour to provide sophisticated products tailored to 
their consumers’ rapidly changing needs. With the high competition in the market, 
firms have to upgrade their products to survive.520  The incremental innovation is 
evidenced by an interview conducted by M. J. Greeven and G. S. Yip between 2011 
and 2017, in which executives of Western firms were concerned about Chinese 
products that offer “twice the number of features as Western products at half price”.521 
For example, Didi Chuxing, a Chinese ride-hailing firm, has much richer and user-
friendly functions for Chinese customers than its competitor Uber, one of the first ride-
hailing firms in the Western world. Due to this, Uber agreed to transfer its Chinese 
operations to Didi in 2016.522 On the other hand, some Chinese firms are characterised 
as offering new-to-world technologies, such as Huawei, Tencent, or Alibaba. However, 
their radical innovations are developed by the firms’ consistent incremental product 
upgrading, which, in turn, improves their innovative capability.523  
 
In conclusion, the innovation mechanism in Chinese firms is more incremental than 
radical. Even in the high-tech industries, such as telecommunication, information 
technology, and computing, some firms are steadily progressing from incremental 
innovation to radical innovation. Considering that China is moving towards a more 
innovative economy, the CME institutional framework is feasible. In addition to the 
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demands for innovation, the new economic context requires solid cooperation between 
employers and employees, making the CME framework even more practical.  
 
With the development of an innovative economy, Chinese firms have an increasing 
need for high-skilled workers. This can be evidenced by the fact that R&D personnel 
rose from 0.173 million in 2005 to 4.045 million in 2017.524 However, Chinese firms 
are known to have a shortage of technicians, entrepreneurs, engineers, and other 
professionals.525 Therefore, they have a pressing need to retain the loyalty of high-
skilled employees by establishing a strong employer–employee collaboration system, 
especially considering the weakness of the Chinese labour market. Meanwhile, the 
Chinese market has been dealing with labour shortages in labour-intensive industries. 
Since the economic reform that started in the 1980s, China has seen a sharp drop in 
fertility, leading to an ageing population. A higher proportion of older people in China 
has resulted in a downward trend in the number of working-age workers since 2011, 
when the Chinese workforce reached its peak at 941 million.526 By 2018, working-age 
workers declined to 897 million, and this number has been projected to further reduce 
by 70 million in 2030. This leads to labour shortages, especially in labour-intensive 
industries where workers are generally uneducated.527  This can explain factories’ 
battle for migrant workers due to labour shortages.528 
 
On the other hand, with China’s economic development, workers have increased 
demands for job security and greater participation in corporate decision-making, 
especially for affairs that directly relate to the interests of workers. This indicates that 
a more innovative economy encourages workers to improve their firm-specific or 
industry-specific skills by investing more time and efforts in their companies. As a 
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result, workers tend to establish long-term relationships with their employers. This is 
because, upon leaving their jobs, workers would be unable to easily find new jobs due 
to the underdevelopment of the labour market, and their acquired skills may not be 
transferrable to other work positions.  
 
The party-state formulated a series of labour laws, particularly labour contract laws, to 
improve workers’ protection and promote their participation in corporate management, 
with the objective of improving employee–employer collaborations. However, these 
laws are far from satisfactory, especially for labour-intensive workers who remain the 
dominant group in China.529 With the economic transition, the employer–employee 
bond has become even weaker than before. This started during the industrial 
restructuring that took place under the economic reform of the state sector. A large 
number of workers lost their jobs involuntarily in lay-off waves.530 According to the 
statistics published by the Xinhua Press, in the last round of SOE reform, 21.37 million 
workers were dismissed between 1998 and 2000.531 A large number of these laid-off 
workers were forced to leave without satisfactory resettlement and compensation, 
leading to severe social stability problems.532 In this round of reform starting from 
2017,533 laid-off, as a key word, was raised again by the state-party, and approximately 
six million SOE workers are projected to leave their positions within the next three 
years.534 The staggering loss of lifelong employment increases the need for workers to 
safeguard their legal rights.535 This is observed via the occurrence of intense labour 
conflicts. Chinese scholars have found evidence of a sharp increase in labour disputes, 
reflecting the “deep contradictions among labour, capital, and the Chinese state”.536 
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There are frequent outbreaks of labour unrest, with workers expressing their need for 
better protection of their legal rights and deeper participation in corporate management. 
According to the China Labour Bulletin, a Hong Kong-based watchdog, there were 
1705 and 1052 labour strikes in China in 2018 and 2019 (by October), respectively. 
The researchers have suggested that this may only represent 10–15% of the actual 
number of cases.537 This substantiates the need for a stronger labour protection and 
participation mechanism in China. 
 
In conclusion, weak collaboration between firms and workers is no longer compatible 
with economic development in China, and a mechanism that strengthens workers’ 
protection and participation in corporate management is necessary. The German co-
determination system may be a model worth considering in greater detail and 




This section aims to lay the foundations for the introduction of the German method of 
coordination with workers into the Chinese economy. Due to the dominance of the 
party-state over the Chinese economy, Chinese firms can no longer rely on the market 
mechanism for coordinating with other firms and share some characteristics with the 
German CME model. However, unlike the latter, the management of Chinese firms 
does not establish close relationships with their workers, a characteristic that emerged 
from the labour-intensive economy.  
 
Innovation has been highlighted in this round of economic reform, making it necessary 
for firms to retain their high-skilled workers. In addition, due to the decline in the 
working-age population and weakness of workers’ protection, firms and low-skilled 
workers now demand better methods of cooperation. As a result, the Chinese economy 
lacks institutional complementarities, which may hinder economic development. 
Therefore, it may be advisable to introduce a Chinese co-determination mechanism to 
achieve institutional coherence. This does not mean that the German style of worker 
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treatment is the only effective way to address Chinese problems. However, due to the 
similarities between Chinese and German firms, it is one of the most direct and 
effective ways to adapt such a mechanism into the Chinese economy.  
 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter provided the basis for the introduction of the German co-determination 
mechanism in the context of Chinese takeovers by using the VoC approach. CMEs and 
LMEs, the models provided by the VoC approach, is at opposite poles of the spectrum. 
The former is represented by Germany and the latter by the US and the UK. In general, 
firms’ core relationships are of two types: those with other institutions and those with 
their own employees. With the dominance of the Chinese party-state over the economy, 
firms are now less dependent on the market mechanism, and accordingly their methods 
of coordination with other institutions are highly similar to those of the German CME 
model. However, Chinese employers do not establish strong collaborations with their 
employees, unlike their German counterparts, which is similar to the system in LMEs. 
These mixed features are caused by the labour-intensive nature of the Chinese 
economy, which is currently undergoing a transition to a more innovative economy. 
Considering this shift, it is necessary to establish stronger cooperation between 
employers and employees, especially to improve workers’ empowerment. The German 
co-determination mechanism seems to be a model worth introducing, especially 
considering the high degree of similarities between the German and Chinese 
economies.  
 
Adapting the German co-determination mechanism to the Chinese economy as a whole 
is too ambitious for this thesis. For a more focused and realistic objective, the thesis 
attempts to limit the emphasis to an analysis of the passivity of introducing this system 
in the context of hostile takeovers, during which workers are particularly vulnerable 
to unjust treatments by their employers. This could be the starting point of an 
institutional reform which may snowball into changes in other spheres as well, such as 
the entire corporate governance system. After endeavouring the introduction of a co-
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determination system and its coherence with the Chinese economic system, this thesis 





Chapter 5: The German Co-Determination Mechanism 
 
Unlike China, where workers lack effective ways to express their voice during the 
takeover process, Germany is renowned for its strong labour protection laws and the 
employees’ high degree of participation in the decision-making process. This mainly 
arises from Germany’s co-determination system. Since legal transplantation is one of 
the most widely accepted ways for legal development,538 analysing the German system 
for solutions to the problems in China would be beneficial.  
 
To achieve this objective, it is necessary to examine the differences between the 
German and Chinese mechanisms, understand the factors that make labour protection 
much stronger in the former, and then explore how the German system can be adapted 
to the Chinese corporate framework. 
 
This chapter focuses on the first step, i.e. comparing the German co-determination 
mechanism with its Chinese counterpart. Accordingly, it begins with a summary of the 
co-determination system, moves on to compare the mechanisms in detail, and finally, 
provides a conclusion about the major obstacles faced by China to effectively protect 
employees’ interests.  
 
5.1 A Summary of the Co-Determination System in Germany 
 
The co-determination system guarantees the presence of a strong voice for workers in 
both “the terms and conditions of the employment and the economic planning” and the 
“decision-making of the company”.539 This high level of workers’ involvement is 
achieved through two channels: the workers’ representation on the board and the works 
council. In the context of takeovers, the former ensures that labour interests are 
considered during the decision-making process, albeit in the best interests of the 
shareholders and company, while the latter helps safeguard the employees’ interests 
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and address their immediate concerns, such as changes in wages and work conditions 
or lay-offs.  
 
5.1.1 Co-determination at the Board Level  
 
Corporate boards in Germany have a two-tier structure,540 each with a supervisory and 
management board. The corporate structure of German companies is illustrated in 
diagram 4. The members of the management board jointly manage the company,541 
while the supervisory board has the power to appoint and dismiss members and 
oversee the management of the management board. The articles of association and the 
supervisory board determine that certain transactions made by the management board 
should be upon the consent of the supervisory board ex ante.542 The members of the 
supervisory board are generally elected and appointed by the shareholders and 
employees, respectively; the number of employee-elected representatives increases 
with burgeoning workforce size. The employee members, including the employee and 
trade union representatives, constitute a third of the supervisory board in companies 
with 501–2000 employees543  and half of the board in companies with over 2000 
employees.544 If the shareholders and employee members cannot reach an agreement 
in the larger companies, the chairman of the board has a casting vote.545 It should be 
noted that in companies that may affect the public interest, representatives of the state 
may also be appointed to the supervisory board. 
 
540 As a prominent feature, this two-tier structure is not mandatorily applied to all the firms in Germany. For 
example, the European companies may choose its board structure between one-tier and two-tier. See 1 Forward, 
German Corporate Governance Code (2017). 
541 § 77 of the Stock Corporation Act (2016). 
542 § 111 of the Stock Corporation Act (2016). 
543 Section 4, the Law on One-Third Employee Representation in the Supervisory Board (2015). 
544 Section 7, the Co-determination Act (2015). 




Diagram 4: the structure of the German co-determination mechanism 
 
With this two-tier structure, the employees are able to exert a substantial amount of 
influence over the management as well as corporate governance through the members 
on the supervisory board. During takeovers, the employees’ participation and 
information rights are also protected by the representatives on the supervisory board; 
the supervisory board is directly involved in the decision-making process for 
takeovers.546 Although the shareholders have decisive power over the decision-making 
process, the supervisory board issues a statement with their reasoned opinions, 
including the effects of the takeover on the interests of the employees. This is an 
important basis for shareholders to make informed decisions547 and is considered an 
important factor for the success or failure of a takeover.548 Rarely, the management 
board is allowed to take frustrating actions, albeit with the consent of the supervisory 
board.549  As a result, a coalition of the two boards is formed to fight off hostile 
 
546 Article 5.1.1 of the German Corporate Governance Code (2017).  
547 Article 3.7 of the German Corporate Governance Code (2017). 
548 K.J. Hopt, “Takeover Defenses in Europe: A comparative, Theoretical and Policy Analysis” (2014) 20 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 249 at 272. 
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takeovers. 550  The members representing the employees are kept informed by the 
management board throughout the takeover process .551  
 
To summarise, workers’ claims are taken into account in takeover scenarios due to the 
presence of their representatives on the supervisory board. However, these members’ 
promotion of employees’ interests may be compromised because they are also legally 
bound to work towards the best interests of the company and its shareholders.552 The 
supervisory board works at the corporate governance level and does not handle the 
employees’ daily concerns such as wages or work conditions. These issues are 
generally addressed by the works council, which is introduced in the next section.  
 
5.1.2 The Works Council 
 
The works council is an establishment-level workers’ representation organisation. It 
works in cooperation with the employer to safeguard the interests of the employees in 
any workplace. The works council has the right of co-determination, especially for 
arrangements, such as working hours, employee conduct, and holiday policies, that 
directly relate to the workers’ interests.553 The work council is involved in matters of 
personnel arrangements; it must approve the hiring and transfer of employees and be 
consulted before any dismissals. The works council’s objection over a dismissal 
provides additional support for the dismissed if he/she files an action in court. In 
matters related to the restructuring of the establishment, such as a transfer of important 
departments, an amalgamation with other establishments, or a split-up of 
establishments, the employer is expected to reach an agreement with the works council 




550 K.J. Hopt, “The German Law of and Experience with the Supervisory Board” (2016). European Corporate 
Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 305/2016, available  
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2722702. 
551 Article 3.4 and Article 5.2 of German Corporate Governance Code (2017). 
552 Article 3.7 of the German Corporate Governance Code (2017). 
553 Section 87 of the Works Constitution Act (2017). 
554 Section 99, Section 102, Section 103, Section 111, and Section 112 of the Works Constitution Act (2017). 
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The works council’s right of co-determination provides employees with sound 
protection in their day-to-day work. While the transfer of shares during a takeover does 
not trigger the co-determination right of the works council, the acquirer has to be 
particularly cautious of any possible arrangements with the employees, such as mas 
lay-offs or job transfers, after the completion of the takeover, considering the works’ 
council’s wide range of co-determination rights, as mentioned earlier. In addition, the 
works council is also actively informed during the process of takeovers. In particular, 
in the case of companies with over 100 permanent employees, the finance 
committee555 that is affiliated to the works council must be informed, well beforehand, 
of the potential acquirer, their intentions for the company’s future business activities, 
and the potential effects on the employees. Afterwards, the employees should be 
informed of the financial situations and takeover process on a regular basis.556 
 
To summarise, before the completion of a takeover, the works council’s role is to 
cooperate with the employer to safeguard the employees’ information rights, and after 
the completion of a takeover, it endeavours to ensure that the workers are well and 
fairly treated by the new employer. 
 
5.2 A Comparison of the Mechanisms in Germany and China 
 
With the co-determination system in place, Germany has strong labour protection 
mechanisms during takeovers, which involve three aspects. First, the workers are able 
to participate in takeover decisions through their representatives on the supervisory 
board. Second, the employees’ information rights are guaranteed by the supervisory 
board as well as the works council. Third, the works council’s co-determination rights 
focus on ensuring the fair treatment of the employees after the takeover. While the 
Chinese approach shares some similarities with the German one, China’s labour 
protection system is significantly weaker. To analyse the reasons for such different 
degrees of protection, this section compares the Chinese and German co-determination 
systems, beginning with the board regimes in each country.  
 
555 If there is no finance committee, the works council should be involved in the takeover.  




5.2.1 Employee Representation at the Board Level 
 
Like the corporate structure of German corporations, Chinese companies have a two-
tier board system consisting of the BoD and BoS. Like its German counterpart, the 
Chinese BoS also includes a number of employee representatives,557 who could work 
to safeguard labour interests during takeovers, as per the context of this thesis. 
However, they are unable to do so for two reasons.  
 
First, the BoS, as the supervisory organ, has limited power in the process of takeovers 
compared to its counterpart in Germany. Unlike the latter, which has control over the 
management board, the BoS in China does not hold power over the BoD in the 
appointment or dismissal of members or fundamental decision making. Instead, the 
BoS oversees the management of the BoD on the behalf of the shareholders ex post.558 
This generally involves consulting with the BoD on financial matters and getting 
involved if business mistakes by the BoD hurts the interests of the firm. As a result, 
the BoS has much weaker power than its counterpart sin Germany. During takeover 
situations, the BoS plays a passive role. The role of the BoS is restricted to general 
care and diligence, without any operational right to actively participate in the takeover 
decision-making process. The shareholders have the power to make decisions during 
a takeover, similar to their counterparts in Germany; however, their decisions are based 
on the inputs of the BoD and not the BoS. An action taken by the BoD does not require 
approval from the BoS unless there is a violation of laws.559 Further, there is no legal 
requirement or procedure for the BoS to access information regarding the takeover bid 
in a timely manner. Unlike the German system, the BoD has no legal obligation to 
keep the BoS informed of any major decisions. While the members of the BoS have 
the right to attend the meetings of the BoD,560 providing them with the opportunity to 
be involved in a takeover scenario, the attendees can only question and provide 
recommendations for, rather than vote on, the board resolutions. Since it is considered 
 
557 Pursuant to Article 51, 70 and 117 of the Company Law of PRC, the employee members on the BoS should not 
be less than 1/3. 
558 Article 53 and 118 of the Company Law of PRC. 
559 Article 8 of Takeover Measures. 
560 Article 54 of the Company Law of PRC. 
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a right and not a duty, the liability of the BoD for a failure to informing the members 
of the BoS about its meetings are not specified in Chinese laws; the latter are also not 
liable if they are absent from BoD meetings.561 As a result, BoS members rarely attend 
BoD meetings. 562  
 
Second, it is highly debatable whether the employee members on the BoS can represent 
the general employees, primarily because very few of them are shop-floor workers. It 
should be stressed that Chinese laws forbid directors and the senior management from 
being employee supervisors.563 However, the restriction leaves behind a fairly wide 
scope of candidates, including cadres of the CPC committee and executives of the firm. 
According to reported statistics, nearly half of the employee supervisors in Chinese 
companies belong to the former group,564 and they are usually (vice) chairmen of the 
trade union565 or party leaders who are responsible for disciplinary inspections. Due to 
the CPC committee’s deep involvement in corporate governance and, accordingly, 
their strong connections with the BoD and senior management, these so-called 
employee representatives tend to be reluctant to speak on the behalf of the grassroots 
employees when their interests are at odds with the management. Further, a large 
number of the employee supervisors are executives, including senior management 
members of the subsidiaries, financial managers, and office administrators of the firm. 
Their remunerations and promotion prospects are decided by the BoD and senior 
management, whereas there are no criteria to assess the performance of the employee 
representatives on the BoS.566 Therefore, employee representatives tend to neglect 
their responsibilities rather than fight for labour interests against their superiors. In 
contrast, German laws have specific rules regarding the composition of the boards and 
guarantee that a part of the supervisory board would must consist of members elected 
 
561 Z. Zhang, “An Interpretation of Article 54 and 55 of the Company Law of China” (我国公司法第 54 条、第 55
条解读) (2009) 12 Modern Finance & Economics (现代财经) 87. 
562 Y. Wang and D. Zhao, “the Reform on the System of the Board of Supervisors of Chinese Listed Companies” (论
中国上市公司监事会制度的改革) (2016) 1 Social Science Research (社会科学研究) 89. 
563 Article 51 of the Company Law of PRC and Article 39 of Democratic Management Provisions (2012). 
564 R. Yang, C. Liu, L. Dang, “Employee Supervisors, Economic Democracy, and Enterprise Income Distribution: 
Evidence from the Listed Central Enterprises of China” (职工监事、经济民主与企业内收入分配-- 央企上市公
司的经验证据) (2017) 4 Journal of Remin University of China (中国人民大学学报) 48. 
565 As mentioned above, the trade union is under the leadership of the party-committee of the company. 
566 Y. Zhou, “Thoughts on the System of Employee Supervisors and Directors” (对职工董监事制度的思考) (2015) 
4 Labour Union Studies (工会理论研究) 15. 
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by shop-floor employees. 567  Members representing the employees’ interests are 
expected to be company employees themselves or trade-union representatives. The 
former group is required to reserve one seat for the managerial staff. It is advantageous 
to have different groups representing labour interests as each of them can make up for 
the others’ disadvantages. For instance, establishment-level members would have 
“valuable first-hand operational knowledge” 568  and sufficient information about 
employees569 that the other groups would not. An executive employee with managerial 
capabilities and experience would be able to cope with making major decisions, as a 
member of the supervisory board, while the trade-union representatives would have 
sufficient knowledge and experience in safeguarding labour interests. Thus, labour 
interests are one of the primary concerns on the supervisory board in German 
companies, but the same is not observed in Chinese companies. 
 
Despite the lack of a requirement for the composition of the BoS, the employee 
members could safeguard labour interests if the process of their election reflected the 
will of the general employees. Hence, the election process is another factor that leads 
to the supervisors’ dilemma in representing the workers. Legislation requires the 
supervisors to be elected by employees.570  However, the election process heavily 
depends on the arbitrary decision of the party-state in action, during the nomination of 
the supervisor candidates. These candidates are required to be nominated by the trade 
union571 and then approved by the firm’s CPC committee.572 Due to a lack of detailed 
rules on the composition of the employee members on the BoS, the party-committee 
and trade union exercise their discretion while selecting candidates, who may be for 
or against labour interests Further, the nomination process is not a transparent one, and 
the employees cannot monitor it. Without the right to nominate or monitor, the election 
by workers or their representatives573 in the Workers’ Congress becomes a rubber-
stamp process that cannot reflect the workers’ will, especially since the election is 
 
567 Section 7 and 15 of the Co-determination Act (2015). 
568 Fauver and Fuerst (n 250).  
569 J.B. Berk, J.H. Van Binsbergen, and B. Liu, “Matching Capital and Labor” (2017) 72 The Journal of Finance 2467. 
570 Article 36 of Democratic Management Provisions (2012). 
571 Article 51 of the Company Law of PRC. 
572 ACFTU, “Opinions of All-China Federation of Trade Unions on Further Promoting the System of Employee 
Directors and Supervisors” (中华全国总工会关于进一步推行职工董事、职工监事制度的意见) (2006). 
573 Article 51 of the Company Law of PRC. 
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organised by the trade union. In Germany, the trade union, employees, and executive 
staff have the right to nominate their respective representatives in an election organised 
by the works council,574  a highly credible organ for safeguarding workers at the 
establishment level. Therefore, the grassroots workers’ demands are expected to be 
fully respected. In addition, measures are taken to ensure that the election is not 
affected by other parties. For instance, voting must be conducted via a ballot, and the 
election process should not be obstructed.575 Thus, German companies have detailed 
rules to guarantee that the elections reflect the workers’ will, whereas in China, the 
election process is left to the discretion of the trade union and the CPC committee of 
the firm. As a result, the election is at the risk of being manipulated. 
 
Unlike the German system, Chinese employees also have representatives on the BoD, 
which could help them exert a substantial amount of influence on the takeover 
decision-making process. This could enable employees to obtain the right of co-
determination in the takeover process at the board level, even though the power of the 
BoS is weak compared to the German supervisory board. However, due to the 
weakness of employee board representation, this objective cannot be achieved. This 
was analysed in detail in section 3.4. 
 
In conclusion, the supervision organs in China and Germany both include a certain 
number of employee members, aiming to safeguard the interests of labour. However, 
due to the differences in the functions and procedures of the representative elections, 
the BoS in Chinese firms is much weaker in safeguarding the employees’ interests. 
One of the most apparent reasons is the lack of detailed and transparent rules to 
guarantee the accountability of employee members on the BoS without them worrying 
about receiving negative treatments by their superiors. However, the deeper reason is 
that these institutions lack independence from the management. The extent to which 
employees’ rights can be upheld is also affected by the party-state, which can exert 
substantial influence over corporate takeover decisions through regulatory and non-
regulatory methods. As a result, takeover decisions made by the management of 
 
574 Section 6 of the Law on One-Third Employee Representation in the Supervisory Board (2015). 
575 Section 15, 16 and 20 of Co-determination Act (2015). 
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private firms may be based on the party-state’s instructions, making it a challenge for 
workers to demand their participation rights when there’s a conflict of interest with the 
party-state. While the party-state does have an interest in safeguarding labour interests, 
it is only one of their multiple considerations in addition to increasing tax revenues or 
making political advancements. Therefore, employees’ rights cannot be effectively 
upheld since the management may prioritise the interests of other stakeholders, 
especially the shareholders and party-state. 
 
As the above analysis indicates, employees in Chinese firms cannot effectively 
participate in the takeover decisions through their representatives on the boards. In 
addition to the board level, workers in Germany have the co-determination right at the 
establishment level. It is noted that there is a similar worker representation organ in 
Chinese firms: the Workers’ Congress. Accordingly, in the next part, a detailed 
comparison of the Workers’ Congress and the works council is provided to understand 
the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the Chinese mechanism.  
 
5.2.2 Employee Representation at the Establishment Level 
 
The Workers’ Congress in China has long been blamed as formalistic and having no 
real effect on the safeguarding of labour interests. The primary reason was examined 
in Chapter Three, which is that the Workers’ Congress was embedded in the old 
socialist planned economic system and does not fit into the current corporate structure. 
This part attempts to explore other reasons for its ineffectiveness by comparing the 
rules of the Workers’ Congress to those of the works council in Germany. 
 
We consider the works council as the counterpart of the Workers’ Congress due to 
their high degree of functional similarities. Specifically, they are both obliged to be 
involved in the decision-making process when it directly concerns employees’ 
interests, such as a change in remuneration or work hours. During takeovers, the 
management boards of firms in China and Germany are required to inform and consult 
the Workers’ Congress and the works council, respectively, about the potential 
takeover and any possible consequences for the employees. This ensures that the new 
 
154 
employer takes the labour interests into consideration after the completion of the 
takeover. However, the Workers’ Congress and works council have some differences 
in their functioning as well, both during and after a takeover 
 
During the process of takeovers, although both organs have information rights, 
detailed procedures are provided in Germany to guarantee that the works council is 
informed timely and sufficiently. For instance, if the information about a takeover is 
inadequate or not provided in good time by the employer, the works council is entitled 
to refer the matter to the conciliation committee,576 “a works constitution body which 
handles and mediates in-house disputes”.577 In addition, in companies with over 1000 
permanent employees, reports to the staff must be given in writing. In contrast, China 
does not have such detailed rules on how the Workers’ Congress should be informed 
or any consequences should the employer fail to fulfil their obligation. Therefore, in 
general, the works council has strong and exercisable rights as compared to the 
Workers’ Congress.  
 
After the completion of a takeover, the works council has co-determination power over 
a wide scope of matters. These include social matters, such as deciding the working 
hours, job remunerations and bonuses, and rules of operation and conduct of the 
employees.578 The right of co-determination also includes structural changes that may 
burden the employees, such as changes in jobs, operations, or the working environment, 
or even staff movement and dismissal. 579  In contrast, the rights of the Workers’ 
Congress are fairly restricted. First, the Workers’ Congress does not have the right of 
co-determination in any aspect of employee arrangements. The employer is merely 
required to inform and consult the Workers’ Congress on matters related to employee 
interests,580 with no expectations about when and how to fulfil this obligation. In 
addition, the Workers’ Congress is not involved in employee movement or dismissal, 
unless there is a mass layoff of at least 10% of all employees, in which case the 
 
576 Section 109 of the Works Constitution Act (2017). 
577  Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of Germany, Co-determination 2019 (2019), available at 
https://www.bmas.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/PDF-Publikationen/a741e-co-
determination.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2. 
578 Section 87 of the Works Constitution Act (2017). 
579 Section 91, 99, and 102 of the Works Constitution Act (2017). 
580 Article 13 of Democratic Management Provisions. 
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employer is obliged to consult the congress. 581  This comparison shows that the 
Workers’ Congress does not have supervision rights as strong or well-formulated as 
its German counterpart for restructuring a firm after a takeover. The Workers’ 
Congress did have a high degree of participation in corporate management in the old 
planned economy; however, these rights were reduced upon the introduction of the 
modern corporate governance system in Chinese firms.  
 
Therefore, although the works council and the Workers’ Congress possess similar 
functions concerning the safeguarding of employees at the establishment level, the 
former has much more powerful and broader rights than the latter. Based on the 
comparison of these two organs, this thesis argues three factors cause the 
ineffectiveness of the Workers’ Congress: the composition of the employee 
representatives, their relationship with the trade union, and their role in the corporate 
structure. A detailed analysis of these three factors is provided below. 
 
The functions of the Workers’ Congress and works council are carried out by 
employee-elected representatives. Therefore, the composition of the employee 
representatives considerably affects the effectiveness of these institutions. In Germany, 
the executive staff are excluded from the works council, 582  and, therefore, the 
representatives are entirely comprised of shop-floor employees. In contrast, the 
Workers’ Congress does not prohibit the participation of managerial employees. The 
proportion of the latter is suggested, rather than required, to not exceed 20% of all the 
employee representatives.583  This portion of executives in the Workers’ Congress 
tends to compromise the voices of the employees at the establishment level, especially 
since voting is the primary way of exercising the function of the Workers’ Congress.584 
Further, although voting on important issues is expected to be done through a secret 
ballot, due to the lack of a monitoring mechanism, most of the votes are cast by a show 
of hands in practice.585 As a result, the presence of the managerial staff may make 
 
581 Article 41 of the Labour Contract Law of PRC. 
582 Section 5 of the Works Constitution Act (2017). 
583 Article 9 of Democratic Management Provisions and Section 5 of Works Constitution Act (2017). 
584 Article 20 of Democratic Management Provisions.  
585 C. Liu, “The Reflection on Vote by Open Ballot of Employee Representatives” (关于职工代表记名投票表决方
式的思考) (2011) 25 Journal of China Institute of Industrial Relations (中国劳动关系学院学报) 99.  
 
156 
employees reluctant to protect their interests from the management and shareholders 
of the firm. This is because of the power held by the management over the salaries and 
promotional opportunities of the grassroots employees. 
 
The Workers’ Congress relationship with the trade union is unlike that of the works 
council in Germany; this is another factor that leads to the functional ineffectiveness 
of the Workers’ Congress. In Germany, the works council is independent from the 
trade union, and the two organs cooperatively work towards safeguarding the interests 
of the establishment-level employees. The trade union is entitled to submit a list of 
candidates for the representative election but does not have voting rights during the 
election. The delegates of the trade union are allowed to attend the meetings of the 
works council but only in an advisory capacity;586i.e. the works council is supposed to 
gain the support of, rather than rest upon, the trade union. In contrast, the Workers’ 
Congress heavily depends on the trade union. This is because the meetings of the 
Workers’ Congress are organised by the trade union, and the trade union is responsible 
for overseeing the management on behalf of the employees and implementing the 
decisions of the Workers’ Congress. In theory, the trade union is expected to safeguard 
employees’ interests as its leadership of the Workers’ Congress should boost the 
latter’s capability to express the needs of the employees. However, due to the trade 
union’s dependence on the management as well as the party-state in China, the trade 
union is perceived as a channel that connects the employees, management, and party-
state. 587  As a result, the decisions of the Workers’ Congress are likely to be 
compromised by the interests of the firm and the party-state. 
 
The relationship of the Workers’ Congress with the trade union affects its role in the 
corporate structure of Chinese companies, and this is the third factor that causes this 
organ’s ineffectiveness. In Chinese firms, the Workers’ Congress is supposed to be the 
organ that specifically supervises labour affairs on behalf of the employees. However, 
due to its inferior role to the trade union and the latter’s close relationship with the 
management and party-state, this supervisory role tends to be formalistic. Along with 
 
586 Section 2, 14, 16, 31 of the Works Constitution Act (2017). 
587 General Provisions of the Trade Union’s Chapter (中国工会章程) (2013). 
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the trade union, it tends to be a platform for the management and party-state to relieve 
themselves from intense conflicts with the workers, and thereby bring benefits to the 
firm. This is evidenced by statistics showing that the Workers’ Congress mechanism 
mitigates employees’ dissatisfaction towards the management and helps internally 
resolve their disputes with the firm, thereby preventing lawsuits.588 Admittedly, the 
dispute-resolving function of the Workers’ Congress does not contradict with its major 
objective of representing the workers’ needs. This is because in firms where the 
employees’ views are expressed and respected, discontent and anxiety are expected to 
reduce, thereby leading to fewer labour–capital conflicts. However, their intimate 
relationship with the party-state and management makes the Workers’ Congress 
deviate from their standing with the workers. Labour protection problems may be 
raised when the workers’ interests are subject to the party-state’s overall 
considerations. For example, in the case of the takeover of Tuopai Shede Wine Co. 
Ltd in 2016, the Workers’ Congress was complacent about the harm caused to the 
interests of labour because the takeover was a decision made by the party-state.589 It 
should be noted that works councils in German enterprises also maintain a sound 
relationship with the management for the good of employees.590 The benefits are two-
fold: First, the managerial staff facilitate the workers’ comprehension of the targets, 
actions, expectations, and employees’ role in implementing the policies and decisions 
of the management; Second, the management have access to the first-hand operational 
knowledge of the shop-floor workers591  as well as their attitudes towards certain 
corporate decisions; thus, the workers’ opinions are more likely to be considered 
during the managerial decision-making process.592 In general, the works council aims 
to achieve industrial peace and is equipped with various mechanisms to oppose the 
management if the latter hurts labour interests. Unlike the Workers’ Congress, the 
works council is independent from the management board, the trade union, and other 
institutions that may affect its position to protect labour interests. As a result, the works 
 
588 J. Zhan, X. Li, and T. Yang, “Can the Workers’ Participation Mechanism Relieve the Conflicts between the Capital 
and the Labour” (企业员工参与制度有助于劳资纠纷内部消解吗) (2016) 18 China Human Resource 
Development (中国人力资源开发) 68. 
589 Sina Finance (n 332). 
590 Section 2 of the Works Constitution Act (2017). 
591 Fauver and Fuerst (n 250). 
592  S. Brezezinski and A. Bak, “Management of Employees’ Commitment in the Process of Organization 
Transformation” (2015) 27 Procedia Economics and Finance 109. 
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council collects the workers’ views, conveys them to the employer, and oversees the 
corporate management exclusively on the behalf of the workers. Meanwhile, it acts as 
the employee representative and helps the management make decisions that seriously 
consider the employees’ interests. In addition to the supervisory function, the works 
council is a co-decision-making organ for various labour affairs. The works council 
plays a significant role as the decisive power in German corporate structures in 
comparison to its Chinese counterpart.  
Thus, the position of the Workers’ Congress in Chinese firms is prejudiced towards 
the management rather than the workers. In addition, the works council has broad and 
powerful rights as compared to the Workers’ Congress against labour issues. However, 
whether such strong rights would be conducive to the party-state, the firm, as well as 
the employees requires further exploration to adapt the works council model to firms 




Although Chinese firms have their respective counterparts to the German co-
determination institutions, a lack of detailed rules make the former much less effective. 
Another reason for their relative ineffectiveness is their structural arrangement. The 
trade union in Chinese firms is the core organ in the worker representation system both 
at the board and establishment levels. On the one hand, it has a de facto decisive say 
over the election of the employee representatives on the BoS due to its nomination 
rights. On the other hand, it exerts a considerable the amount influence over the 
Workers’ Congress by organising and leading its work. Considering the party-state’s 
leadership over the trade union and its influence in corporate decision making, the 
effectiveness of the worker representation mechanisms in Chinese companies rests 
upon on the incentives of the management as well as the party-state. In contrast, the 
core institution of the German co-determination mechanism is the works council, 
which represents the workers at the establishment level and elects their representatives 
to the supervisory board. Unlike the trade union in China, the works council is 
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insulated from any external influences, which guarantees its effectiveness in 
representing the workers. 
 
5.3 The Ideologies underlying the Chinese and German 
Employee Participation Mechanisms 
 
Having examined the differences between the worker representation mechanisms of 
China and Germany, we now examine the deeper reasons for these differences by 
understanding each country’s law-making ideologies in this section. 
 
The idea of examining the backgrounds to these work representation mechanisms 
arises from the path dependency theory, which explains the persistent power of 
idiosyncratic corporate structures and rules in different economies operating against 
the worldwide tendency towards convergence in corporate governance.593 One reason 
for such persistence is that the corporate rules are embedded in the respective political 
and social settings that reflect the relevant strength of the interest groups, which in turn 
deepens their entrenchment. Along with these corporate rules, the underlying 
ideologies tend to persist and have profound impacts on each amendment of the laws, 
including the current work representation mechanisms in Germany and China. As a 
result, to further test whether the German co-determination system can be adapted to 
the Chinese economy, it is necessary to identify the ideologies underlying these rules 
by analysing their social, institutional and political settings. 
 
5.3.1 The Ideologies underlying the Workers’ Congress in Chinese 
Firms 
 
The history of the Workers’ Congress in China was briefly introduced in section 3.2.2. 
This part focuses on the major objectives of the Workers’ Congress in the old planned 
economy. While the Workers Congress’ primary role “on the books” is to represent 
 
593 Bebchuk and Roe (n 18). 
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the workers, its objectives “in action” are closely connected with the party-state and 
its political purposes.  
 
The ideologies of the Workers’ Congress can be examined from two aspects. The first 
is from the needs to reduce the agency costs. The Workers’ Congress role was to 
oversee the factory directors, which reduced the costs of the party-state in managing 
the state-owned enterprises in the socialist economy. As mentioned in section 3.2.2, 
the factory director managed the factory on behalf of the party-state. Therefore, the 
party-state needed a supervisory organ internal to the enterprise to reduce the agency 
costs incurred by pervasive problems such as tunnelling or bribery of the factory 
directors.594 However, this function gradually became obsolete with the introduction 
of the modern corporate system, and the BoS began to act as the major supervision 
organ in the 1990s. Since then, this supervisory role was replaced by the workers’ 
compulsory participation on the BoS. The second aspect goes beyond corporate 
governance to the party’s ruling of the country. This can be explained using the 
political settings of three milestones during the development of the Workers’ Congress. 
The first milestone is traced back to the founding of the People’s Republic of China. 
The workers’ interests were expected to align with those of the party-state, as the 
“masters” of the country,595 and their mission was to support the latter in economic 
recovery from economic prostration after the war. The party-state engaged in restoring 
the Chinese economy to the normal working order. 596  Therefore, in addition to 
safeguarding labour interests, the Workers’ Congress was committed to encouraging 
the workers’ initiatives in production on behalf of the party-state.597  The second 
milestone was reached in the late 1980s, when the Workers’ Congress system was 
confirmed by law. As mentioned in section 3.2.2, this was mainly due to the impact of 
the “Polish Crisis”, when workers were organised to rebel against the communist 
regime in Poland in the 1980s. The Chinese communist party analysed the main 
 
594 Z. Ding, “From Bribery to Capital flight: Some Thoughts on the Loss of State Assets” (从腐败到资金大外逃—
对 于 国 有 资 产 流 失 的 几 点 思 考) (2000) 1 Modern China Studies, available at 
http://www.modernchinastudies.org/us/issues/past-issues/68-mcs-2000-issue-1/529-2012-01-03-12-11-40.html. 
595 ACFTU (n 305). 
596 S.G. Zhang, Economic Cold War: America’s Embargo Against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance: 1949-1963 
(Stanford University Press-2001) 50. 
597 Y. Zhang, “The Relations between the Trade Union and the Party-State” (中国工会与党－国家的关系) (2003) 
18 21th Century (二十一世纪), available at http://paper.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/Details.aspx?id=2574. 
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reasons for the communist crackdown in Poland, one of which was a lack of 
democratic mechanisms for workers to consult with the party-state. In order to solidify 
the ruling of the party-state, the role of the mechanism of the Workers’ Congress in 
Chinese firms was re-emphasised and strengthened by the party-state.598 It should be 
noted that during the same period, China was undergoing the reform of the economic 
system, which included a change of labour policies. In 1986, the employment contract 
regime was introduced to China,599 which was deemed to fundamentally change the 
workers’ relationship with the firm.600 Starting from then, Chinese workers started to 
lose their life-long employment and was exposed to the risks of being dismissed. In 
addition, some social welfare programs such as housing, education, and healthcare 
were gradually separated from the economic activities of SOEs. Accordingly, in order 
to alleviate workers’ unrest arising from this sudden loss of job stability and welfare, 
the unemployment insurance was introduced, and the Workers’ Congress mechanism 
was revived. The third milestone was reached in the early 2000s, when the workers 
were endowed with certain co-determination rights in the context of the SOE reform. 
The traditional SOEs had long been criticised as low on efficiency compared to private 
enterprises. As a result, the government decided to enhance the competitiveness of the 
state industries through firm exit or the restructuring of firms,601 both of which led to 
mass redundancies. Despite the confirmation of the Workers’ Congress mechanisms, 
this organ remained silent in the face of the huge lay-offs on administrative orders. 
This indicates that the Workers’ Congress is subject to the party-state’s political 
objectives. On the other hand, most lay-offs are senior workers who had developed a 
high degree of firm-specific skills. These could not be transferred to other workplaces 
and job profiles. Furthermore, the laid-off workers usually lacked educational 
credentials and were thereby marked as unskilled. As a result, they found it difficult to 
compete with the labour market and make a living after their dismissal. The need for 
the state to improve the efficiency of the SOEs conflicted with labour welfare, leading 
to various social problems such as unlawful protests and violence against the 
 
598 Wilson (313) at 259. 
599 The State Council of PRC, Provisional Regulations on the Implementation of the Labour Contract System in State-
Owned Enterprises (国营企业实行劳动合同制暂行规定) (1986). 
600 K. Ngok, “The Changes of Chinese Labor Policy and Labor Legislation in the Context of Market Transition” (2008) 
73 International Labor and Working-Class History 45. 
601 W. Hurst, the Chinese Worker after Socialism (Cambridge University Press-2009) 53. 
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management of the enterprises.602  Due to this, the co-determination power of the 
Workers’ Congress was introduced to alleviate the serious conflict between the 
interests of labour and the state by formulating a plan for employee arrangements 
satisfactory to both parties. Thus, in addition to its basic function of protecting the 
employees’ interests, the Workers’ Congress is perceived as a tool for the party-state 
to achieve its political objectives, such as economic development and the maintenance 
of social stability, as mentioned above. As a result, whether employees can effectively 
express their issues to the management board of the enterprises through the Workers’ 
Congress depends on whether labour interests are prioritised during policymaking by 
the party-state. Therefore, Chinese mechanisms lack detailed rules, making the 
mechanism non-transparent and unpredictable to facilitate the implementation of the 
party-state’s political policies, since the labour force may occasionally be deemed to 
be a barrier of their fulfilment.  
 
The Workers’ Congress system that originated in the old planned economy was 
approved by the Chinese laws and is accordingly applied to private firms. Similar to 
the SOEs, the Workers’ Congress in private firms depends on the party-state to fulfil 
its information and participation rights during takeovers. However, unlike the SOEs 
that are frequently used to achieve political objectives, private firms in China are the 
major source of the market force that contributes towards China’s economic growth.603 
As discussed in Chapter Two, a moderate degree of workers’ participation positively 
relates to the firm value. Therefore, to improve the effectiveness of the Workers’ 
Congress aligns with party-state’s present needs as well as its expected future needs. 
 
5.3.2 The Ideologies underlying the German Co-determination 
Mechanism 
 
The co-determination system present in Germany allows workers to strongly affect the 
corporate governance of their respective firms. The labour participation ideas first 
 
602 A. Liu and P. Wang, “An Analysis of the Lay-offs’ Choice of Actions: Taking Xiamen for Example” (下岗、失业
工人的行动选择分析: 以厦门市调查为例) (2005) 209 Journal of Fujian Party School (中共福建省委党校学报) 
37. 
603  Lardy, Markets over Mao (n 393). 
 
163 
appeared in publications as early as 1834, and the detailed and generally applied co-
determination mechanism was codified by the Co-determination Act in 1976.604 This 
section attempts to examine the reasons for the origin and underlying ideologies of the 
co-determination system in Germany to assess the extent to which it would be feasible 
to adapt it to the Chinese economy.  
 
The first reason is attributed to the spirit of social democracy, mutuality, and equality 
being prevalent in German society.605 Democracy can be explained using the worker’ 
participatory scheme in the context of corporate governance. The rationale was that if 
the owners of the firms reserved all the decision rights, they must bear all the losses. 
However, workers also suffered from such losses and, therefore, it was stated that 
workers should be allowed to participate in corporate decisions.606 Although these 
values are observed in China, exemplified by the democratic system of allowing 
workers’ representation on the boards, the party-state has retained its paternalistic 
control throughout the history of the Chinese economy. Hence, the extent to which 
these values are emphasised depends on the party-state’s willingness to do so, and 
these values are not rooted in the society.  
 
The second reason is the trade union’s independence from any external institution, 
which was conceived as the basis for the establishment of the co-determination 
mechanism. The employee representation in German enterprises originated from 
collective agreements based on the industrial culture of democracy, mutuality, and 
equality between the employees and employers. Such values were largely promoted 
by the German trade unionists, and, accordingly, the codification of labour co-
determination was regarded as an achievement of the trade union movement. The trade 
unions in Germany were fairly active and able to exert pronounced influences on 
labour protection. This strong power resulted in the trade unions’ complete 
independence and position of exclusively serving labour interests.607  
 
604 H. Teuteberg, Geschichte der Industriellen Mitbestimmung in Deutschland (Tubingen-1961). 
605  R. Lewis and J. Clark, ‘Introduction’ in O. Kahn-Freund, Labour Law and Politics in the Weimar Republic 
(Blackwell-1981)7. 
606 E.C. McCreary, “Social Welfare and Business: The Krupp Welfare Program, 1860-1914” (1968) 42 The Business 
History Review 31. 




The third reason is that the co-determination system arose from the belief that a deeper 
involvement of workers in factory management would increase production, which 
aligned with the employers’ interests.608 The co-determination mechanism was first 
introduced by the factory owners, rather than the trade unions, on a voluntary basis.609 
Although such an alignment was widely questioned by scholars,610 the labourers’ 
participation in management positively affected economic development in certain 
historical periods. For instance, the resurrection and development of labour 
participation coincided with the country’s urgent need for economic recovery. Recent 
studies have confirmed the individual employer’s embrace of this belief as well as the 
cooperation between capital and labour in management. 611  However, there is no 
denying the fact that the labour co-determination system was highly controversial and 
was forced to confront a series of problems upon introduction. This is illustrated by 
the reluctance of other jurisdictions, such as the UK, to adopt this mechanism after 
intense debates over its advantages and disadvantages. 612  For instance, the trade 
unionists in the UK thought that the workers’ participation on the board might make 
the trade union indistinguishable from the management, thereby restricting the trade 
union’s capacity to engage in collective bargaining.613 Even in Germany, lawmakers 
found it difficult to draw up laws compatible with the German company laws.614 This 
was because Germany company laws prioritised shareholders’ interests, but the parity 
of worker’s representation on the supervisory board prejudiced the shareholder’s final 
right of decision. Further, the secrecy of the members on the supervisory board was 
 
608  E.G. Furubotn, “Co-determination, Productivity Gains, and the Economics of the Firm” (1985) 37 Oxford 
Economic Papers 22. 
609 E. McGaughey, “The Co-determination Bargains: The History of German Corporate and Labour Law” (2015). 
LSE Law Society and Economy Working Papers 10/2015, available at 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/61593/1/The%20codetermination%20bargains%20the%20history%20of%20german%20
corporate%20and%20labour%20law.pdf. 
610 M.C Jensen and W. Meckling, “Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and 
Co-determination” (1979) 52 Journal of Business 469 at 473. They “suggest that co-determination or industrial 
democracy is less efficient than the alternatives which grow up and survive in a competitive environment.” 
611 T. Paster, “Do German Employers Support Board-level Co-determination? The Paradox of Individual Support 
and Collective Opposition” (2012) 10 Socio-Economic Review 471. 
612  R. Zahn, “German Co-determination without Nationalization, and British Nationalization without Co-
determination: Retelling the Story” (2015) 36 Historical Studies of Industrial Relations 1. 
613 N. Chester, the Nationalisation of British Industry (HMSO-1975) 844. 
614  W. Kolvenbach, “Co-determination in Germany: History and Practical Experience” (1981) 9 International 
Business Lawyer 163. 
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thought to conflict with the obligations of the worker and trade union representatives 
to safeguard the interests of labour. 
 
To summarise, three reasons for the effectiveness of German co-determination 
mechanism have been identified in comparison to Chinese contexts. The first is the 
complete independence of the trade union, which was the main driving force behind 
this system. The second is the long-standing belief that workers’ deeper involvement 
in management aligns with the shareholders’ interests, although this was largely 
questioned by academics when the system was first proposed.  
 
5.3.3 Compromising Ideologies 
 
The German and Chinese labour participation mechanisms are shaped by different 
ideologies, and this may be an obstacle to Chinese firms adopting the German co-
determination mechanism. As evidenced by the history of the German system, it would 
be a challenge for workers to obtain co-determination rights without the support of 
completely independent trade unionists. This is especially the case in China as 
industrial relations are managed by the party-state, which in turn affect corporate 
decisions. This dependence on the party-state may compromise the position of the 
trade union and Workers’ Congress as the representatives of the workers. On the other 
hand, Chinese workers may gain advantages, as compared to their German 
counterparts, in obtaining and exercising their co-determination rights, as explained 
below. 
 
First, the German co-determination mechanism can only be introduced if it is 
supported by the party-state. This is because the party-state is the driving force behind 
the law-making system and retains control over the market. Although the political 
process of law-making has become “more consultative and sophisticated, and political 
actors more diversified and competitive”,615  the party-state continues to have the 
 
615 Y.N. Cho, “The Politics of Lawmaking in Chinese Local People’s Congress” (2006) 287 The China Quarterly 187. 
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leading role in the rule-of-law regime.616 Therefore, without the permission of the 
party-state, the German co-determination mechanism cannot be introduced in China.  
 
Second, the party-state can alleviate this imbalance of power and, thus, make workers 
exercise their rights in a more effective manner. The party-state can persuade or 
occasionally force the employer to provide employees with co-determination rights 
during takeovers due to its command over the Chinese market and influence in 
corporate decision making. For instance, the employer is less likely to disobey the 
party-state’s instructions to improve the employees’ roles in the takeover decision-
making process. Hence, workers’ information and participation rights are more likely 
to be safeguarded under the supervision of the party-state.  
 
Third, the operation of the co-determination mechanism would be more effective and 
streamlined with the party-state’s leadership as the party-state can intervene when the 
workers’ information or participation rights are infringed by the employer. 617 
Additionally, since Chinese workers have relied on the party-state to safeguard their 
legitimate interests throughout history, they may lack adequate resources and 
capabilities to uphold their co-determination rights, making them vulnerable to unjust 
treatments by the management during takeovers. Therefore, with the solid support of 
the party-state, workers would be more capable of protecting their rights and 
bargaining with the employer.618 
 
However, as mentioned above, this mechanism was initially adopted by some German 
firms on a voluntary basis. This gives rise to the question of whether Chinese firms 
would voluntarily choose to follow this system; this may not be feasible in the Chinese 
economy for three reasons.  
 
 
616 S. Trevaskes, “China’s Party-led Rule-of-law Regime” (2017), available at 
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617 J. Zhang and W. Xu, Towards Negotiations: Empirical Exploration of the Trade Union in China (走向谈判: 中国
工会的实践探索) (Xinhua Publishing House-2014).  
618 B. Bai, “The Compatibility of the Trade Union Accepting the Leadership of the CPC with its Performing Functions 
Independently and Creatively” (工会自觉接受党的领导与独立自主创造性工作统一关系思考) (2010) 24 
Journal of Institute of Industrial Relations (中国劳动关系学院学报) 35. 
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First, the adoption of the co-determination mechanism would bring relatively few 
benefits to the individual employees at a loss to managers due to their having less 
leeway for opportunistic managerial behaviours. Due to the lack of information and 
collective action problems, shareholders can hardly insist on the co-determination 
mechanism against entrenched managerial opposition.619 Therefore, the resistance to 
the introduction of an employee participation scheme is strong. To benefit both 
shareholders and employees as well as positively affect the Chinese economy and its 
innovative capabilities, the party-state needs to be the driving force that adapts this 
system to the Chinese laws.  
 
Second, China lacks independent workers’ organisations that can support the adoption 
of the German co-determination system. By understanding that the Chinese trade 
unions are not equipped to represent the interests of the employees, an increasing 
labour non-governmental organisation (NGO) with the objective of protecting the 
interests of employees emerged.620 However, these organisations have weak voices, 
and, more importantly, labour organisations other than the trade unions are prohibited 
by Chinese law.621  
 
Third, the paternalistic style of leadership that is rooted in Chinese culture is opposed 
to the values of democracy, mutuality, and equality that guided Germany’s path to co-
determination. In China, the party-state is, similar to the patriarch of a family, expected 
to control as well as provide care and protection for its subordinates, while the 
subordinates, in return, are expected to be loyal and obedient to their superior.622 One 
noticeable consequence of this leadership style is the inequality of power between the 
party-state and workers. In particular, workers give up their rights to exercise 
autonomy and choice623 to the party-state in return for corporate decisions that favour 
employees. The party-state is expected to determine the wants and needs of the 
 
619 Smith (n 266).  
620 According to a survey, as of 2013, there were more than 50 labour organisations in China. Starting from 2007, 
an increasing number of labour NGOs have been repressed by the local government. See Xu (n 331) at 246. 
621 Article 2 and 4 of the Trade Union Law of PRC. Some labour NGOs were repressed by the local government 
from 2007. See Howell (337).  
622 Z. Aycan, “Paternalism: Towards Conceptual Refinement and Operationalization” in U. Kim, K. Yang, and K. 
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employees but not on a reciprocal basis.624 However, evidence shows that workers 
tend to remain silent when unfavourable corporate decisions are made under the 
paternalistic leadership 625  for various reasons, including the fear of retaliation or 
punishment from management626 and the shared belief that defying the decisions made 
by their superiors is not worth the effort as their suggestions would not make a 
difference.627  Therefore, workers are inclined to withhold their opinions from the 
party-state even when the decision would harm would their interests. Due to this, the 
party-state, and not the employees, needs to be the driving force that introduces the 
German co-determination mechanism in China. 
 
As analysed in Section 2.2 and Section 5.3.1, the improvement of workers’ 
involvement in takeover decisions aligns with the interests of the firm as well as the 
party-state. This echoes the ideology underlying the German co-determination 
mechanism, which furthers the party-state’s incentive to introduce this system in 
Chinese firms. Although Chinese firms and their German counterparts have 
institutional and cultural differences, the establishment of the co-determination 
mechanism would be feasible with the support of the party-state. However, whether 
this system can be introduced and implemented effectively depends on how it can be 




This chapter provided an introduction to the German co-determination mechanism at 
the board and establishment levels. Compared to their Chinese counterparts, German 
workers have stronger rights that enable them to effectively participate in corporate 
management and make decisions on issues relating to their interests. These advantages 
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are attributed to two factors: 1) German firms have powerful and independent trade 
unions; and 2) the values of democracy, mutuality, and equality are prevalent. These 
two factors are not observed in China due to the dominance of the party-state over the 
Chinese economy. The party-state can exercise its discretion over the extent to which 
workers can be involved in corporate management. Due to this, firms cannot be 
expected to voluntarily establish the co-determination mechanism, especially 
considering the paternalistic style of leadership followed in China. Therefore, the 
party-state needs to establish rules of co-determination specific to China. With the 
strong support of the party-state, this scheme would be adopted and enforced in firms. 
The addition of explicit rules to limit the party-state’s discretionary behaviours would 
help to change the level of workers’ participation in corporate management. 
 
Having identified the differences between the Chinese and German employee 
participation mechanisms and the ideologies underlying these systems, the next 






Chapter 6: The Co-Determination Mechanism in Chinese 
Takeovers 
 
This chapter aims to present how the German co-determination mechanism can be 
adapted to Chinese firms. However, adapting the entire German co-determination 
mechanism to Chinese firms is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, based on the 
German scheme, I suggest ways to improve workers’ participation levels during 
takeovers to better safeguard their interests in China. As analysed in Chapter 5, 
German workers’ co-determination rights are reflected at both the board level and the 
establishment level. The former focuses on the employees’ involvement in takeover 
decisions, whereas the latter focuses on safeguarding the interests of immediate 
concern to the workers. Options for reforms at the two levels in Chinese firms are 
explored based on the German mechanism. Considering that the German system 
emerged under wholly different historical, cultural, economic, and legal contexts, the 
introduced system may have certain side effects in addition to the improvement of 
workers’ participation level in the context of takeovers. One is that the corporate 
governance model of shareholder primacy, which Chinese firms widely adopt, is 
expected to be more stakeholder oriented. This change in ideology is able to provide 
theoretical foundation for the suggested mechanism, and therefore, that is first 
examined in this chapter. Other factors in Chinese contexts may affect the extent to 
which the introduced model can be accepted and is effective. This is expected to affect 
the feasibility of the suggested system in the context of hostile takeovers. Accordingly, 
after the details of the suggestions for deeper workers’ involvement are provided, the 
feasibility of the directions for reform is examined.   
 
6.1 The Ideology underlying the Suggested Mechanism: from 
the Perspective of the Model of Corporate Governance 
 
As examined in section 2.1, corporate governance models that pose a challenge to 
shareholder primacy provide the theoretical foundation for employee claims to be 
taken into consideration. Depending on the extent that shareholders and stakeholders 
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are granted a voice in corporate governance these corporate governance models 
constitute a spectrum, wherein shareholder primacy and stakeholder theory lie at the 
poles and ESV is somewhere between them. As analysed in section 1.3, this thesis 
presents that the corporate governance model that Chinese legislators choose is 
shareholder primacy. Meanwhile, although German corporations have different 
development paths from these models in the Anglo-American tradition, it is generally 
agreed that they adopt a stakeholder approach of German style, which is characterised 
by two features.628 First, as described in section 4.3, due to the stable role of banks in 
providing external corporate finance and acting as long-term investors, the objective 
of management in German firms is focusing on firms’ long-term value. This requires 
the management to consider stakeholders’ interests, which is different from the model 
of shareholder primacy that focuses on the short-term gains of investors. Second, the 
German co-determination mechanism provides employees with extensive 
participation rights in corporate decision making and in affairs that directly relate to 
workers’ interests. In this regard, the application of the German co-determination 
scheme to Chinese firms in the context of hostile takeovers is expected to make the 
ideology of corporate governance in Chinese firms move away from shareholder 
primacy and towards stakeholder theory in the spectrum of the corporate governance 
models. Before suggesting the co-determination scheme in hostile takeovers of 
Chinese styles, it is necessary to identify the location of its underlying ideology on 
which the model is based.  
 
In order to achieve this objective, three questions must be addressed. The previous 
chapters have provided clues for the answers, so these questions are explored briefly 
here. The first is whether shareholders’ interests should be prioritised to the point of 
exclusion of other stakeholders’ interests as in the shareholder primacy. This question 
has been answered in Chapters 1 and 2; workers are vulnerable to adverse treatments 
in hostile takeovers and their claims must be considered to positively affect firm value. 
In this regard, compared to shareholder primacy, the suggested model should be 
stakeholder oriented.  
 
628 G. Jackson, M. Hopner, and A. Kurdelbusch, “Corporate Governance and Employees in Germany: Changing 





The second is whether employees should have any decisive say over takeover decision 
making, which is required by stakeholder theory. The answer is also negative. Hostile 
takeovers are particularly perceived as the most powerful mechanism for shareholders 
to discipline underperforming executives,629 which arises from shareholders’ ability to 
freely transfer their shares. In this regard, if workers are endowed with the co-decision 
power, the emergence of a hostile takeover will be hindered because developing a 
takeover plan satisfactory to workers is time-consuming and costly and may also lower 
the corporate raider’s intention to acquire the target firm. In addition, giving workers 
this co-decision right is unrealistic; as described in Chapter 1, hostile takeovers are 
normally achieved by tender offers step by step, and it is unreasonable for workers to 
reject the share sale on behalf of shareholders. Therefore, even in Germany, which is 
widely deemed to adopt a stakeholder approach, workers do not have the decisive say 
in takeover decisions.  
 
Thus, the introduced German mechanism is closer to ESV, which take employee 
claims into consideration for the benefit of the firm’s long-term value. Specifically, in 
takeovers in the UK that adopt the ESV model, the board of the target firm should send 
a circular to shareholders and others with information rights, which include the opinion 
of the board on the offer and advice from the independent advisor. It should be noted 
that Chinese laws have similar requirements as introduced in section 1.1. However, 
differently, in the UK, the opinions of employee representatives should be appended 
to the circular of the target board, 630  which is similar to the German rule. It is 
reasonable that the takeover rules in both countries are influenced by the EU directive 
on takeovers.631 However, compared to the UK rules, the German ones have more 
details to procure the opinions of employee representatives can reflect workers’ voices. 
This can be evidenced by the vague definition of employee representatives in the UK, 
which do not require shop-floor employees to be chosen as the representative.632 
 
629 J.A. Pearce II and R.B. Robinson JR, “Hostile Takeover Defenses that Maximize Shareholder Wealth” (2004) 47 
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630 Rule 25 of the City Code. 
631 See European Union, Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
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Compared to the ESV which is represented by UK law, the proposed German 
mechanism can express the workers’ voice better, as detailed rules leave less room for 
the personal discretion of executives. Therefore, in the spectrum of corporate 
governance models, the suggested German model is close to ESV, but compared to the 
latter, it is slightly more stakeholder oriented. 
 
It should be noted that the introduction of the German system in the context of hostile 
takeovers cannot make a difference to the model of shareholder primacy that Chinese 
firms have adopted in the landscape of corporate governance. This is especially the 
case considering that although the number of hostile takeovers is expected to increase, 
they are still rare in the life circle of a corporation. Such modifications of ideology in 
this context only aim to alleviate workers’ vulnerability to adverse treatments and 
promote a firm’s long-term value. After identifying the ideology, the details of the 
suggested scheme are provided in the next two sections.   
 
6.2 Employee Participation at the Board Level 
 
Three benefits of worker’s representation at the board level have been highlighted in 
the previous chapters. First, these members are able to directly represent workers 
during the takeover decision-making process, which is conducive to employee 
protection. Second, it provides the management and shareholders with shop-floor 
knowledge and information, which may enhance the quality of the takeover decisions. 
Therefore, “discussions in the boardroom on issues affecting the choices and 
alternatives can now be better controlled and rational decision-making is thus 
facilitated”.633 Third, higher levels of workers’ participation in corporate decision 
making are expected to improve production and positively affect the firm’s value. 
However, due to the ineffectiveness of employee representation on both the BoD and 
BoS, these benefits are not being obtained, which indicates the need for a reform of 
the ways in which employee representatives perform their functions. 
 




It should be noted that employee representatives are present on the BoD as well as the 
BoS, both of which involve legitimate opportunities to participate in the takeover 
process. However, compared to the BoD, the BoS is the ideal institution for workers 
to exercise their co-determination rights in, and this section begins with an analysis of 
the reasons underlying this choice. It then moves on to explore possible solutions to 
Chinese problems based on the selective adaptions of features of the German system.  
 
6.2.1 Worker Representation on the BoS and BoD 
 
In German companies, workers participate in corporate management through their 
representatives on the supervisory board. Therefore, it may seem natural to focus on 
the employee representation mechanism of the BoS in Chinese firms to improve 
employees’ involvement in takeover decisions. However, this would be far too hasty 
a conclusion to make, especially considering that the German supervisory boards 
retain some responsibilities that, according to Chinese laws, should belong to the 
management board. In particular, the supervisory board in Germany is required to 
participate in making management decisions of fundamental importance to the firm,634 
especially the initiation of takeover defence tactics. 635  The practical difficulties 
involved in distinguishing between the managerial and supervisory functions636 have 
induced a debate among Chinese scholars over whether the German BoD or BoS can 
be deemed as the counterpart of the supervisory board in Chinese firms.637 Hence, we 
explore this choice between the BoD and BoS in this thesis with the aim of increasing 
workers’ involvement in takeover decisions.  
 
We do not aim to adapt the entire co-determination mechanism to the Chinese 
corporate governance for this thesis, especially considering that the German system 
has its own defects, as noted by scholars.638 Accordingly, one of the objectives of this 
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637  P. Jiang, “Talks on the Amendments of the Company Law” (纵论公司法的修改) (2005), available at 
http://old.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=23368&_d_id=04f321303ee4beb0ae09f2e144f30a. 
638 V. Carrasco, “Corporate Board Structure, Managerial Self-Dealing, and the Common Agency” (2006) Stanford 
Institute for Economic Policy Research SIEPR Discussion Paper No.04-15, available at 
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thesis is to solve Chinese problems without significant changes to the current corporate 
laws. From this perspective, improving the effectiveness of worker representation on 
the BoS has practical advantages compared to the BoD, as explained below. 
 
According to Chinese laws, a third of the BoS is required to be filled by employee 
representatives. In contrast, the same system is merely encouraged for the BoD of 
private firms.639 Due to the ineffectiveness of the latter system, as analysed in section 
3.4, reforming the BoD would involve much higher costs because it would require 
establishing a compulsory workers’ representation mechanism beforehand, and 
whether this system is feasible is still under exploration by the party-state. Additionally, 
a takeover is a complex process which is normally accompanied by long term 
procedures and negotiations with the acquirer. Resistance to the potential takeover by 
the BoD would lead to further complications between the acquirer and the target 
firm. 640  Such a scenario would require the involvement of directors with high 
management capabilities and experience as employee representatives, which is a 
challenge in private firms. In contrast, for members on the BoS who are not necessarily 
engaged in every step of the takeover process, this qualification is relatively lower. 
According to the Chinese Company Laws, the BoD has a fiduciary duty to the 
shareholder assembly; this is not the case with the BoS.641 Accordingly, the role of 
employees on the BoD is ambiguous since they are required to serve the shareholders 
as well as employees, the interests of whom may conflict.642 However, employee 
members on the BoS do not share these conflicts of interest. Their representatives have 
no legal obstacles to safeguarding the workers’ interests.  
 
Due to the above reasons, the BoS is the ideal platform to introduce the co-
determination mechanism at the board level as compared to the BoD. The above 
analysis does not aim to deny any positive implications of employee representation on 
the BoD for safeguarding workers’ interests. In addition to direct participation in 
takeover decisions, employee representatives’ resistance on behalf of workers would, 
 
ftp://ftp.repec.org/opt/ReDIF/RePEc/sip/04-015.pdf. 
639 Article 44 and 51 of the Company Law of PRC.  
640 D. Watson and A. Head, Corporate Finance: Principles and Practice (Pearson Education-2010) 332. 
641 Article 46 of the Company Law of PRC. 
642 Hu (n 355).  
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in general, make it difficult for the acquirer to control the firm, since the 
representatives would be elected by the Workers’ Congress and not the shareholder 
assembly.643 However, due to their close connections with other members on the BoD, 
as mentioned in Section 3.4, employee representation on the BoD is normally used by 
the management as an anti-takeover tactic rather than to safeguard workers’ interests. 
Besides, employee representation on the BoS has its own deficits in safeguarding 
workers’ interests during takeovers. As analysed in Chapters 3 and 4, there are two 
reasons for these deficits: the representatives are unable to represent the workers’ 
interests; and the BoS cannot actively participate in the takeover decision-making 
process. In the next section, co-determination at the board level during takeovers is 
established, particularly in response to these two problems.  
 
6.2.2 The Establishment of a Chinese Co-determination Mechanism 
in the Chinese Takeover Context 
 
After deciding that the BoS is the platform to introduce workers’ co-determination 
rights during takeovers at the board level, we explore how this system can be adapted 
into the Chinese legal system in this section. As previously mentioned, obstacles to 
providing employee representatives with co-determination rights in takeover situations 
exist at two levels: the institution and individual. This section includes a discussion on 
increasing the involvement of the BoS in the takeover decision-making process, and 
then an analysis of the two levels of obstacles. 
 
To Improve Effectiveness at the Institution Level 
 
The first objective of this mechanism is to ensure the free flow of information between 
the BoS and the BoD, which is also the primary aim of the German co-determination 
system.644 According to German laws, the management board is obliged to report any 
takeover process to the supervisory board, and members on the supervisory board are 
 
643 L, Song, “Case Analysis of Anti-Takeover of Vanke” (万科反并购案分析) (2017) Master’s Dissertation of 
Shenzhen University 31. 
644 J. Du Plessis, B. Großfeld, C. Luttermann, I.Sawnger, O. Sandrock and M. Casper, German Corporate Governance 
in International and European Context (Springer-2012) 146. 
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entitled to request information about the takeover at any time. The information 
provided by the management board is expected to be timely, conscientious, and 
accurate.645 These rules facilitate the flow of information from the management to the 
supervisory organ, which can be directly adapted to the Chinese laws, especially 
because there is no explicit rule, at present, to allow the BoS to actively participate in 
the takeover process. Members on the BoS can also gain information by attending the 
meetings of the BoD, albeit without voting rights, but, rather than being required by 
Chinese law, this is merely encouraged. The BoS does not necessarily have to attend 
all the BoD meetings for daily corporate management, especially for matters beyond 
the scope of their supervisory responsibilities and role, as excessive supervision over 
the BoD may impede the latter’s efficacy in corporate management.646  However, 
considering the significant changes that can be caused by takeovers, members of the 
BoS should be required to attend meetings of the BoD to gain information and provide 
their opinions on the impacts of the potential takeover, and the BoD should not resist 
this participation. Therefore, the BoS members should be invited to BoD meetings, 
with a written notice and within a reasonable period prior to the meeting, to vote on 
matters related to takeovers. The shareholder-elected and employee-elected members 
should both be required to attend these meetings. However, members of the BoS would 
have to be bound by the duty of confidentiality to gain access to confidential takeover-
related information. Due to their role, employee representatives may have to disclose 
confidential information to some employees; these employees should also be required 
to comply with the duty of confidentiality. This rule is defined in the German laws,647 
and can be adopted by the Chinese. 
 
After setting up rules to provide information rights to the BoS, the next objective is to 
discuss ways to deepen this institution’s participation in the takeover decision-making 
process. As explained in Section 5.1, in Germany, although the shareholder assembly 
has decisive power over takeover decisions, the decisions are largely shaped by 
 
645 §90 of the Stock Corporation Act (2016) and Article 3.4 and Article 5.2 of the German Corporate Governance 
Code (2017). 
646  N.F. Sharpe, “Volkswagen’s Bad Decisions and Harmful Emissions: How Poor Process Corrupted Co-
determination in Germany’s Dual Board Structure” (2017) 7 Michigan Business and Entrepreneurial Law Review 
49. 
647 Article 3.5 of the German Corporate Governance Code (2017). 
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reasoned statements from the management and supervisory board members on the 
takeover offer, including the expected effects on the target company and employees 
should the takeover be successful.648 Meanwhile, in China, takeover decisions made 
by the shareholder assembly are influenced by the suggestions and opinions of the 
BoD and independent financial advisors;649 the laws do not mention the involvement 
of the BoS. Considering the consistently passive role of the BoS in corporate 
governance, its members would not be able to provide sound opinions on the takeover 
offer without a channel to provide them with sufficient and accurate information. 
These circumstances would change once the BoS has information rights and is required 
to be involved in the takeover decision-making process. They would then be able to 
issue statements about the consequences the target firm and employees should expect, 
providing the basis for shareholders to make informed decisions like their German 
counterparts. Accordingly, the BoS members’ statement should be submitted to the 
CSRC along with other formal documents such as the statement of changes in equity, 
the statement of the BoD, and takeover reports.650 
 
The BoD in Chinese firms exercise broad discretion over various matters that should 
be under the supervision of the BoS. As discussed in Section 2.2.3, this supervision 
could mitigate the opportunistic managerial behaviours of the BoD that may militate 
against the interests of shareholders and employees during takeovers. For example, 
similar to the German laws,651 certain takeover defence measures, such as the sale of 
crown jewels or other valuables that may cause an undervaluation of the firm, are 
forbidden unless approved by the shareholder assembly.652 However, other measures 
such as looking for a competing offer (referred to as “the White Knight”) can be 
initiated by the BoD. To properly oversee the management board’s behaviours, 
German laws require the consent of the supervisory board to be obtained before such 
measures are taken. The BoS in Chinese firms can also be endowed with similar rights 
to lower the risks of opportunistic managerial conduct, along with the right to gain 
information directly from the BoD as well as through the BoS members’ participation 
 
648 Section 27 of the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (2011). 
649 Article 8 of Takeover Measures. 
650 Article 87 of Takeover Measures. 
651 Section 33 of the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (2011). 
652 Article 33 of Takeover Measures. 
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in BoD meetings. Under the supervision and with the cooperation of the BoS, the BoD 
would be expected to take the employees’ interests into account as it would be in the 
best interests of the firm. 
 
To Improve the Effectiveness at the Individual Level 
 
The deeper involvement of the BoS members in the takeover-related meetings would 
provide employee representatives with increased opportunities to express their 
opinions and suggestions. The next step to establishing the co-determination system at 
the board level would be to make these employee members better represent the 
workers’ interests. 
 
The German Corporate Governance Code suggests that employee and shareholder 
members hold separate meetings in preparation for the supervisory board meeting. If 
necessary, these preparatory meetings can also be held with members of the 
management board.653 This rule can also be implemented in Chinese firms, especially 
since it can help address certain board representation problems. It should be noted that 
the employees and shareholders’ opinions on various matters may be different 
depending on whether the decision is in their interests. If their interests conflict, the 
employee members may be reluctant to express their dissenting opinions in front of 
the shareholder members and play a passive role in the meeting, as discussed in Section 
5.2.1. If the different groups are offered opportunities to consider the interests of their 
respective constituencies in preparatory meetings, without any intervention from other 
members on the BoS, they are more likely to form opinions that favour employees. 
Evidence shows that involving every member and obtaining diverse opinions would 
positively affect the supervisory board’s effectiveness.654 Although the members may 
have diverse opinions prior to the supervisory board meeting, introducing this rule 
would drive them towards finding a compromise in the best interests of the company. 
In addition, it would provide opportunities for the representatives of each board to raise 
 
653 Article 3.6 of the German Corporate Governance Code (2017). 
654 C. Kratz, A. Roos, U. Pidun and S. Stange, “Learning from the Best Supervisory Boards: Recipes for Success by 





their concerns to the management board before the BoS meeting.655 This facilitates 
cooperation between the BoS and BoD, and this increased communication is expected 
to reduce conflicts between the two boards.656 Further, opinions from the perspective 
of the employees’ interests would be expressed to the BoD before a statement is made 
in the BoS meeting. 
 
Another factor that hinders the BoS’s role in safeguarding workers’ interests is the 
composition of the board’s employee members. Most of the employee representatives 
are from the executive team and can hardly represent employees at the establishment 
level. In contrast, the German laws include strict rules on the proportion of shop-floor 
employees required on the supervisory board. Without the involvement of workers at 
the establishment level, these members cannot properly represent the general 
employees. As analysed in a prior section, this improper board composition in China 
is partly due to the party-state’s influence over the election process; this cannot be 
expected to change soon. The party-state is expected to retain its leadership over 
industrial relations due to China’s unique political and economic system. However, 
with the solid support of the party-state, employee representatives would be able to 
participate in the takeover decision-making process more effectively, and the 
introduction of the employees’ co-determination rights should, therefore, rely on the 
party-state’ influence.  
 
Based on the Chinese economic conditions, three possible directions have been 
identified to improve the participation of shop-floor employees, as per the objectives 
of this thesis. First, there should be legal requirements for the number of BoS 
representatives from employees at each level.  For instance, there should be a minimal 
number of executive members and shop-floor employees respectively who are elected 
as employee representatives on the BoS. Second, in the context of takeovers, shop-
floor employees should be invited to the BoS as temporary members. Third, as a part 
of their takeover-related responsibilities, members of the BoS should be encouraged 
to obtain suggestions from the employees at the establishment level. The first direction 
 
655 Du Plessis (n 644). 
656 L.L. Dallas, “Proposals for Reform of Corporate Boards of Directors: The Dual Board and Board Ombudsperson” 
(1997) 54 Washington and Lee Law Review 91. 
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provides the most direct solution for the Chinese problems. However, this change may 
lead to shop-floor employees’ participation in corporate governance beyond corporate 
takeovers, which may be too ambitious at this stage. Therefore, the second direction 
has been suggested, enabling the shop-floor employees to contribute to the BoS 
meetings. However, two problems may arise, the first of which lies in the selection of 
the representative. If the temporary member is to be perceived as representing workers’ 
interests in general, he/she should be elected by the Workers’ Congress; but this may 
lead to practical difficulties. Workers are not required to be informed of a potential 
takeover before the publication of the offer due to factors of confidentiality.657 An 
election prior to the publication of the takeover offer may disclose confidential 
information about the takeover. An election after the publication of the offer is also 
impractical as the temporary member may be unable to be involved in the entire 
process of takeovers, especially considering that the election process takes time. The 
other problem is that the elected employee representatives may not have the necessary 
experience or knowledge of law and auditing to perform the role of a BoS member. 
Compared to the former two suggestions, the third is feasible since it can fit into 
China’s current legal system. Instead of the shop-floor employees directly 
participating in meetings of the BoS, they would choose employee members on the 
BoS to represent them. As suggested by the ACFTU, employee members on the BoS 
should collect employees’ thoughts on a routine basis. 658  If this suggestion is 
voluntarily implemented, the employee members on the BoD should be clearly aware 
of workers’ demands towards a potential takeover. The representatives should be 
required to consult with the shop-floor employees to understand the employees’ 
attitudes towards the potential takeover; however, the consulted should be similarly 
bound by the duty of confidentiality. This consultation should constitute one of the 
bases for the BoS members’ opinions and attached to their submitted statement. 
 
Third, employee members should perform their responsibilities without any concerns. 
These concerns would generally lie in two aspects. First, since a large portion of the 
 
657 In German takeovers, works council should be informed promptly after the publication of the takeover offer. 
See Section 10 of the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (2011). In takeovers in the UK, workers should be 
informed promptly after the commencement of offer period. See section 2.11 of the City Code. 
658 ACFTU, Opinions of the ACFTU on Further Promotion of the Systems of Employee Directors and Employee 
Supervisors (中华全国总工会关于进一步推行职工董事职工监事制度的意见) (2006). 
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employee supervisors would hold concurrent positions in the firm, to prepare for and 
attend meetings of the BoS may mitigate their performance levels as executives of the 
firm. It should be noted that their German counterparts do not share similar concerns 
due to their significant roles in their companies. However, other rules that aim to 
safeguard the interests of the works council can be introduced. It would be prescribed 
that BoS meetings should be held outside working hours unless necessary; and that 
employees should be provided with hourly remuneration for meetings held outside 
working hours and not penalised due to meetings held during working hours. 659 
Second, to disagree with the opinions of the BoD members may expose them to risks 
of retaliation from the latter. Accordingly, any unfavourable treatment, such as job 
losses or wage cuts, resulting from employee members exercising their responsibilities 




In this chapter, arguments were presented for the introduction of a German-type co-
determination mechanism at the board level of Chinese firms in the context of hostile 
takeovers. While employee representatives exist on both the BoD and the BoS in 
Chinese firms, the BoS was chosen as the ideal platform for introducing the employee 
representatives’ co-determination rights in this thesis. Accordingly, two objectives 
were outlined to be achieved: improving the participation of the BoS in the takeover 
decision-making process and the effectiveness of employee representatives in 
safeguarding workers’ interests.  
 
Based on the German laws, several principles need to be identified to guide employee 
supervisors in exercising their responsibilities. First, although employee 
representatives are supposed to safeguard workers’ interests, their responsibilities are 
to include workers’ voices in takeover decisions for the best interests of the firm. 
Therefore, a compromise normally takes place during the meetings of the BoS. Second, 
as the supervisory organ, the role of the BoS is not to challenge the BoD but work 
cooperatively with it. Hence, BoS meetings should not be a conflict between the 
 
659 Section 44 of the Works Constitution Act (2017). 
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employees and shareholders contesting for their respective interests but a friendly 
negotiation to explore the best possible decision for the firm.  
 
Having provided some possible directions for the establishment of workers’ co-
determination rights at the board level, we explore the co-determination mechanism at 
the establishment level in the next section. 
 
6.3 Employee Participation at the Establishment Level 
 
In the German laws, the employee co-determination system’s focus at the board level 
and the establishment level are slightly different. The former takes advantage of the 
workers’ inputs to improve the quality of corporate decisions, with the intention of 
benefiting the firm, while the latter focuses on matters related to the employees’ direct 
concerns. Since employees are vulnerable to negative treatments in takeover situations, 
they require information and participation rights which, in turn, benefit firm value. 
Chinese laws endow workers with these rights, but they cannot be effectively exercised. 
Meanwhile, German companies are renowned for their co-determination mechanism 
at the establishment level, the core organ of which is the works council. Therefore, an 
attempt to adapt the German system to Chinese firms with objectives to ensure workers’ 
information and participation rights are upheld is made in this thesis.  
 
6.3.1 Right to be Informed About the Takeover 
 
As one of the most significant stakeholders of any firm, employees should be entitled 
to information about potential takeovers and the expected consequences for the firm 
and them. However, the provision of these rights requires careful prescription. On the 
one hand, employees should have sufficient time to effectively exercise their rights. 
On the other hand, they should not be informed too early as it may lead to a disclosure 
of confidential information. German laws provide an ideal way to satisfy these 




During takeovers, subject to the duty of confidentiality, the employer in Germany is 
expected to inform the finance committee that is affiliated to the works council about 
the situation and provide relevant documentation related to the takeover. In the absence 
of a finance committee, the works council should be informed instead. After prior 
coordination with the finance committee, the employer has to provide reports on the 
takeover and any further developments to the staff at least once every calendar quarter, 
promptly starting after the publication of the takeover.660 Following the publication of 
the takeover offer, the finance committee or works council also has the right to obtain 
the takeover documents, including the bidding documents and statements from the 
management and supervisory board, promptly after their publication.661  
 
During the early stage of a takeover, and particularly before the official publication of 
the offeror’s intention to engage in takeover intention, the finance committee or works 
council is chosen under German laws as the bodies to gain information and 
documentation on behalf of the employees. This legal arrangement helps keep 
necessary information confidential during the takeover process due to three factors. 
First, the members are bound by the similar confidentiality duties as the supervisory 
board.662 Second, although exposing more members, in addition to those on the boards, 
to takeover documentation may increase the risk of information disclosure, the number 
of members on both the finance committee and the works council is limited.663 This 
lowers the risk to a minimal level. Third, this rule does not specify the exact time of 
notification, leaving it up to the employer’s discretion for the sake of confidentiality. 
However, the finance committee retains the right to challenge the employer if the latter 
does not hand over the information in a timely manner, as required by the laws.664 
 
Meanwhile, the finance committee can well represent the employees’ interests 
effectively, especially considering that it must include at least one member of the 
 
660 Sections 106, 109, and 110 of the Works Constitution Act (2017) and Section 10 of the Securities Acquisition 
and Takeover Act (2011). 
661 Sections 14 and 27 of the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (2011). 
662 Article 3.5 of the German Corporate Governance Code (2017). 
663 If the number of employees exceeds 100, a finance committee is required, with members between 3 and 7. If 
the number of employees is fewer than 100, the maximum number of members of the works council is 3. See 
Section 9 and 107 of the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (2011). 
664 Section 109 of the Works Constitution Act (2011). 
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works council. 665 It has extensive rights to consult with the employer on takeover-
related matters whilst being obliged to report to the works council, the workers’ 
representation organ at the establishment level. In addition, the takeover information 
reported by the employer to the staff should be subsequent to the prior coordination 
with the finance committee.666 The participation of the finance committee tends to 
facilitate the provision of an accurate, full, and timely report to the employees. 
 
The German mechanism provides a sound model for Chinese firms to uphold 
employees’ information rights during takeovers. However, it is noted that the structure 
of the worker representation mechanism in China is different from that in Germany. 
Therefore, it is necessary to identify the ideal institution to perform the role of the 
finance committee or works council in Chinese firms before they adopt this system. 
The identified institution should have two characteristics: First, it should be able to 
represent workers’ interests; second, the number of members should be limited. 
Accordingly, the Workers’ Congress should be excluded, since it has no fewer than 30 
members to represent the broad interests of the employees.667 Instead, the Chinese 
trade union committee is chosen as the counterpart of the German finance committee 
for the purpose of this thesis.  
 
The trade union committee is affiliated to the trade union, which is the executive organ 
of the Workers’ Congress.668 It is obliged to arrange the meetings of the Workers’ 
Congress and supervise the management on implementing the decisions made in these 
meetings,669 and, therefore, it is deemed to represent employees’ interests in Chinese 
firms. These responsibilities require the trade union committee to frequently 
communicate with the management on behalf of the employees, which is similar to the 
finance committee in German firms. Further, its members are similarly limited and 
required to include a certain portion of shop-floor employees.670 The high degree of 
 
665 Section 107 of the Works Constitution Act (2011). 
666 Section 110 of the Works Constitution Act (2011). 
667 Article 38 of Democratic Management Provisions. 
668 Article 35 of the Trade Union Law of PRC. 
669 Article 6 of the Trade Union Law of PRC. 




similarity makes the trade union the ideal organ to function in a role similar to the 
finance committee. However, this would be a hasty conclusion to reach before several 
issues are addressed. 
 
First, in theory, the trade union is independent, which means that it is not under the 
domination or control of any employer. Therefore, as the committee affiliated to the 
trade union, whether its access to confidential information at the early stage of 
takeovers is justified is doubtful. However, in Chinese firms, the trade union is inclined 
towards being dependent on the firm due to historical reasons. As examined in Chapter 
3, enterprises in the old planned economy were under an administrative hierarchy and 
had to carry out production missions assigned by the party-state.671 Therefore, these 
old enterprises were indispensable to the party-state, and the trade unions under the 
leadership of the party-state were also internal to the enterprises. Accordingly, instead 
of safeguarding workers’ interests, the objectives of the trade union were to help the 
party-state improve the production levels of the enterprise by relieving the workers’ 
concerns and educating them to better implement the policy of the party-state.672 After 
the introduction of the modern corporate system, the party-state was no longer the 
controller and was gradually excluded from the corporate governance system of 
private firms, but the trade unions remained internal to the modern firm. For instance, 
the leaders of a trade union normally hold concurrent positions in the management and 
the CPC committee of the firm,673 making them inseparable from the firm. Hence, 
unlike those in western countries, the trade unions in Chinese firms are internal rather 
than independent organs. This thesis does not include a justification of the trade unions’ 
lack of independence and their corresponding ineffectiveness in safeguarding workers’ 
interests. Instead, the objective of this thesis is to identify the role of the trade union in 
Chinese firms in practice, which is path dependent and cannot be changed in the 
expected future. Therefore, the trade union’s access to confidential information at the 
early stage of takeovers can be justified due to its close connection with the employer. 
 
 
671 A.G. Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (University of California 
Press-1986) 86. 
672 Zhang and Xu (n 617). 
673 Liu and Zhang (n 344) at 19. 
 
187 
Second, it should be noted that the works councils in German companies are expected 
to cooperate with the employer towards the interests of the employees and company. 
Considering the priority of trade unions is to safeguard the workers’ interests,674 
whether they can similarly cooperate with the employer for firm value is doubtful. 
Since trade unions can be perceived as internal organs in Chinese firms and the trade 
unions are dependent on the firms, cooperation between trade unions and the 
employers is widely found in China. According to an interview with the chairman of 
a trade union in a private firm,675 by realising the alignment of the workers’ interests 
with those of the firm, the function of the trade union is to encourage and help workers 
implement the decisions made by the employer in addition to safeguarding the workers’ 
interests. As an organ internal to the firm, a trade union tends to cooperate with the 
management to safeguard workers’ interests instead of fighting against it, especially 
considering that they do not have the right to strike.676 Accordingly, the role of trade 
unions in Chinese companies is similar to that of the works councils in German firms, 
and therefore its affiliated organ, the trade union committee, can function the similar 
way that finance committee does.  
 
Having identified the organ through which access to information and documentation 
at the early stage of takeovers can be gained, the mechanism to inform workers of 
potential takeovers can now be established. Before the publication of the takeover, the 
BoD should inform the trade union committee of the forthcoming takeover, provide 
relevant documentation, insofar there is no risk of disclosing the trade or business 
secrets of the company, and demonstrate the implications of the proposed takeovers 
for the workers. Promptly after the publication of the offeror’s intention to take over 
the firm, the trade union committee should be informed of the process of the proposed 
takeover timely. Documentation such as the bidding documents and statements of the 
BoD and BoS on the takeovers should also be offered to the trade union committee. 
 
674 Article 6 of the Trade Union Law of PRC. 
675 G. Feng, “The Systemic Weakness of Trade Unions in Enterprises and Its Background” (企业工会的制度性弱
势及其形成背景) (2006) 26 Society (社会) 1. 
676 M. Su, H. Yao and L. Zheng, “The Legal Confirmation and Regulation of the Right to Strike” (法律对罢工权的
确认及规范) (2001) 5 Legal Science (法学) 12. 
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After prior coordination with the committee, the BoD should report relevant details to 
the Workers’ Congress in preparation for the consultation.  
 
Due to the heavy dependence of the trade union on the firm, a concern arises as to of 
whether the trade union committee members have enough of an incentive to exercise 
their obligations. The fact that trade unions in private firms are under the control of 
the party-state, which is powerful but unpredictable, adds to this concern. Therefore, 
explicit rules should be provided to regulate the committee’s conduct and hold them 
accountable. For instance, the report should be provided to the staff within a specified 
period after the publication of the takeover offer. In addition, employees should be 
given the right to challenge members of the trade union committee if they shirk their 
responsibilities during takeovers. Some possible directions for the rules are given in 
this thesis; the details would have to be refined in the future. Possible channels to 
enable Chinese shop-floor employees’ participation in takeover decisions are explored 
in the next section. 
 
6.3.2 Right to Participate in Takeover Decision-Making 
 
From the perspective of the employees, issues arising from the forthcoming takeover 
can be divided into two categories: takeover decisions that relate to the interests of the 
firm; and issues of direct concern to the shop-floor employees, especially with regard 
to how they will be treated in the restructured firm after the takeover. Workers are 
expected to have different levels of participation rights depending on the category the 
relevant issues fall under, and this is reflected in the German laws. 
 
Collecting employees’ opinions on the potential takeover is not a compulsory 
procedure in the German laws. Instead, if the works council members or employees 
(in the absence of a competent works council) of the target firm submit their reasoned 
statement commenting on the takeover offer to the management board, the 
management board must append this statement to its own as a vital basis for 
shareholders to make informed decisions. This legal arrangement facilitates the direct 
transmission of employees’ views to the shareholders who retain the decisive power 
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over takeover decisions. In addition to the statement of the supervisory board on the 
offer, this provides a channel for shop-floor employees’ views to be included in the 
takeover decisions. As a result, although the management board is not required to ask 
the works council for advice on takeovers, the workers are able to make their opinions 
heard under the German laws.  
 
In comparison, although the laws require the management in Chinese firms to consult 
with the workers on the forthcoming takeover, they are not obliged to convey the 
workers’ opinions to the shareholders, making these procedural requirements a mere 
formality. Although the managerial team are expected to make more informed 
decisions and suggestions to shareholders by considering the workers’ opinions on the 
takeover. However, the workers’ views need to be heard by the shareholder assembly 
in order to make informed takeover decisions. The workers’ involvement can be 
enabled by introducing rules similar to the German system. A well-reasoned statement 
by the workers, commenting on the takeover, can similarly be appended to the 
statement of the BoD, which is required by the CSRC and deemed to be the basis for 
the shareholders’ decision-making process. However, since Chinese firms do not have 
works councils, it is necessary to explore how this statement can be made. Following 
the directions provided in Section 5.2.1, the trade union committee should be the organ 
that issues the statement on behalf of the employees. However, due to concerns about 
the effectiveness of the committee in safeguarding the workers’ interests, the statement 
should be required to reflect the workers’ opinions. Accordingly, these opinions should 
be collected during meetings of the Workers’ Congress, which are organised by the 
trade union committee to provide information about the takeover to the employees. 
 
German law does not include any rules regarding issues of direct concern to workers, 
specifically in the context of takeovers. However, as summarised in Section 5.1, works 
councils have co-determination rights covering a broad range of issues touching on the 
treatment of workers, such as job cuts, job transfers, and changes in working hours. 
Therefore, the new employer should be mindful of industrial relations while 




It should be noted that while Chinese workers do not enjoy a similar level of protection, 
introducing the co-determination rights of works councils as a matter of general 
practice to Chinese firms is not realistic as it would require a systemic change in the 
Chinese corporate structure. However, this thesis argues that workers should be 
endowed with co-determination rights for takeover scenarios only and that this is a 
feasible package of reform. Since it would not be appropriate to directly introduce the 
German system, the rules for the workers’ co-determination rights can be found in 
China’s own legal system. To be specific, the Workers’ Congress should have rights 
to deliberate upon and approve plans for the treatment of employees in takeover 
situations, including the new employer’s detailed plan on issues such as job cuts, job 
transfers, and their corresponding compensations.  
 
This plan arises from the context of the SOE reforms, by which workers with 
“guaranteed lifetime employment in state enterprises”677 were changed to employees 
by contract. In the old planned economy, workers in state enterprises were provided 
with various employment-related benefits, such as pensions and healthcare allowances, 
to cover their needs “from cradle to grave”.678 During the SOE reform, workers were 
confronted with a substantial reduction in welfare benefits and a huge number of 
workers were laid off, which intensified the workers’ conflicts with the party-state. 
Therefore, to alleviate these conflicts during the transition period, the worker treatment 
plan was suggested, especially in private investors’ takeovers of SOEs.679 This plan is 
generally divided into two parts. The first part includes details of the workers who will 
be laid off, whose job positions will change, or who are awaiting reassignment within 
the enterprise, while the second part is mainly about how workers are compensated 
and the measures that are undertaken to help lay-offs find re-employment. Similarly, 
in takeovers of private firms, workers are vulnerable to unfair treatment. As analysed 
in Chapter 2, safeguarding workers’ interests has a positive effect on the productivity 
rate and, accordingly, the firm’s value. Therefore, workers in private firms should be 
given similar co-determination rights as their counterparts in SOEs. It should be noted 
that this rule can fit well into the current legal system in China. For instance, while 
 
677 BBC News (n 316). 
678 C.J. Finer, Social Policy Reform in China: Views from Home and Abroad (Routledge-2003) 1  
679 Article 14 of Democratic Management Provisions. 
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formulating or amending rules or making decisions on issues directly related to the 
interests of employees, employers are currently under a legal duty to discuss these 
issues with employees in meetings of the Workers’ Congress on an equal basis.680 This 
rule lays the procedural foundation for the new employer to negotiate the plan for 
employee treatment in takeover situations, especially considering this plan can be 
interpreted as covering issues of direct concern to the workers. In addition, a change 
in the investors does not affect the fulfilment of the employment contracts. This helps 
incumbent employees to proceed through the transition period until the completion of 
the takeover, in preparation for meetings of the Workers’ Congress to negotiate the 
employee treatment rules while restructuring of the firm. On the condition that a plan 
is agreed to by the new employer and the Workers’ Congress, as suggested in this 
thesis, the management of the acquired company should be required to report a series 
of issues, including the treatment of the employees, on a quarterly basis within one 
year after the completion of takeover. This rule can be used to persuade the new 




This section provided an overview of channels through which workers’ can be 
informed of forthcoming takeovers and participate in the takeover decision-making 
process at the establishment level. This mechanism is suggested by drawing lessons 
from the German co-determination mechanism, which is adapted into Chinese current 
legal system.  
 
The trade union committee would be the core institution in the suggested scheme 
because of four factors. First, it is entitled to information and documentation at the 
early stage of a potential takeover, on the behalf of the workers. Second, this institution 
can arrange meetings of the Workers’ Congress for shop-floor workers to gain 
information, express their views on the takeover, and deliberate upon and approve the 
plan for the future treatment of employees. Third, the committee is responsible for 
 
680 Article 4 of the Labour Contract Law of PRC. 
681 Article 72 of Takeover Measures. 
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collecting workers’ views on the takeover and issuing the workers’ statement, which 
should be appended to that of the BoD. Fourth, as the institution committed to 
representing workers’ interests and towards working in the firm’s best interests, it is 
expected that this structure would alleviate any conflicts that emerge between 
employers and the employees.  
 
Therefore, the trade union committee plays a crucial role in protecting workers’ 
information and participation rights and should be supervised by the party-state; i.e. t. 
the trade union and relevant government bodies such as the departments of human 
resources and social security at the upper level. To improve its effectiveness, trade 
union members and employees should be required to report any violation of the trade 
union’s obligations to these supervisory bodies.  
 
6.4 The Feasibility of the Suggested Mechanism  
 
Based on the theory of legal transplantation, the introduced German mechanism is 
likely to not be feasible in the Chinese context. Accordingly, this section examines the 
level of feasibility of the suggested mechanism in the Chinese context. In general, there 
are six obstacles working against the German system being adapted to the Chinese 
corporate structure in hostile takeovers. Three of them can be addressed by the 
modifications to the German scheme. On the other hand, resistance still exists, based 
on the economic and cultural considerations.  
 
6.4.1 Three Major Challenges that Can Be Addressed 
 
The first is the difference between organisational structures at the board and 
establishment levels. It is difficult to find institutions in Chinese firms that can be 
expected to function the same way as their German counterparts. There are two 
possible solutions to overcome this challenge, the first of which is to introduce the 
entire German structure of corporate governance into Chinese firms. This solution is 
too ambitious at this stage, especially considering the historic background of the 
Chinese corporate governance system and the party-state’s leadership. In addition, it 
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goes way beyond the scope of this research project. Accordingly, a second and 
comparatively advisable solution is to provide workers with co-determination rights 
without a dramatic change in the role and function of the institutions currently present 
in Chinese firms.  
 
The second challenge arises from an analysis of the selected institution that would be 
able to perform the required functions. At the board level, the BoS is considered as the 
counterpart of the German supervisory board, but its role during takeovers has not been 
specified in Chinese laws. Therefore, directions are provided in this thesis to define 
the role of the BoS and improve workers’ involvement in the takeover decision-making 
process. At the establishment level, the trade union committee has been chosen as the 
counterpart of the finance committee or works council in the German system for the 
purpose of this thesis. Unlike those in western countries, trade unions in Chinese firms 
are internal to the firms, albeit with the external support of the party-state. Since it 
endeavours to work towards the interests of the firm, which is similar to the role of the 
works council in Germany, this thesis argues that the trade union committee would be 
the appropriate organ for the exercise of the responsibilities of the works council. 
 
The third challenge comes from the systemic deficits in the Chinese firms’ worker 
treatment methods. Throughout Chinese history, the extent to which workers have 
been involved in corporate decisions has depended on the needs of the party-state. 
Therefore, the party-state can either be the powerful driving force behind adapting the 
German system in China or the resistant force behind the introduction of this system. 
However, as argued in Chapter 5, the introduction of German co-determination is 
compatible with the party-state’s needs for economic development and a more 
innovative economy. Therefore, it is submitted that the party-state would indeed be 
willing to adopt and promote the enforcement of the suggested mechanism because it 
would realise that this mechanism would align with the party-state’s interests. Detailed 
rules would need to be provided to restrict the party-state’ discretionary behaviours on 




6.4.2 Possible Resistance from Chinese Environment  
 
By overcoming these challenges, the German codetermination mechanism can be 
adapted to the Chinese corporate structure. However, enforcing this scheme may cause 
two major concerns to arise. 
 
This first is the negative impact of the labour co-determination mechanism on the 
takeover process. Workers’ deeper involvement in takeover decisions may lower the 
attractiveness of target firms from the perspective of corporate raiders and raise the 
difficulty of finalising a takeover due to the workers’ resistance to the takeover. This 
is a plausible concern, especially considering that hostile takeovers are rare in 
Germany. 682  However, the difficulty in executing hostile takeovers in Germany 
principally arises from the existence of cross-shareholdings and the two-tier board 
structure, which make it difficult for an acquirer to effectively exert any control.683 It 
should be noted that these circumstances are not observed in China since the cross-
shareholding structure remains at an early stage of development and the boards are less 
powerful than their German counterparts. As such, the same obstacles to a hostile 
takeover that are encountered in Germany do not exist in China. Even in Germany, 
hostile takeovers have been more frequently observed in recent years.684 Accordingly, 
the introduction of the German co-determination system is not expected to slow down 
the rising trend of hostile takeovers in China. Additionally, the positive economic 
impacts of employee involvement in the hostile takeover process would also 
compensate for any issues that may arise. As analysed in Chapter 2, a moderate degree 
of co-decision making with workers would positively affect a firm’s performance. In 
the context of takeovers, employee engagement is expected to develop positive beliefs 
 
682 “2016 Mergers and Acquisitions Reports: Germany” (2016) International Financial Law Review, available at 
https://www.iflr.com/Article/3540080/2016-Mergers-and-Acquisitions-Report-Germany.html?ArticleId=3540080. 
683 J. Koke, “The Market for Corporate Control in Germany: Causes and Consequences of Changes in Ultimate Share 
Ownership” (2000) Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), available  
at https://www.cass.city.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/65622/CPW1.pdf. 




and attitudes,685 which, in turn, is expected to increase shareholder returns, particularly 
in terms of monetary benefits.686  
 
The second concern is whether the suggested Chinese mechanism can function in a 
similar way to its German counterpart. The steps involved in the enforcement of the 
co-determination system may be different from the German mechanism due to the 
prevalence of guanxi relationships and the paternalistic style of leadership in corporate 
governance. The guanxi relationships would be complementary to the legally 
mandated process as the employee involvement mechanism would provide a platform 
for the employee representatives, managers, and shareholders to develop sound 
interpersonal relationships. Since it is based on mutual trust and benefits, workers’ 
compliance with firm regulations and policies as well as their managers’ orders would 
enable managers to safeguard the employees’ interests during the takeover decision-
making process. Due to the paternalistic leadership style prevalent in China, 
developing a channel for workers’ communication with members on the BoD would 
facilitate a change in the leadership style, from being authoritarian to being benevolent 
or moral, which would positively affect the employees’ performance. As identified by 
scholars, there are three dimensions to a paternalistic leadership style: authoritarianism, 
benevolence, and morality. These three dimensions are defined as follows:687 
 
Authoritarianism refers to leadership behaviours that assert authority and 
control and demand unquestioning obedience from subordinates. Under 
authoritarian leadership, subordinates comply and abide by leaders’ requests 
without dissent. Benevolence refers to leadership behaviours that demonstrate 
individualized, holistic concern for subordinates’ personal and family well-
being. In return, subordinates feel grateful and obliged to repay when the 
situation allows. The third dimension, morality, depicts leader behaviours that 
demonstrate superior personal virtues (e.g., does not abuse authority for 
 
685 A.M. Konard, “Engaging Employees through High-Involvement Work Practices” (2006) 70 Ivey Business Journal 
1. 
686 H. Liang, L. Renneboog and C. Vansteenkiste, “Corporate Employee-Engagement and Merger Outcomes” (2017) 
CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2017-011, available  
at https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6236&context=lkcsb_research. 
687 E.K. Pellegrini and T.A. Scandura, “Paternalistic Leadership: A Review and Agenda for Future Research” (2008) 
34 Journal of Management 566. 
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personal gain, acts as an exemplar in personal and work conduct), which lead 
subordinates to respect and identify with the leader. 
 
Chinese managers are believed to follow an authoritarian leadership style.688 The co-
determination mechanism, which would allow workers to express their views to the 
BoD members, would enable the latter to tackle these concerns on behalf of their 
subordinates, facilitating a shift from authoritarianism to benevolence. In addition, 
frequent communications between the employee representatives and BoD members 
would perform a supervisory function, ensuring that the superiors behave themselves 
and act as role models for workers. This would facilitate a shift towards a morality-
based leadership style. Empirical studies have showed that these changes positively 
affect workers’ performance.689  
 
The third concern arises from the enforcement mechanism: do employees have legal 
remedies if their involvement rights in the context of hostile takeovers are violated? In 
Germany, the works council is the key organ to safeguard worker participation rights. 
Specifically, if employee representatives are not elected legally or workers are treated 
unfairly after the completion of a takeover, the workers’ council have the right to bring 
lawsuits on behalf of workers. However, Chinese firms do not have similar organ with 
the capacity to commence lawsuits on behalf of workers. Instead, workers can only 
refer to legal remedies individually if experiencing adverse treatments during the 
process of takeovers.690 Considering the imbalance of powers between the employer 
and the individual employee and the prevalence of paternalistic leadership style in 
Chinese firms, the Chinese workers need a counterpart of the German works council 
to collect workers’ claims and sue in the court of law. To begin with, the Workers’ 
Congress cannot be endowed with this right because the Workers’ Congress is 
perceived as an internal institution of the company and, thus, does not have the 
independent role to initiate a lawsuit.691 Therefore, the trade union is the only proper 
 
688 M.W. Peng, Y. Lu, O. Shenkar and D.Y.L. Wang, “Treasures in the China House: A Review of Management and 
Organizational Research on Greater China” (2001) 52 Journal of Business Research 95. 
689 X.P. Chen, M.B. Eberly, T.J. Chiang, J. Farh, and B. Cheng, “Affective Trust in Chinese Leaders: Linking Paternalistic 
Leadership to Employee Performance” (2014) 40 Journal of Management 796. 
690 Article 77 of the Labour Contract Law of PRC. 
691 Article 48 of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国民事诉讼法) (2017). 
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organ to bring lawsuits on behalf of workers. In theory, it has the right to take legal 
actions for the benefit of workers, but the scope of this right is limited. A lawsuit can 
only be raised when the trade union finds that there is a violation of collective 
employment contracts.692  This is reasonable as the trade union is responsible for 
negotiating terms and conditions of the collective employment contracts.693 Based on 
the same ideology, if the trade union is given the responsibility to safeguard employee 
involvement rights in the context of hostile takeover, as suggested in this chapter, it is 
reasonable to endow the trade union with the right to take legal actions. However, as 
examined in section 3.3, the trade union itself has certain systemic deficiencies in 
safeguarding worker interests. In this regard, if worker involvement rights are 
infringed on by the trade union, no effective channel for employees seek remedies will 
be available. A possible solution is to establish the channel for the government, such 
as HRSS, to be involved in resolving these disputes. In fact, the government has 
traditionally acted as the mediator in the conflict between the employer and 
employees.694 The mediation role of the government arises from the context of grand 
mediation, which refers to the dispute resolution that “relies on mediation but links 
various social and governmental resources together aiming at resolving conflict more 
effectively”.695 It is perceived as complementary to the instable judicial system and 
inadequate legal remedies for workers. However, different from legal actions 
characterised by transparency, predictability, and certainty, the administrative 
involvement in conflicts between an employer and employees is under the discretion 
of the government. Therefore, whether the grand mediation can effectively safeguard 




This section examines the whether the German co-determination mechanism can be 
acceptable to Chinese firms in the context of hostile takeovers. In general, although 
 
692 Article 20 of the Trade Union Law of PRC. 
693 Article 6 of the Labour Contract Law of PRC. 
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the corporate structure and economic system of Chinese firms are different from those 
of German ones, the German employee participation mechanism does not conflict with 
the Chinese context. However, due to the divergence of backgrounds between China 
and Germany, there are admittedly certain obstacles for the co-determination 
mechanism to be adapted to the Chinese context. The problems caused by differences 
incorporate structures can be addressed by certain adjustments of role and functions of 
the Chinese corporate organs. In addition, the party-state retains its say over the extent 
to which employees are safeguarded in the context of hostile takeovers. Meanwhile, 
there are certain factors that may lead to the infeasibility of the suggested system in 
Chinese firms, which includes the firm’s economic considerations, the paternalistic 
leadership style, and a lack of enforcement mechanism. These problems can hardly be 
resolved immediately after the introduction of the suggested system. However, with 
further implementation of the co-determination scheme in the Chinese style, 
employers are expected to become aware of the positive impacts of the promotion of 
workers’ interests on firm value and firm management then tends to communicate 
more with employees. For the enforcement system, the trade union should be given 
the power to bring lawsuits to the court and government mediation can be deemed as 
a complementary to this type of legal remedy. Its effectiveness needs to be further 







1. Overview of Research Findings 
 
The thesis has suggested adapting the German co-determination scheme to the context 
of Chinese firms, to improve workers’ involvement in hostile takeovers. Based on the 





The first part, which includes Chapters 1 and 2, answers the question, “Why should 
employees’ opinions be valued in the context of hostile takeovers?” Through use of a 
theoretical analysis, the thesis suggests that workers are vulnerable to a variety of 
adverse treatments, particularly in this context. This vulnerability arises in particular 
from post-takeover operational restructuring by new management. One explanation of 
this restructuring involves the market for corporate control, whereby corporate raiders 
tend to acquire underperforming firms and improve their performance levels following 
completion of takeovers. One of the most effective ways to do this is to cut labour 
costs; by definition, this includes measures such as mass redundancies, job cuts, and 
job transfers. The mindset of the new management, in leaving employees in an inferior 
position, arises out of the ideology of shareholder primacy, which prioritises 
shareholders’ interests at the expense of those of other stakeholders. It should be noted 
that such adverse treatments of workers are less likely to emerge if the nature of the 
takeover is not hostile. In such a scenario, employees are perceived to have an implicit 
contract with the employer, expressive of a willingness in both parties to establish a 
long-term and stable employment relationship. The implicit employment contract, 
which aims to encourage workers’ specific investments, is sustained by the workers’ 
trust in the management. Accordingly, management turnover after takeovers breaks 
the workers’ implicit connections with their employer, which are fundamental in 




The other finding that supports a deeper involvement on the part of the worker is that 
the company also needs employee participation in the event of hostile takeovers, since 
this is positively correlated with firm value. Through its examination of empirical 
studies, the thesis finds that a moderate level of employee involvement positively 
affects job satisfaction amongst workers, job commitment, and, in turn, worker 
productivity and firm value. This positive correlation can be illustrated by two theories. 
First, due to the incompleteness of the contract between employer and employees, the 
extent to which both parties make relationship-specific investments cannot be 
contracted. Accordingly, in the context of hostile takeovers, in which they are 
confronted with unpredictability and uncertainty, workers tend to withhold their firm-
specific investments, in order to avoid being held up by their employer. Informing 
employees of the potential takeover and establishing channels by which they can 
express their opinions, alleviates this inclination amongst workers to withhold their 
investments in the employment contract. Second, inspired by agency theory, the 
relationship between employer and employees constitutes an agency relationship. The 
employee’s involvement mechanism plays a monitoring role in curtailing managerial 
behaviours that infringe on workers’ interests. This mechanism is also compatible with 
shareholders’ interests. By recognising the employee advantage of owning ‘inside 
information’ regarding how the company is managed, workers’ voices, in being heard 
by shareholders, can curtail managerial rent-seeking behaviours which are known to 
jeopardise shareholder interests. It should be noted that taking employees’ interests 
into consideration is not supported by the corporate governance ideology of 
shareholder primacy. However, some comparatively stakeholder-oriented models, 
such as enlightened shareholder value, team production theory, and stakeholder theory, 




This part, which mainly comprises Chapter 3, addresses the research question, “What 
are the reasons for the problems in employee protection in the context of hostile 
takeovers in China?” This part begins by using the theoretical analysis to examine the 
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ideology of corporate governance in Chinese firms. It suggests that Chinese firms have 
adopted the model of shareholder primacy, which prioritises the interests of 
shareholders, to the exclusion of others. At the institutional level, the doctrinal 
methodology is employed, to illustrate that worker representation mechanisms, as 
operational in trade unions and the Workers’ Congress internal to the firm, are far from 
effective. The most obvious reason for this is that Chinese law does not provide details 
on how this mechanism can be operated effectively. However, the core reason is that 
this mechanism is under the control of the party; thus, the extent to which workers’ 
interests are accommodated depends on party-state policy. Through employing path 
dependence theory to examine the history of this mechanism, the thesis finds that this 
mechanism was embedded in the old planned economy, which is incompatible with 
modern corporate structures. Therefore, in order to make the worker representation 
mechanism operational in an effective way, certain modifications are necessary; these 




This part, which includes Chapters 4, 5, and 6, is in response to the third research 
question, “How can the issues of labour protection be addressed in the context of 
hostile takeovers in China?” By using the methodology of a comparative study, this 
section suggests the resolving of the Chinese problem by transplanting the German co-
determination scheme into Chinese firms in the context of hostile takeovers. This 
approach is referred to as that of “legal transplants”. Due to the divergence between 
the domestic environments of China and Germany, whether it is possible to adapt the 
German mechanism to the Chinese context remains the major concern. This thesis, 
therefore, takes three steps to address the issue of the prudent transplantation of the 
German scheme. 
 
The first of these steps involves the justification of the introduction of the German co-
determination scheme. This thesis firstly provides three explanations for this choice. 
The first, and most obvious, of these is that German firms are renowned for their co-
determination mechanism, which endows employees with strong and effective 
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participation rights. Thus, it is equipped to effectively address the problem in Chinese 
firms. The second and third explanations are derived from using the VoC approach. 
The Chinese economy has a high level of similarity with the German economy in terms 
of methods of coordination between firms. However, Chinese firms follow a different 
approach to the treatment of workers, leading to institutional incoherence. This is 
incompatible with the demands of the Chinese economy for development and 
innovation. Given the similarities between the two economies, it would be 
institutionally coherent for the German co-determination mechanism to be readily 
operational in the context of the Chinese economy. Further, since it would benefit the 
economy, it would align with the interests of the party-state – the driving force behind 
such a transplant. 
 
The second of the steps is to identify the differences in organisational structures and 
ideologies underlying the worker representation mechanism, which are perceived as 
obstacles to transplantation. This thesis suggests that the differences lie at both the 
board level and the establishment level. With respect to employee representation at the 
board level, the BoS of Chinese firms are functionally similar to the supervisory boards 
of German firms. However, the former has comparatively limited power. At the 
establishment level, the Workers’ Congress in China can be deemed to be the 
counterpart of the works council in Germany. However, Chinese shop-floor workers 
do not have the co-decision rights that German workers do. This can be attributed to 
the different ideologies underlying the arrangements. While German firms value the 
spirit of democracy, mutuality, and equality, Chinese firms uphold a paternalistic 
leadership style, which requires subordinates to obey their leaders. In addition, given 
the dominance of the party-state over industrial relations, it is almost impossible to 
expect Chinese firms to voluntarily adopt the employee involvement mechanism.  
 
By recognising the differences between the two systems, this thesis suggests possible 
amendments in the effort to adapt the German system to the Chinese context. It should 
be noted that the supervisory board and works council are the key institutions that 
facilitate employee participation in takeover decision-making in Germany. In China, 
their counterparts are the BoS and the trade union committee, respectively. At the 
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board level, the BoS is required to play an active and crucial role in the takeover 
decision-making process. Since it is required that at least a third of the BoS consists of 
employee members, there is a channel for including workers’ opinions on takeover 
decisions. At the establishment level, it is expected that the opinions of shop-floor 
employees are valued. Their reasoned statements on the forthcoming takeover should 
be transferred to the shareholder assembly, the decisive organ during the takeover 
process. Issues of direct concern to employees, such as the new employer’s plans for 
job cuts, job transfers, or wage changes, should be approved by the workers through 
meetings of the Workers’ Congress. In light of the differences between the cultural 
and political contexts of Germany and China, Chinese firms are likely to display a 
pattern of worker-management coordination during the takeover decision-making 
process that differs from the pattern observed in German firms. However, the 
suggested mechanism could serve to improve workers’ involvement in hostile 
takeover decisions in China, to the benefit of employees, shareholders, and the firm as 
a whole. 
 
2. Contributions to Legal Scholarship 
 
The first contribution of this thesis is to draw attention to the employees’ claims in the 
context of hostile takeovers in China, which attracts few attentions from legal 
scholarship. As examined in section 1.3, hostile takeovers are referred to as the market 
for corporate control, which is the mechanism to discipline underperformed 
management. In this case, literatures on hostile takeovers mainly focuses on the 
relationship of incumbent shareholders and management of the target firm. In addition, 
as mentioned in section 1.1, hostile takeovers are perceived as the battlefield of 
incumbent management of target firm and corporate raiders, and therefore regulations 
on takeover defence tactics attract broad scholarship attention.696 However, as one of 
the most significant constituents of the firm, employees have significant stakes in the 
hostile takeover and its proceeding managerial turnover. Therefore, the thesis pays 
attention to employees in this context. By examining the workers’ vulnerability to 
adverse treatments and the positive impacts of workers’ involvement in the process of 
 
696 See Armour et al (n 24) and Armour and Skeel (n 25). 
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takeovers, the thesis highlights the significance of employees’ claims in the context of 
hostile takeovers.   
 
The second contribution is to put labour protection problems in China in the broader 
landscape of corporate governance. In doing so, this research is expected to provide a 
fresh perspective on the examination of problems relating to stakeholders and 
employees in the Chinese firms in particular as well as how they ought to be addressed. 
According to the incomplete contract theory, which is introduced in introductory 
paragraph of Chapter 2, in addition to the contractual connection, due to workers’ 
human capital in the firm, they should be deemed as residual claimants, similar with 
shareholders. This makes workers’ interests closely connect with those of the firm, 
which is beyond the mere employment relationship. Therefore, employees, as the 
stakeholder of the company, should play a role in major decision-making (including 
decisions in hostile takeovers), since their interests connect closely with the firm. In 
this regard, the thesis examines the major corporate governance models to provide 
theoretical foundation for workers’ involvement in corporate in section 2.1. Before to 
introduce the German mechanism to Chinese firms, its underlying ideology is 
examined, in order to clarify the extent to which employees should be involved in 
hostile takeovers.  
 
The third contribution is to examine firm’s treatments on workers from the 
macroeconomic perspective, which is mainly presented in Chapter 4. Although the 
approach of varieties of capitalism has highlighted the importance of firms’ ways of 
coordination with workers in national economies and their capability to innovate, few 
researches ever attempt to explore the employee protection problem in this broad 
context. However, in the context of China, the party-state has strong demands for 
economic development and innovation. Hence if the workers’ deeper involvement in 
hostile takeovers cannot meet these demands, it cannot be feasible in China, 
considering that the party-state is the major driving force of law-making. By 
comparing the economic systems between China and Germany, the thesis originally 
identifies the institutional incoherence of the Chinese economic system, and further 
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argue that the introduction of the German ways of treatments on workers can meet 
with the party-state needs for innovation and economic development. 
 
The fourth contribution is to use the approach of “legal transplants” to resolve Chinese 
legal problems. It is admitted that China has a long history of legal transplantation, but 
considering the unique historical, cultural, political, and economic backgrounds of 
China, the importing of western rules is a challenge. The use of legal transplantation 
is controversial in scholarship. This is because as stated in Section 3.5, the law is 
embedded in its unique domestic environment, and therefore legal transplantation 
tends to be become a challenge if there is a significant divergence from the origin of 
rules. In order to address this resistance, this thesis sets out three principles for using 
legal transplants. First, the imported rules should be able to effectively solve problems 
in importing country. This thesis argues that the introduction of the German co-
determination mechanism to Chinese firms can effectively improve workers’ 
participation in decision making during the takeover process, which complies with this 
first principle. Second, the foreign rules should be attractive to the dominant force in 
the host country. As identified in Chapters 3 and 4, the party-state has a dominant role 
in the economy as well as in legislation. By arguing that German co-determination is 
coherent with China’s demands for economic development and innovation, the 
introduction of the German system is not expected to be resisted by the party-state. 
Third, the transplanted rules should be feasible in the local context. Accordingly, this 
thesis attempts to establish a Chinese worker representation system in takeover 
decision making based on the current institutional framework of Chinese firms. In 
addition, this thesis goes further to adapt the German scheme to the Chinese corporate 
structures by making certain amendments. Then, its feasibility in Chinese political, 
economic, and cultural contexts is tested in Section 6.4, in order to validate the legal 
transplantation. Admittedly, the company’s resistance, the paternalistic leadership 
style, and a lack of effective enforcement mechanism for workers, along with other 
unexpected factors that are unique to China may constitute the obstacle for this legal 
transplantation. However, it takes time to adapt foreign rules to the domestic context, 
as argued in section 6.4, the introduction of foreign rules can also exert influences on 
the domestic environment, making these rules more acceptable. In addition, based on 
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the implementation of the suggested rules, the party-state reserves the power to further 
modify these rules to improve their feasibility. 
 
3. Limitations: The Complexity and Unstable Chinese Contexts 
 
By using the approach of ‘legal transplants’, the thesis adapts the German co-
determination mechanism to Chinese firms in a prudent way. However, due to the 
unique complexity of the Chinese context, this thesis cannot exhaustively explore all 
potential influencing factors on levels of acceptance and the effectiveness of 
implementation of the introduced German system. Thus, although the thesis projects 
the feasibility of the suggested rules in the context of China based on observations, it 
cannot make the arbitrary argument that these rules will definitely be accepted by 
Chinese legislators and companies or that they will be effective in safeguarding 
employees’ interests. This is especially the case when the party-state has the decisive 
say over the direction of economic development, law-making, and the extent of worker 
protection. The administrative power is characterised as unpredictable and uncertain, 
and therefore the Chinese contexts are subject to change at any time, potentially 
rendering the observations on which this thesis makes its arguments invalid.  
 
4. Possible Future Directions: The Reform in a Broader 
Landscape 
 
The thesis focuses on workers’ claims in the context of takeovers. However, as argued 
in Chapter 4, German modes of coordination with employees are expected to positively 
impact the Chinese national economy. In light of this, the question may arise of 
whether it is feasible and beneficial for Chinese firms to adopt the German 
coordination mechanism wholesale. This could be expected to change the corporate 
governance models adopted by Chinese firms as well as industrial relations in China 
as a whole, in turn leading to the structural reform of Chinese corporate laws and even 
the entire economic system. Such legal transplantation requires further extensive and 
thorough examination of the German system’s feasibility in the Chinese context – a 
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